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It was only natural that adventurous and restle~s men in the 
United States during the 1850's and i8601 s would turn to northwestern 
MeJQ.co as the place to make reality their dreams of easy conquest. 
Arrericans, along with Frenchmen in California, believed that "natural 
law" dictated their superiority over lowly Mexicans, and thus that a 
more enlightened race naturally should come to dominate the lesser 
people of that region. Further, it was natural that filibusters would 
inve,de northwestern Mexico because that region was yet a frontier, and 
the frontier had always been a source of inspiration for those aspiring . 
to a new start and new adventures. Moreover, Mexico was a land of 
fascinating appeal: it was foreign, with a lt;mgUage strange to the 
Anglo and Saxon tongue; it was distant, almo~t a shimmering mirage; 
and it was badly governed by its ruling officials, tom by endless 
revolution, and subject to tyrannical dictators. Thus invasion of this 
territory carried with it a taste of flavorful adventure, a sense of 
lifting oppression from tne shoulders of an inferior people, and a hope 
of quick wealth. 
This same region also appealed to adventurers for its long history 
of making impossible dreams come true. Hem'1 Cortlz had conquered ·~he 
Aztec;: empire, thereby gaining a title of nobility and uncountable 
wealth. Imperious Spanish hidalgos had used Indian labor to found 
agricultural and pastoral empires. Pearls were known to come .from the 
Gulf of C~ifornia, while lost gold and silver mines reportedly 
iii 
abounded in the region. Yet, this was a land of almost irresistible 
lure, and the breadth of its incredible possibilities had been widely 
revealed betweip; 1800 and 1848. Men seeking a new beginning, men dis-
credited in more settled parts of the world, and men driven by 
ambition and ego had rushed to the region during these five decades; 
there they had conspired and consorted together in a land containing 
.... 
wil~ deserts, raging rivers, and towering mountains to plot such 
diverse schemes as a refuge for Napoleon after his downfall, a haven 
for pirates, and the site of several republics, even an empire or two. 
During this same era the United States was expanding rapidly. 
The Louisiana Territory was purchased from France in 1803 and Florida 
from Spain in 1B19. Then in 1845 came the annexation of Texas, to be 
followed the next year by the Oregon settlement with England. And in 
1B48, at the end of the war with Mexico, the nation despoiled Mexico of 
one-third of its domain. Thus in less than five decades, by piecemeal 
expansion, the Umited States had extended its boundaries from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. Not unexpectedly, some Americans 
dreamed of further conquests, either for annexation to the United 
States or, more ambitiously, for starting new republics. 
Such dreams may have seemed insanity to the mass of Americans, 
but only a few stout-hearted believers were all that were required to 
turn seemingly impossible dreams into reality. Had Sam Houston not 
carved the Republic of Texas from Mexico's little-populated north-
eastern province with fewer than a thousand men? And had John Charles 
Fre'mont 'With even fewer followers not conquered California under the 
banner of the Bear Flag Republic? Anything seemed possible on Mexico's 
northwestern frontier. 
iv 
Making the region even more attractive in the fifteen years after 
1848 was the hope of easy wealth. Spanish missionaries reportedly had 
discovered rich mines whose locations had been lost or suppressed. 
These legends, and they were nurrerous, gained credence with the Cali-
fornia gold rush of 1849, for it seerred only logical that the mountains 
containing gold in California likewise would contain precious metals as 
they extended into Sonora. 
The decade and a half following the end of the war between the 
United States and Mexico saw six men making major attempts to wrest 
this territory (mainly Sonora and Baja California) away from its owner. 
These six men--Joseph c. Morehead, Charles Pindray, Gaston de Raousset 
Boulbon, William Walker, Henry A. Crabb, and William Gwin--all came to 
the region ostensibly as colonizers, but in reality they saw themselves 
as presidents, sultans, or dukes creating new republics, dukedoms, or 
fiefs. Four of the rren were from the Anerican South, while the other 
two were natives of France. Both Southerners and Frenchmen of this 
era were noted more for their romantic and quixotic visions than for 
any grasp of hard realityo All were men who in one way or another had 
failed to win the fortune, high political office, and fane that they 
had sought through the usual channels and so turned to visions of them-
selves as rulers by self-proclamation and strength of anns rather than 
by election. 
In short, the six men encompassed by this study were motivated 
more by personal ambition than by ideology, more by a sense of ad-
venture than by philosophy, more by hope of quick wealth than by 
idealism. Yet they also were intensely interesting men, for they did 
not lead ordinary lives. They performed at the outer edge of hum&n 
v 
imag!nation, and as such have a fascination beyond their own lifetimes. 
Had they read the poet Robert Browning, they doubtless would not have 
agreed with him that "A man's reach should exceed his grasp •• ,, " That 
they failed is a measure of the magnitude of their grasp. 
In ~aking this study I have incurred nwnerous debts, which I 
here inadequately acknowledge. For the original idea, for constant 
encouragement, and for immeasurable guidance, I am indebted to Professor 
Odie B. Faulk of Oklahoma State University. I am also greatly indebted 
to Professors Homer L. Knight, H. James Henderson, Charles Dollar, and 
Clifford A. L. Rich of the same institution. To the archivists and 
librarians at Oklahoma State University, University of California at 
Berkeley, and the Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, I owe a special 
debt for making available many documents. Finally, had it not been for 
the tireless support of my wife, I could never have completed this 
study. 
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As darkness descended on the Mexican pueblo of Querltaro on May 
25, 1S48, fireworks exploded and flashed brilliantly against the 
blackened skies' while in the plaza gaily frocked senoritas danced to 
fiesta music. Peace at last had come between the United States and: 
Mexico, and it was only proper for the people to project a mood of 
ecstacy at their future prospects now that the Mexican House of 
Deputies had accepted the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. After suffering 
interminably over dusty Mexican roads, Nathan H. Clifford, the Attorney 
General of the United States, and Ambrose H. Sevier, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arrived at the small town late in 
. ~ 
the day to be greeted by Luis de la Rosa, the Mexican Secretary of 
State and Relations. In a specially prepared building, the Mexicanp 
received the AII¥3rican diplomats and hosted a dinner. Careful planning 
and stiff, formal politeness permeated the placid atmosphere. Five 
days later ratifications of the treaty were exchanged after both 
nations had agreed to its terms.1 Unfortunately, a treaty exchanging 
territory seldom satisfies all participants, and this agreement was. no 
exception. Many Mexicans disliked the final settlements, but were 
1A.mbrose H. Sevier and Nathan Clifford to James Buchanan, 
Queretaro, May 25, 1$48, House ~· Doc. 2.Q, 30th Cong., 2nd sess.:, 
Serial 541, PP• 74-76. , 
1 
unwilling to provoke another war. However, in the United States IIl8IlY 
men were willing to break international law for self aggrandizement• 
Inured to the boisterous, turbulent conditions on the frontier~ 
f 
those Americans who failed to find quick wealth in the gold fieids, i 
! 
sought prestige and riches by encouraging illegal . f:Uibustering exp+-
. r 




So~ Southerners in California may have been interested in acquisition 
I 
of territory for the expansion of slavery. Others merely wanted 
wealth and power, fancying themselves as future s\lltans or presidents 
of northern MeJd.co. 2 In the United States the sectional conflict 
over expansion of slavery influenced most legislation in Congress to 
a greater or lesser degree--Northerners long had denounced attempts to 
annex new territory as part of the Southern slaveocracy conspiracy. 
In Mexico conflict also existed, for although the war with the United 
States had begun with a degree of popular support and optimism, public 
opinion soon tu~ed to apathy and discontent. Mexican governments 
rose and fell with dazzling rapidityo Nevertheless, one constant 
existed in Mexico-intense dislike and di~trust of Americans. "Grin-
' 
gos" were hated or feared, and there were those who did not conceaµ 
their antipathy. In Querltarc;.,,.·wh$ti the Ame;ri¢an diplomats passed,_ 
people had energetically hurled rocks and insults. Mexico had lost 
nearly half of its sovereign territory by the terms of the Trea·ty qf 
'' 
Guadalupe Hidalgo...,.-a humiliating experience for the patriotic and 1 .1 
~); 
l 
proud Mexican. I 
f 
Complicating the politics of Mexico was the centralist-federa.Jfist 
\.his idea is proposed in John Hope Franklin, 
(Cambridge, 1956), P• 117. 
I 
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conflict which began anew during this period. The Catholic Church and 
the Army, along with other traditional oligarchs, supported the con-
servative centralists, while many eleirents, including social refonners, 
/ 
supported the liberal federalists. Late in 1848 General Josef Joaquin 
de He.rrera, a liberal, became president, but reconstruction, lack of 
credit, and racial war in Yucatan precluded any possibility of reform. 
In 1851 General Mariano Arista, also a liberal, assumed the presidency 
through one of the few peaceful elections the country had ever ex-
perienced. Attempts to establish a stable economy led to Arista's 
removal in 1853. 3 With the liberals out of office, the stage once 
again was set for the final act of one of Mexico's most infamous 
villains, Antonio L6pe z de Santa Anna. 
Santa Anna was born :in 1796 at ,Jalapa, and grew to maturity with 
an admiration for military pomp. This led to his service in the 
Spanish Army where he gained invaluable experience, and then to his 
..,. 
leading a revolt in 1822 against Augm~tin de Iturbide, self-made 
emperor of Mexico immediately after independence had been won from 
Spain. In 1833 Santa Anna beca.rre president, serv:ing until 1836 when he 
led an expedition to crush the Texas revolt. Captured and forced to 
recognize the independence of the Lone Star State, he fell from fav0r, 
and, for a time, was only indirectly involved in politics. He was 
a man of little administrative ability as well as vindictive, vacil~ 
lating, and vague character. Unfortunately, he regained national 
influence during the Pastry War with Frar;ce :in 1838 when he led a 
\-umerous works are available. See, Wilfrid H. Callcott, 
Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, 1931). See also, Daniel 
Cosio Villegas, Historia Moderna ~ Mexicc'' ~ La R.epublica Restaurada, 
7 vols. (Mexico City, 1955-1965). 
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successful expedition to drive the intruders from Mexico. In this 
"heroic" campaign Santa Anna lost a leg, becoming an instant hero with 
the MeJO.can people. Although he controlled the government again in 
1841-44, his old faults soon surfaced, and he was overthrown and exiled 
again. 
During the war with the United States, Santa Anna reappeared and 
was made provisional president and commander of the army; yet he double 
crossed the Arrericans, who had made it possible for him to regain 
power by aiding in his return to Mexico. As commander he led the 
Mexican forces in the battles of Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and Mexico 
City. When Mexico lost the war, he faced exile again in l.848, but 
again was recalled as dictator from 1853 to 1855. Santa Anna's last 
presidency was brazen deception-a rule of tyranny, corruption, and 
extravagance. Badly needing money to keep his tottering regirre in 
power, he sold additional territory to the United States by the terms 
of the Gadsden Purchase agreement. As a result he was exiled finally 
in 1855. Then an angry mob exhumed his leg, which had been buried with 
full military honors in 1838, and dragged it through the streets of 
Mexico City. Throughout his twenty-five years in Mexican politics, 
Santa Anna supported the wealthy, the army, and the Church-yet he 
died ignominiously and in poverty after being allowed to return to 
Mexico City in 1874.4 Yet Mexico permanently would bear the scars of 
his rule, while the filibustering activities of the 1850's were largely 
a result of his misrule of the country. 
~ I I 
-1Jiccionario Porrua de Historia, Biografia l. Geografia ~ Mexico, 
2nd. {Mexico City, 1964). See also, Ann F. Crawford, ed., The Eagle: 
The Autobiograph;y of Santa~ (Austin, 1967). · 
The advent of Santa Anna's presidency in 1853 served the United 
States well. This nation wanted 45,000 square miles in the Mesilla 
Valley, now a part of Arizona and New Mexico, in order to construct a 
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railroad across it and to define the international boundary then under 
dispute. Santa Anna sold this territory in 1853 for $10,000,000--only 
enough to finance his regime's two !'inal years. From 1855 to 1876 
Mexico suffered twenty-one years of civil strife, during which the 
liberals limited the traditional privileges of conservatives and Church, 
and inaugurated a new economic and social course. 
This l;l..beral moverent, called "la refonna," began in the southern 
/ 
mountains under the leadership of an illiterate Indian, Juan Alvarez. 
He became the first effective liberal military leader. Even before 
the fall o.f Santa Anna in 1S55, Ignacio Comonfort and his moderate 
followers reinforced the liberal ranks and announced the Plan de Ayuta 
in March, 1S54, calling for Santa Anna's ouster and for a new constitu-
tion. In November, 1S55, liberal forces occupied Mexico City without 
firing a i;ihot, and a provisional government was forrood with Juan 
I 
Alvarez as president and Benito ~Ju~rez as minister of justice and 
religion. 
/ ,Juarez was loved by his countrymen, and he was genu,i..11ely 1 r:rt.er-
ested in bettering their conditions. A full blooded Zapotec Indian, 
he was born in 1So6, near Oaxaca. When he was but three, he lost both 
his mother and father and went to live with an uncle. At twelve he 
journ~yed to Oaxaca and found employment in the home of a Franciscan 
lay brother. Jufrez' s education was sporadic, but good.. Briefly he 
studied for the priesthood, then attended a liberal iri.stitut.e in 
Oaxaca where he studied law. Later he entered practice, earning a 
substantial reputation by 1845. He served in the national congress 
while his country was at war with the United States, and was governor 
of his native state from 1847 to 1852. Finally, in 1855, he traveled 
to Acapulco and joined with Alvarez in the 11)8.rch on the capitol. 5 
6 
As minister of justice and religion Ju/rez issued the Ley Jua'rez, 
reducing the powers of military and ecclasiastical courts. Conserva-
/ 
tives launched an immediate protest, and a contused Alvarez resigned 
in December, leaving the presidency to Ignacio Comonfort. The new 
leader soon alienated Jua'rez and other liberals. The Ley Lerdo of 
1856 further limited the power of the clergy, but did not redistribute 
lands as the peasants wanted. The failure of this law to satisfy the 
desi,res of the people set the stage for the writing in 1857 of one of 
Mexico's best constitutions. It was a liberal document, reaffirming 
the principle of federalism while giving near dictorial powers to 
congress. Conservatives loudly denounced this constitution, whereupon 
Comonfort resigned. Ju(rez assured the presidency on December 1, 1857, 
and again conservatives, led by Fllix Zuloaga, rebelled. Zu1oaga pro..; 
claimed himself president on January 11, 1858, thereby giving Mexico 
two presidents. A three-year war of ;reform raged between the two 
presidential aspirants, with Ju/rez ·occupying Vera Cruz and Zµloaga 
remaining in Mexico City. On April B, 1859, the United States recog-. 
nized Jua'rez's government, guaranteeing the ult;l.mate defeat of the 
conservatives. Julrez was reelected president, and he remained iii 
offi~e until the French drove him out early in 1862. 
While the central government was in this state of nux that 
5Ralph Roader, Ju,rez ~ fil:! Mexico, 2 vols. (New York, 1947). 
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approached anarchy between 1848 and 1862, the frontier areas bordering 
the United States reflected the same unstable conditions. The region 
was almost totally unprotected because here also the liberals and 
conservatives were struggling for positions of power. During the war 
with the United States, the Indians had decimated the Mexican frontier 
and made most of the area unsafe. Apache Indians from both sides of 
the border raided almost at will in Sonora, destroying settlements and 
6 attacking even the larger towns. In February of 1848 the central 
government passed a war tax to finance protection for then exposed 
states. Yet even after this attempt Apache raids intensified. for 
example, in less than two weeks in January, 1849, eighty-six people 
were massacred in Sonora alone. Authorities tried to negotiate a 
cease fire, but were so unsuccessful that a mass e~gration of settlers 
from Sonora occurred.7 
Nevertheless, punitive expeditions accomplished very little. 
And at this critical time the frontier states were further denuded of 
population as Mexicans joined the gold rush to California. Settlers 
and troops alike deserted the area despite governmental colonization 
attempts. In 1848, five military colonies were planned for Sonora, but 
the national government proved so unstable that by 1850 only one, that 
at Fronteras, was established. The total troops available to defend 
Sonora numbered only 5'Zl men-hardly enough to patrol such a great 
6For conditions on the frontier see, rly ill!.. California, 1850-
1860, and the wew York Daily Tines, 1851-1 · O. . 
7Joseph F. Park, "The Apaches in Mexican-American Relations, 
1848-1861: A Footnote to the Gadsden Treaty," Arizona and the West, 
III (Summer, 1961), P• 136. See also, Robert c. Stevens;-i1Tiie Apache 
Menace in Sonora, 1831-1849," Arizona and the ~' VI (Autumn, 1964), 
PP• 21.1-222. . 
expanse of desert and mountains. When the state tried to ease the 
pressure on this limited force by s"Uggesting a plan to colonize 
foreigners in this frcmtier area to fight the Indians, the central 
s government would not support the move. 
This national struggle between conservatives and liberals was 
reflected, perhaps even more intensely, at the state level. Manuel 
/ 
Maria Gandara, a conservative, was governor of ·sonora in 1S4S, but 
discontent was so ripe that in March that year a plot to kidnap and 
dispose of him was considered by his enemies. 
y .1 
However, Jose Maria 
Redondo received enough votes in May to become substitute governor. 
s 
Gandara, who rema:i,ned a strong force in Sonoran politics in the 1850' s, 
was born in 1801 in northern Mexico and began his :political career in 
1829, rising to the position of Constitutional Governor of the De-
partment of Sonora in 1837. For the next four decades he would fight 
for control of the area. In 1841 Gandara supported Santa Anna, for 
which he received the Order of Guadalupe, and in 1851 he joined the 
revolt against Mariano Arista. By 1855 he assumed the military and 
political control of the state of Sonora. During this year his chief 
rival was Ignacio Pel;!queira, who eventually fled to Arizona, but par-
ticipated in Mexican politics un~il his death at Hermosillo in 1878, 9 
In elections late in 1848 Jos~ Aguilar was chosen governor, a 
8Hubert Howe Bancroft, History: of . the North Mexican States ~ 
Texas, II (San Francisco, California, 1886). See also, Wigberto 
Jimenez Morenp and Kieran McCarty, OFM. (compliers) Archiv0 Hist0rico 
del Estado ~ Sonora (Hermosillo: Biblioteca de la Universidad de 
Sonora, · N. · D.) , micro-copy in Arizona Pioneer's Historical Society, 
Tucson, Arizona. 
9Francisco Almada, Diccionario de Historia, Geograffa, y: Bi0grafia 
Sonorenses. (Chihuahua City, 1952), pp.' 28S:294; 
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position he held until October, 1851. Aguilar lost control of the 
military when Colonel Jost M. Carrasco-a capable, brave, and enter-
prising man--was appointed to command troops in the area. Carrasco, 
allegedly a superior soldier, may have been able to stabilize frontier 
conditions, but he died six months later of cholera. 
Significantly, it was not until the threat of American filibuster-
ing became serious that the central government provided troops and 
supplies for the frontier. In 1853 General Santa Anna and his con-
servative supporters overthrew the government and established a dicta-
torship. Under Santa Anna's centralist policies, Sonora was made a 
subordinate department, and Manuel Mar{a Gandara was named governor. 
However, in 1854 Santa Anna removed Gandara and appointed General Josr! 
Marla Yanez as governor because the latter was more highly regarded as 
a military leader; the dictator believed that military leadership was 
necessary to repulse the filibustering expeditions then underway in 
Sonora and Baja California. 
Thereafter, the state of Sonora experienced a series of short-
term leaders. General Arrellano succeeded General Jost Marfa Yanez, 
but co1111I1anded only until Gandara saw his chance to reassume power when 
the Plan de Ayutla was pronounced. He was not supported by' the central 
government, however, but the government acquiesced and appointed him 
military commander under Aguilar. Quite soon Aguilar was arrested, and 
Gandara again controlled the state. Aguilar searched diligently for a 
liberal military supporter and finally enlisted the aid of Ignacio 
Pesqueira, a long time foe of the Gandarist faction. 
Pesqueira had a long varied career, but at heart he remained an 
intellectual opportunist. Born in 1828 he held numerous local govern-
10 
mental posts in Sonora and northern Mexico. He had traveled to Europe 
and studied commerce and trade in France and Spain. When he returned 
to Mexico in 1839, Pesqueira soon became a district sub-prefect. In 
1847 he joined the National Guard, and narrowly averted a fatal wound 
while fighting Indians in 1851. He supported the Plan de Ayutla and 
fought against Santa Anna as early as 1854.10 Each year he increased 
his influence and power in Sonora, and early in 1856 he became the 
military commander at Ures. That same year he assumed the executive 
power of the state, initiating a long reign that lasted until 1875. 
According to a correspondent for the Daily ~ California, Pesqueira 
was a "fine looking gentleman ••• of medium height," dark complexion, 
"with a fine head, intelligent expression of countenance, quite broad 
across the breast, and shows a form inured to some hardship. 1111 On 
July 17, 1855, he captured the enemy (centralist) garrison at Ures, 
but Gandara retreated, regrouped his forces, and recruited the aid of 
the fierce Yaqui Indians as well as the conservative clergy. Together 
they struggled on until defeated in January, 1857. The conservatives 
were not beaten permanently, however, for in June they were in the 
field again. Just when it appeared that Pesqueira would secure complete 
victory, Gandara moved the war into neighboring Sinaloa, enlisting the 
aid of more conservatives there. Finally, in April, 1859, after a 
proionged siege, the last bastion of conservatism fell when Pesqueira 
/ captured Mazatlan. Pesqueira then ruled both in Sonora and Sinaloa. 
Although uprisings continued throughout the decade, the liberals re-
lOibid., PP• 574-583. 
11naily Al ta California, April 18, 1B57. 
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mained in control until the French invasion of 1962. 
Yet another major problem on the frontier had always been scarcity 
of population. The Mexican government was aware of this, and had made 
several attempts to colonize the area.12 Unfortunately, even those 
souls who were adventurous enough to attempt settlement were unwilling 
to remain in the path of hostile Indians. Moreover, with the news of 
the gold strike in California, Mexicans as well as "gringos" raced for 
the gold fields, leaving their farms and homes in northern Mexico to 
the Indians. 
Gold had been discovered in California just nine days before 
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. James Wilson Marshall, 
a moody eccentric carpenter and employee of John Ao Sutter, had found 
what he believed to be gold while working on a sawmill in the foothills 
of the Sierra Nevada Mountains early in 184S. Excited by the possi-
bility, Marshall rode rapidly to New Helvitia, and there he and Sutter 
tested the metal, concluding that it was gold--pe:r.haps as much as 
twenty-three carats. Marshall was so enthused that he rode through a 
torrential rain to report his findings to the residents of Coloma. 
Sutter wanted to maintain secrecy, for he feared the influx of gold 
seekers would ruin his business enterprises. Few Cal.:ifornians paid 
much attention to the news until a Morman elder, Samuel Brannan, rode 
madly down the streets of San Francisco on May 12, shouting "gold, gold7 
12See, Patricia R. Herring, "A Plan for the Colonization of 
Sonora's Northern Frontier~ The Paredes Proyectos of 1B50," Journ.al 
of Arizona History, X (Sunurer, 1969), pp. 103-114~ See also, Odie B. 
Faulk, ed., "Projected Mexican Colonies in the Borderlands, 1852," 
Journal 2f. Arizona History, X (Surnroor, 1969), PP• 115-128,. 
12 
gold, from the American River, 1113 
Shortly afterwarf;,)ships jammed the harbors along the California 
coast~rotting because crew members and passengers alike had abandoned 
them for the gold fields. Soon towns were deserted, and by SE3ptember, 
1848, news of the gold strike had reached the eastern United States, 
propelling people to the gold fields to prospect. Some sailed for 
months on the 18,000 mile voyage around the tip of South America, 
suffering extreme hardships and even death. Others caught ships for 
Panama, believing that once across the Isthmus they could obtain 
passage to California. However, many of these unfortunates were 
stranded, as few ships sailed from Panama to California, Many of these 
eager souls were unable to return to the United States and suffered the 
rest of their lives in wooden shacks or leantos. Other routes were 
available, and the most popular was the overland trail. Men who had 
been responsible citizens in the East carelessly quit their jobs, 
callously abandoned their families, and incautiously raced for the 
gold fields. Before the end of 1849 miners swarmed over the region 
near Coloma, but the placer gold~r that easily mined-was soon gone o 
As the gold fever abated, the disillusioned turned back to the 
cities, only to face harsh reality. The cities swelled with despondent 
men, many of whom were forced to turn to illegal activities to secure 
even a meager livelihood. San Francisco was typical of these new law-
less cities. Cattle rustlers, horse thieves, murderers, and misplaced 
gold seekers roamed the streets. The saloons were scenes of shoot-
outs, stabbings, and other crimes of violence; men had only to brandish 
1~any works are available on this subject, for example, see John 
Walton Caughey, Gold is the Cornerstone (Berkeley, 1948). 
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a weapon or utter the word "coward" to provoke a killing. Few women 
lived in this sordid environment~those who did were churlish dance 
hall girls, gambling their fates for a few ounces of gold dust. Daily 
papers contained a sad record of suicides and murders-rarely did a man 
die from old age. Citizens became increasingly intolerant of this law-
lessness. Finally, the editor of the Daily~ California urged 
citizens to act: "It is high time this headlong speed to settle diffi-
culties at the muzzle of the pistol in a crowded room, this reckless 
disregard for the lives of innocent men who happen to be standing by 
was put a stop to. 1114 
The gold rush had created a special kind of man accustomed to dis-
order and violence, with little regard for the value of life, and it 
became necessary for the citizens of the area to form vigilante com-
mittees to control the lawless element. The only authority in Cali-
fornia during the period from 1848 until admission into the Union on 
September 9, 1850, was the military. The army ruled de facto, even 
illegally, during this period, while impatient Californians tried many 
times to establish civilian government. Finally on November 13, 1849, 
an agreement was reached, a constitution was ratified, and Peter H. 
Burnett was elected governor. Yet, California was not admitted to the 
Union until Southern congressmen won new laws protecting slavery. With 
the Compromise of 1850 providing a fugitive slave law and leaving the 
"peculiar institutional" up to the inhabitants in the territories the 
California statehood bill passed Congress and the president signed it 
14naily !lli. California, November 19, 1851. See also, any issue 
Daily~ California, 1849-1862, for examples of this violence. 
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on September 9, 1850.15 
Nevertheless, Indian raids on the C~ifornia frontier and crime 
in the cities increased as more and yet more "seekers" cane to the 
golden land of opportUhity. To counter the rise of lawlessness in the 
Q;ities, vigilantes began dispensing justice as "judge lynch" pronounced 
sentences. 
Such an environroont quite naturally would spawn and encourage 
several vain ventures, and, because land represented the wherewithal, 
filibustering fever flourished on the frontier. Leaders soon came 
forward-Charles Pindray, Count Raoussett de Boulbon, William Walker, 
and Henry Alexander Crabb-all with designs of establishing themselves 
in nearby, weak Mexico. Those that advanced these schemes of fili-
bustering were by necessity inspired recruiters, stronger than the 
barren desert. 
Many of these expeditions would follow the Gila Trail in reverse 
to southern Arizona. This was a main route to California, followed by 
many emigrants from the Eastern states. Much of the Gila Trail crossed 
desert-a sun parched sand where white, shimmering light and hot, 
searing winds burned the surface by day and where creeping cold chilled 
the waste by night. There were few animals. Only snakes, scorpions, 
desert rats, and other equally tough animals could exist. It was a 
country of few contrasts, where only here and there a tiny oasis broke 
the monotony of the terrain. But, there also was beauty along the 
trail. Lieutenant Thomas Sweeny, who followed the trail in 1850-1851 
l5For an account of the issue of slavery expansion and the Compro-
mise of 1850, see, Allan Nevins, Ordeal of Union, 2 vols. (New York, 
1947). 
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and camped beside the Colorado River, reported that "the stars shine 
like loop-holes into the Heaven of heavens, and moon like the home of 
calmness, purity and peace." He also recorded that "there is a never-
ceasing hum of millions of insects, and the Colorado murmurs like a 
huge bronze serpent, whose glittering scales reflect the moonbearns."16 
His record.of travel conditions on the desert from San Diego to the 
Colorado and Gila rivers shows the extreme hardship that man and beast 
had to endure. He recorded that "it took twenty days to get the wagon 
across the desert, which is in a wretched condition for travelling, 
without a drop of water between Cariso GicJ Creek and Alam Mucho (ilici), 
a distance of ninety miles.".. Men often faced death at the hands of the 
harsh desert, and in at least one case he knew of 
drivers [who] were compelled to kill one of the oxen and. 
drink the blood or perish of thirst-an occurrence but 
too corrunon in this desert, which in sW1111Er can only be 
travelled at night, as neither men nor animals can endure 
the excessive heat of the day.17 . 
Few men lingered in the desert-except Indians, renegades, and bandits. 
The Mexican government had struggled with frontier problems for 
several years. From 1848 to 1852 concerned Mexican statesmen suggested 
that the only way to solve their difficulties was through colonization 
of the entire frontier. Accordingly, they considered military coloni-
zation and importation of foreign colonists~all to no avail. 
~ . 8 8 Arthur Woodward, ed., Journal. of Lt. Thomas.!£. Sweeny, 1 49-1 53 
(Los Angeles, 1956), p. 61. 
17Ibid., P• 114. 
CHAPTER II 
MEXICAN SCHEMES OF COLONIZATION 
Along the border the Mexican defense against raids of murderous 
Apaches and lawless Norte-arnericanos remained sorely inadequate. From 
the inception of the Republic, the central government had been unable 
to cope with the unstable situation, nor had individual states mustered 
sufficient military strength to control the area. The border was too 
long. And, although the United States was obligated by the terms of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to patrol the line, its few soldiers 
in the area were inadequate. Individual Mexican states m~de alliances 
with each other and with friendly Commanches, but such efforts likewise 
were largely ineffective against the warlike and nomadic Apaches. 
Constantly the Mexican states appealed to the central government for 
help, but it was never stable enough to respond decisively. 
The loss of territory in 1848--one-third of the Republic-and the 
fear of losing more to the United States, along with the Indian 
troubles provoked suggestions from sincere statesmen who wished to 
populate the frontier through colonization. In 1848, 1850, and 1852, 
three Mexicans suggested plans to create military or civilian colonies 
in the northern states. Unfortunately all three plans either failed 
to win national approval or were never implemented. Although these 
laws, except for that of 1$48, were not passed, most Arerican and 





On July 19, 1848, Mexican president Jose Joaquin de Herrera promul-
gated the first of the colonization laws. According to the decree, 
military colonies would be established in the northern states along 
the boundary with the United States in order to populate the region and 
thereby forestall further alienation of the "patria," To encourage 
civilians to volunteer to settle near these military installations, 
Herrera guaranteed that when a colony progressed sufficiently it could 
form a ~icipal government and become civilian controlled. 2 The law 
also provided that the frontier would be divided into three parts: the 
Eastern Frontier, consisting of the states of Tamaulipas and Coahuila; 
the Middle Frontier, made up only of Chihuahua; and the Western Fron-
tier, which included Sonora and Baja California. The ;Law also provided 
for payment of ten thousand pesos each year to those friendly Indians 
near the colonies, thereby creating badly needed local support. Each 
area was to be characterized by meticulous military organization. In 
fact, this entire colonization plan was very similar to the presidial 
1For conditions on the frontiers of Baja California and Sonora 
see, Pe,blo L. Martinez, A. Histog of Lower California (Mexico, 1960). 
See also, Robert c. Stevens, "Forsaken Frontier:. A History of Sonora, 
Mexico, 1821.-1851," (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1963). 
2For the Spanish text of this plan see, Colonias Militares, 
Proyecto ~Su Establecimiento en~ Fronteras de Oriente ~Occi­
dente (Irnprenta de I. Curnplido, Mexico City, 1848)in the Holliday 
Collection of the Arizona Pioneer's Historical Society. For a trans-
lated and edited version see, Odie B. Faulk, ed., "Projected Mexican 
Military Colonies for the Borderlands, 1848," Journal. Q! Arizona 
Histog, X (spring, 1968), PP• 39-47. 
system used in the Spanish colonial. government.3 A colonel was to be 
in conunand of each area, a lieutenant colonel would have charge of no 
more than three colonies, and a captain would conunand individual. 
colonies. Volunteers were to enlist for six years, receive a bonus 
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of ten pesos, and, when their enlistment expired, receive arable land 
near the military post. To promote the establishment of such coloni~s, 
the national. government agreed to advance a "six-months·' supply of pro-
visions, to be charged to the public treasury" along with "tools, plows, 
oxen, horses, and whatever is needed to build houses for the colony. 114 
Special incentives were offered for married colonists. The law 
provided that "those individuals in the colony who are married, or who 
get married within the first four months of its establishment, are to 
be excepted from the payment of all taxes, including those of the 
parishes.115 This law of 1848 clearly demonstrated the Mexican anti-
pathy for foreigners, as it excluded them from the colonies "either 
as military colonists or as civilians unless it be done personally and 
at the responsibility of the inspector, in order that there be no 
questionable motives behind their joining. 116 This provision was aimed 
mostly at colonists from the United States; the experience in Texas 
was not easily forgotten. 
Almost from the beginning the atteliij)ts to build these colonies 
3For a copy of the ·Royal Regulations of 1722, which describes 
the Spanish presidial system, see Sidney Brinckerhoff and Odie B. 
Faulk, Lancers for 2 King (Phoenix, 1965). 
4Fau1k, "Projected Mexican Military Colonies," P• 43. 
5Ibid., P• 44. 
6Ibid. 
faced such serious Q.ifficulties that some of the military presidios 
were abandoned during the administrations of Presidents He.rrera: ,~ 
Arista. Shortages in financing, poor planning, and incessant delays 
hindered the planting of the colonies. By 1850 only nine of the 
eighteen colonies scheduled for the frontier had been partially es-. 
tablished, but on the Western Frontier only two of the proposed six 
colonies had begun operations. After successive Indian raids, the 
colonists in those two became disheartened, and many just "wandered 
about in quest of sustenance or deserted to the glittering placers 
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of the gold region. 117 A single colony established in Baja California 
at the end of 1849 had a small contingent of men ready to return home 
by the time they reached the location. Gover:nrrent inefficiency and 
unwillingness to support the colonies fully made their success im-
possible. 
With the failure of this early plan for colonization of the 
frontier, the Mexican borderlands were on the verge of total collapse 
by 1850. However, by that year interested Sonoran statesmen had come 
to realize that although the plan of 1848 had failed, another approach 
must be attempted if the frontier was to be populated. As early as 
May 6, 1848, the Sonoran legislature had broached the subject by re-
vising the earlier rulings on colonization into a new and extremely 
liberal settlement law. Three years later the central government 
declared this law unconstitutional. 
These previous failures caused Sonoran leader Mariano Paredes 
to suggest still another colonization p~an. Paredes, no kin to a 
7Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, p, 720. 
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national leader of the same name, was a representative in the Sonoran 
legislature and had constantly disagreed with Governor Josif de Aguilar 
on the correct way to subdue the Indians while colonizing the frontier. 
Aguilar believed the best method was to send troops to attack the 
renegades, then quickly establish military colonies while the Indians 
were disorganizedo Paredes felt that first the colonies should be 
established, then campaigns against the renegades should follow. Also, 
Paredes was so disenchanted with the central governrrent that probably 
his plan of 1850 was more for the sake of disagreement than for real 
defense of his state. 
On August 16, 1850, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies heard Paredes 
explain his ideas on settlement of the frontier. He suggested exten-
sive colonization of civilians and a comprehensive mercantile develop-
ment for the entire frontier. 8 He warned the members of the Chamber 
that they should beware of that "avaricious neighbor" to the north. 
If something were not done at once, he predicted the United States 
would take Sonora on the slightest pretext, especially as Sonora was 
in a state 
of misery, of insecurity, of lack of protection ••• and it 
would not be impossible that the madness of its suffering 
would cause it to throw itself into the hands of a neighbor 
that offers help, protection, and in fine, an enchanting 
and improved way of life, as today is enjoyed in Upper 
~ariano Paredes, Proyactos ~ layes sob!:!, colonizacioh y comercio 
~el estado de Sonora, presentados ~la Camera ~ Diputados por %." 
representante de afMel estado, ~ la sesi.on. extraordinario del di.a 16 
~Agosto ~ 1850 Mexico, D. F. Ignacio Cumplido, 1S50)., F0r a 
translation of this see Odie Be Faulk, ed., "A Colonization Plan for 
Northern Sonora, 1850," New Mexico Historical Review, XI.IV (October, 
1969), ppe 293-314. 
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California, whence many Sonorans return enchanted. 9 
He explained to the national representatives that Sonora was a special 
case and needed a particular law which "should be very liberal and very 
generous, one which guarantees to foreign colonists the joy of all 
their liberties." Thus Paredes realized the dangers to the frontier 
and favored civilian colonization, for he firmly believed the estab-
lishment of military colonies would not work. With the failure of the 
law of 1848, the situation in Sonora had grown steadily worse. He 
knew that "gangrene is spreading for there are those who will stir the 
fire; and, in tine with violence, and without losing an opportunity, 
means for Sonora's salvation will not exist. 1110 Furthermore, he was 
convinced that a new law of the type he proposed would discourage 
Mexican immigration to Upper California. 
Along with many of his countrymen, Paredes feared the United 
States--that powerful northern neighbor from which Mexico was separated 
only by the Gila River which on our side, serves numerous 
caravans of wagons as the most level and well supplied 
route of transit to Upper California, The strip of land 
on the opposite side will soon be populated. Meanwhile, 
on our side , years will pass without the same thing 
happenin~ because of laws enacted but impossible to 
execute. 1 
To stimulate trade on the Mexican side, he asked that the seaport of 
Guaymas be declared a free port for twenty-five years. He was con-
vinced such a move was needed, for he envisioned the Colorado River as 
a major highway, with Guaymas strategically located to control all 
9Faulk, "A Colonization Plan for Northern Sonora," p. 299. 
lOib.d 
i •' P• 
llib.d 




traffic and trade. Paredes reminded the Chamber of the American move-
ments in Baja California. If Guaymas were made a free port, he said, 
the Americans would lose this area of influence. Paredes apparently 
believed that this seaport could be the greatest single factor in 
stimulating the growth of Sonora. Subtly, Paredes suggested that 
Guaymas, along with individual colonies and inhabitants, would solve 
the frontier problems. In addition, he felt those colonists should be 
chosen with great care. He referred to the settlers only as European 
or Mexican, for he lmew it to be inadvisable to encourage Anglo-Ameri-
cans to settle on Mexican soil. 
Paredes' plan was generous, for its author intended to attract 
settlers. Thus he urged that each head of a family should receive not 
only 177 acres of irrigable land but also be guaranteed his properties 
and liberties. For those colonists who choose to raise cattle, rather 
than farm, the government would allot 4,42S acres of level land. Even 
the old empresario system was to be employed (an empresario was a 
contract colonizer), for additional grants could be made to those who, 
at their own expense, transported European colonists to the Mexican 
frontier. Paredes envisioned that one day these new ;residents would 
become Mexican citizens, and the men would agree voluntarily to enlist 
in the militia (guardia nacional). Of course,he suggested other en-
ticements for colonists: exemption from extraordinary taxes (forced 
loans) levied at the national or state level for twenty-five years 
and exemption from taxes on foods. 
This concerned Sonoran official had planned in detail. Every 
colony would be four square leagues in size. Clauses would be included 
whereby the colony could become civilian controlled when the population 
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reached 1,000 inhabitants. In addition, every colonist was guaranteed 
"the security o.f all the rights o.f Mexican citizenship, the only ex-
ception being that he may not sell the properties he has thus acquired 
12 until he has owned them .for eight years." As one .final security 
measure, Paredes asked .for the establishment o.f a coast guard to patrol 
the area .from Cape San Lucas to the mouth o.f the Colorado River. This 
naval .force could stop all ships and make a list o.f their cargo-thereby 
locating not only Americans but other nationals who were .fili-
bustering.13 
Objections to the Paredes project are not known. Even whether it 
was debated cannot be ascertained, but the bill did not pass the 
Mexican Congresso The government doubtless .feared any .foreign coloni-
zation on the .frontier, but especially at a time when the French were 
then trying .force.fully to occupy Mexican lands in Sonora, 
Following Paredes' proposal and his .failure to win passage o.f it, 
there were other officials who recommended colonization schemes. For 
example, Minister o.f R.elations Jos' Mar/a Lecunza heard a special com-
mittee report January 7, 1B51, which called .for colonization o.f the 
entire .frontier. As be.fore, nothing was decided; the .frontier con-
tinued to disintegrate because o.f the activities o.f Indians, outlaws, 
12Faulk, "A Colonization Plan .for Northern Sonora," p. JO?. 
13Herring, "A Plan .for the Colonization o.f Sonora's Northern 
Frontier," P• 107. It was not surprising that at this time there was 
talk in both countries of the possibility of annexing northern Mexico 
to the United States. Knowledge of this attitude was widespread, and 
therefore, in October, 1B52, Count Gaston de Raousset Boulbon, leader 
of a group o.f French "colonists," who had just captured H~rmosillo, 
approached Paredes to form an alliance to overthrow the state govern-
ment. Paredes' reply was a firm rejection and denunciation o.f those 
foreigners desiring to alienate more Mexican territory. 
and filibustering expeditions.14. 
A year later, in January, 1852, a third major colonization plan 
was proposed for frontier settlement o l5 The plan was introduced by 
Juan N. Almonte, an aging soldier who combined his army skills with 
such diplomacy and patriotism that the government listened to his 
suggestions about the frontiero He was born in Michoaca'n in 180.3, and 
later joined with Jost' Marla Morelos in the Mexican Revolution. Al-
monte had cause to understand the American desire for territory, for he 
had represented Morelos in the United States during the war for inde-
,, 
pendence, remaining there until the downfall of Agustin de Iturbide. 
Later he had traveled throughout the world on diplomatic missions, but 
significantly, Almonte had headed the boundary survey between the 
United States and Mexico in 18.34. He also had earlier experienced the 
loss of Mexican soil when he fought against the Texas revolutionary 
movement in 18.36. And he had served as Secretary of War and Marine and 
as ambassador to the United States under Antonio Lo'pez de Santa Anna 
in 1842-1845. In 1850, as a conservative, he was elected a member of 
the national Senate.16 Like others he saw the need for a definite 
and on-going frontier policy, but his ideas on stabilizing the frontier 
differed significantly from other plans. Unlike his predecessors in 
proposing colonization schemes, Almonte was not as concerned about the 
danger of United States expansion as about the crisis of the Indian 
l4For information on all aspects on Mexican problems on the entire 
frontier see, Bancroft, North Mexican States, II. 
l5Juan N. Almonte, Proyectos de Leyes Sabre ColonizaciC:n (Mexico, 
D. F., 1852). 
16niccionario Porrua, p. 60. 
menace. He believed it first was necessary to stop the Indian raids 
before turning to other settlement problems. He believed that once 
this menace was no more, then the interior wasteland:?, as .. well as the 
frontier, should be colonized. This last feature made his plan the 
most forward-looking of the era. 
Almonte knew conditions on the frontier. He told his colleagues 
that life was deplorable for the inhabitants of the region, for they 
are murdered, their houses sacked, and their fields burned by 
the various tribes or barbarians (Indians) that ceaselessly 
invade their lands. Added to this calamity, there has been a 
great scarcity of seed for about two years past in these 
suffering states because of the terrible drought they have 
experienced.17 · 
In sharp contrast to his fellow countrymen, Almonte used the United 
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States as an example to be emulated; Mexico, he said, at least must do 
what its northern neighbor had done in order to settle the frontier. 
The United States had grown in wealth and population because that 
government had surveyed, priced, and opened its public domain very 
early in its history. Mexican land awaited the. settler; therefore, he 
urged his government to send agents to Europe to extoll the richness 
of Mexican land and the opportunities that were a~ailable. Advertise-
ment of land sales should be translated into all major European 
languages. Almonte believed that the hard-working Germans would make 
the best colonists, believing as he did that Mexicans had the wrong 
habits, dispositions, and customso Moreover, he added that Belgians 
could be used to colonize the interior provinces. Under his plan the 
states would have a degree of self determination in aiding colonists. 
States could create new towns in the interior of the Republic wherever 
l7Faulk, "Projected Mexican Colonies," p. 120. 
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they had enough settlers. 
The first step in the' colonization process would be a survey, 
,/~-
using the acre as unit of measure because this was the one "most 
lS conunonly known in Europe." Then the government should establish land 
offices and sell land to the settlers at low prices, Government owned 
lands could sell for about $1.50 per acre, he felt, but the states 
could make donations of land to whomever they pleased. In addition, 
provisions in the plan would make it possible for those without fi-
nancial means to settle in designated areas. For example, for each 
family of five persons, the government should supply 500 pesos for 
transportation to the frontier and for means to establish their farms 
and homes. The settlers would have to repay such funds as low-interest 
loans, but the terms were to be extremely liberal. Foreigners would 
be exempted from taxes, military service, and all municipal obligations 
for five years. To lessen the paperwork of immigration authorities, 
Almonte suggested that the foreign settlers be admitted to the country 
without passports or security cards. 
Such was the plan that General J~an Almonte suggested as a solu-
tion to the frontier problem. Unfortunately for the frontier, his 
proposals, like the others made during this period, were never enacted 
into law. Yet the concern Almonte, Paredes, ancl other Mexican officials 
voiced concerning American intrusion into Mexico indeed were justified. 
There definitely were Americans who had an interest in Mexican terri-
tory. And in May, 1S5J, President Franklin B. Pierce dispatched James 
Gadsden to Mexico with instructions to resolve the boundary between the 
lSib.d 12':1 
i •' P• _,. 
two countries by purchasing territory.19 It seeIIl9d a convenient time--
with an unstable Mexican governIIl9nt. One important cause of the in-
stability was the government's inability to solve the frontier dilemma. 
The scantily populated Mexican frontier thus was neglected by the 
national government, while at the same time local politicians vied for 
power to the detriment of the regiono Nor could the United States 
offer help to the hapless Mexican residents of Sonora by preventing 
Indians from raiding across the international boundary, as it was 
obligated to do by terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Ironically 
the first effort to punish the Indian raiders, made in 1850 by the 
governor of California, also would result in the first filibuster--i>ut 
not to a halt in Indian depredationso 
l9For the negotiations on the Gadsden Treaty see, Paul N. Garber, 
The Gadsden Treaty (Pennsylvania, 1923). 
CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST FILIBUSTER 
In the sununer of 1849 Lieutenant Cave J. Couts commanded a United 
States military detachment guarding a survey party at the junction of 
the Colorado and Gila riverso There he encountered a fiery Mexican 
,/ ,,, 
colonel, Jose Maria Carrasco, who favored American intervention in 
northern Mexico. While calling on Couts for provisions, the animated 
but flighty Mexican expounded his beliefs. Plied with champagne, 
Carrasco talked freely, perhaps with the hope that Couts would take an 
active interest in Mexican problems.1 Carrasco saw the United States 
as "spreading over the world by its good laws, institutions, and 
management, [while] the other [Mexican government] was dwindling away 
as a ball of snow before the fire, and all in consequence of old rep-
2 tiles fighting among themselves for power and plunder." Carrasco 
believed that Sonora, caught between the vicious Indians and the 
corrupt officials of the Mexican government, was doomed to be deserted 
unless circumstances changed on the frontier, and he preferred the 
alternative to conditions as they were. Fierce Yaqui Indians, attack-
ing villages and killing travelers in northern Mexico, had created a 
state of anarchy. Unsuccessfully Carrasco had urged wealthy Sonorans 
1william McPherson, ed., From San Diego to ~Colorado in ~: 
The Journal and Maps 2f. ~ l• Couts (Los Angeles, 1932), P• 2?. 
2Ibid. 
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to contribute money to be used to employ an American adventurer to 
"rid them of their detested rulers, 113 but he received little encourage-
ment from the apathetic oligarchy, as well as from the peasants.· Other 
innuential Mexicans such as Mariano Paredes may have iilfiuenced 
Carrasco by suggesting that Sonora secede from Mexico in order to seek 
American help against the Indians. 4 Paredes, the following year, would 
also suggest plans to colonize northern Mexico, hoping this would 
populate the area sufficiently to control frontier problems. 5 Such 
Mexican sentiments as those of Carrasco, as well as Yuma Indian raids, 
may have been instrumental in bringing Joseph Clayton Morehead to 
Mexico. 
The Morehead family was prominent in Kentucky politics until after 
the Civil War. 6 Morehead had b',en born in Kentucky about 1824, the 
son of James Turner Morehead, governor of Kentucky from 1834 to 1836. 
Joseph Morehead left Kentucky during the Mexican war and accepted a 
·lieutenant's commission in Stephenson's New York regiment of volunteers 
destined for California. Once :lll the far West the wily Kentuckian 
quickly made critically important connections with local politiaians, 
and after the war represented one of the mining districts in the state 
legislature. 7 As a law partner of the California attorney general, 
3Ibid. 
4aurus K. Wyllys, The French in Sonora (Berkeley, 1932), P• 52., 
5Herring, "A Plan for the Colonization of Sonora's Northern 
Frontier," PP• 103-ll4. 
6Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds,, Dictionary 2! Arerican 
Biographl, XIII, PP• 158-159. . . . . . . 
7 Daily Al ta California, January 14, 1851 .. 
Morehead's activities brought him into contact in 1850 with Governor 
Peter H. Burnett of California, 8 who appointed him quartermaster 
general of the state. While holding this appointment, Morehead was 
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ordered to aid General Joshua Bean, who was commissioned to track and 
punish Yuma Indians for killing John Joel Glanton and ten of his men. 
Wanted in Texas as an outlaw, Glanton had found the climate south 
of the border more to his liking. There he organized some renegades 
to operate a ferry on the Colorado River and to take Indian scalps for 
the bounty offered by the state of Sonora. The government of that 
state, in hopes of controlling Indian raids into northern Mexico, was 
paying well for Indian scalps. The opportunistic and devious Glanton 
discovered that Mexican authorities could not tell the difference be-
tween Indian and Mexican scalps; thus he soon became the scourge of 
both Indians and Mexicans, murdering innocent peasants and selling 
their scalps to the Mexican government. Glanton, a merciless killer, 
cleverly blamed the Indians in the area for such massacres. The Yuma 
Indians, determined to avenge the deaths of many of their tribesmen, 
attacked Glanton's party, killing him and ten of his cohorts. Some 
of the gang survived to reach Los Angeles, however, and there they told 
a pitiful tale of an Indian "massacre." Unaware of the actual reasons 
for Glanton' s death, and perhaps unwilling to investigate first, the 
California government sent General Bean and Joseph Morehead to avenge 
the killings.9 Thus, an outlaw wanted for numerous crimes in Texas, 
8For a biographical sketch of California governors, see Bret 
Melendy and Benjamin F. Gilbert, The Governors of California (George-
town, California, 1965). 
9naily Alli California, January 14, 1851. 
31 
along with an unhappy Mexican colonel, very likely set in motion the 
series of events that led to the first filibuster into Mexico following 
10 the end of the war of 1B46-184B. 
Until the Yuma expedition, Morehead' s career apparently had been 
as respectable as possible in a frontier state of the 1B50' s. But 
early in the expedition General Bean directed Morehead to defray the 
costs of the expedition by paying state drafts for supplies, and the 
Kentuckian began to display his true nature. For example, when many 
of the old ranchers refused to accept his state script, they were 
threatened, shot, or otherwise intimidated into cooperation by Morehead. 
In at least one case an old rancher retaliated, and by sheer force re-
captured the supplies he had "sold" to Morehead. Nevertheless, most 
ranchers cooperated with the expedition, believing compliance the 
wisest and safest policy.11 To increase the size of his force, More-
head hired transients from Arkansas and Texas, but the entire force 
was driven away from the Colorado River by strong Indian attacks. 
After reorganizing his men, Morehead retraced his steps to the Colorado 
and soundly defeated the Indians.12 While Morehead fought the Indians, 
General Bean and the main party was searching for other renegades along 
the Colorado and Gila rivers. California officials were suspicious, 
however, when Morehead's troops stayed in the field far beyond the 
necessary time. The quartermaster general apparently was planning 
greater exploits. In truth, on this final march to the Colorado, 
10 Woodward, ed., Journal of Lt. Sweeney, P• 136. 
11naily .fil! California, January 14, 1851. 
12rbid., January B, 1B51. 
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Morehead even confiscated United States Anny supplies en route to Major 
Samuel P. Heintzelman for the use of the troops whom Heintzelman was 
taking to the river to establish what would become the celebrated Fort 
Ywna.13 
In December, 1850, the Morehead expedition camped with a party 
building a ferry at the confluence of the Gila and Colorado rivers. 
Captain George A. Johnson, leader of this group, planned to promote 
a profitable business ferrying immigrants across the rivers.14 On 
October 11, the Indians launched a vicious attack on the combined camp. 
Morehead's inept military strategy would have brought disaster to the 
entire force had Johnson not counter-acted the plan. Morehead's un-
willingness to gauge the Indians wisely was illustrated again when the 
expedition tracked the band responsible for the Glanton massacre. 
After wearing down the Indians, Morehead not only demanded eleven 
hostages but also wanted all the trinkets and valuables that the war-
riors had taken from Glanton' s party. Thus challenged, the braves 
fought one last battle before retreating. Then Morehead' s band relent-
lessly pursued the Indians, shooting stragglers and burning villages. 
The Yuma expedition was not a stunning success despite the victories 
Morehead achieved; its only real accomplishment was the further aliena-
tion of the Indians. 
Following this exploit, Morehead soon turned his efforts to more 
l3Ibid. , January 18, 1851. 
14George A. Johnson, "The Life of Capitan George A. Johnson," 
typed manuscript in the California State Library, Sacramento, Cali-
fornia; variant copy in the Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, 
Tucson. For additional biographical details see, Johnson File, 
Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, Tucson. 
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rewarding channels. Mexican mine workers traveled through the area, 
and Morehead found them easy victims. He may also have turned to 
robbing Mexican peasants of their burden animals to secure a means of 
transporting his booty. Many of the Mexicans who lost their animals 
were stranded nearly one hundred miles from the nearest water supply, 
with little hope of reaching civilization.15 Again Morehead's actions 
were beyond what was necessary to complete the Yuma expedition. The 
ferry party's records mentioned the robberies, and they carry Captain 
Johnson's opinion that the Morehead expedition was preparing to embark 
on some clandestine venture.16 The zeal with which Morehead sought 
supplies for his men and his treatment of Mexicans caused Californians 
to fear that his actions might lead to a serious diplomatic crisis with 
Mexico. Critical. letters to the newspapers charged Morehead with mis-
using authority, while others defended his actions as necessary in 
punishing the Indians, whom many considered little more than bar-
barians.17 
Governor Burnett resigned in January, 1851, and John McDouaal. 
became the second governor of California. The new chief executive, 
upon reviewing the report of General Morehead and discovering the 
$75,000 cost of the expedition, called for an investigation by the 
California legislature.18 On April 25, 1851, he reported an irregu-
l5Daily ~ California, January 20, 1851. 
16Johnson, "The Life of Capitan G. A. Johnson." 
l7Dail;y .fil.! California, February 10, 1851. 
18For a discussion of this investigation see Journals of the 
Legislature of California (Sacramento, California, 1851), PP• 104-105, 




larity had been discovered in the o.f'.f'ice of' the Quartermaster General. 
He believed Morehead had stolen and sold "400 muskets and 90,000 car-
tridges without authority and had pocketed the money. 1119 McDougal 
reconunended that the entire matter be turned over to an investigatory 
,'committee. 2° Five days later the committee asked the legislature to 
/ 
authorize the "governor to o.f'.f'er a reward of' $1, 500 .f'or Morehead' s 
arrest, and his delivery to the proper o.f'.f';i.cers in this State."21.. How-
ever, the legislature only pointed out that Morehead was out of' the 
states, using these funds to finance an expedition of' conquest. 
In the first half' of' 1851 Morehead was using the money to organize 
a secret party to invade Mexico. Recruiting in Calii'ornia .f'or such a 
grandiose scheme proved easy, .f'or disappointed Forty-Niners who had 
tailed to find their Eldorado were willing, even eager, to join an 
expedition that held promise of' possible riches. On March 30 a body 
of' well-armed men passed through Los Angeles, saying that they were just 
prospectors headed .f'or the gold fields; they were, in fact, part of' the 
Morehead party. Morehead' s plans called .f'or three groups to invade 
Sonora, with the main party arriving at Mazatl~ aboard the bark 
Josephine, a ship he had purchased to facilitate his invasion. 
While the expedition prepared at San Francisco, rumors circulated 
in California of' "secret expeditions" preparing to attack Sonora with 
thousands of' men. The Daily Alta California compared these rumored 
1~elend.y and Gilbert, Governors 2.£. California, P• 44. 
20naily ill,! California, April Z7, 1851. 
21.Joumals. of' 2 Legislature of' the State of' Ca1ifornia1 P• 479. 
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expeditions with "piracy upon the high seas. 11 22 Meanwhile, Morehead 
purchased a sloop; later he would acquire the smaller vessel, the 
Josephine. The sloop may have been used by some of the men who were to 
land at La Paz in Baja California. Regardless of the use of the ves-
sels, their purchase depleted Morehead's finances. 
Thus Morehead had to plunge deeply into debt at San Diego to pro-
vision his forces for the planned attack on Sonora. Recklessly he 
bought provisions, incurring the enmity of merchants when he failed to 
pay his bills. In addition, his men created disturbances and generally 
sacked the town during the twenty days they remained there. Citizens 
in the city began arming themselves, and a small war seemed eminent, 
but, just when it appeared a conflict would explode, Morehead learned 
that the governor had offered a reward for his arrest. Quickly he 
crossed the border into Baja California to avoid capture, whereupon 
post authorities at San Diego boarded the Josephine and searched it for 
anns and ammunitions, but found nothing. 
At this point a number of Morehead's men became disillusioned and 
returned to northern California. 23 Finally, on May 11, 1851, without 
adequate supplies, Morehead and 45 men boarded the Josephine to sail 
for Mazatl~, still envisioning great dreams of conquest. Many citizens 
in San Diego believed the group was on its way to invade Sonora. 24 
Apparently the United States government thought likewise, for shortly 
after the sailing of the Josephine, a schooner touched at San Diego 
22naily Alta California, April 'Zl, 1851. 
23Ibid. , Mfl.Y 17, 1851. 
24Ibid., June 3, 1851. 
hotly in pursuit or the expedition. Obviously the echooner was a 
government cutter: Mexico was a friendly nation, and the United States 
had an obligation to halt filibustering expeditions. 
Some disillusioned members of his party, after deserting, passed 
through Los Angeles on their way north, spreading rumors of Morehead's 
inadequate equipment. Two old muskets and one rusty cannon were sa:i,d 
to be his entire stock of war supplies. However, these deserts related 
that Morehead told them of a ship ahead of his group with abundant 
supplies to defeat all Mexican opposition in Sonora. 25 Morehead 
obviously was referring to the sloop he had purchased and aboard which 
he had men sailing to La Paz. These men arrived in Baja California in 
June only soon dispersed in the face of Mexican opposition and 
hostility. 26 
Despite Morehead' s failure to plan well and to arm his men 
adequately, Mexican officials on the frontier were angered and worried 
by the.se filibustering att.empts. They lmew there were insufficient 
Me~can troops in the region to protect their interests. Mexicans 
:· •. 
were warned of approaching filibusters, for early in April local 
officials in Sonora alerted the governor and citizens of Americans 
coming overland. The Prefect of Alamo advised the people under his 
jurisdiction to be on the lookout near Altar, and urged the people to 
arm themselves.27 In Mazatl~ Mexican authorities proclaimed that 
their nation was "exposed to destruction, losing its territory by 
25Ibid., June 4, 1851. 
26Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, P• 721. 
~Ures, El Sonorense, May 30, 1851, in Pinart Transcripts, IV, 
P• 312. 
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fragments until a third of the Republic had been lost. n28 Because 
officials in Mexico City were apathetic and indolent toward frontier 
problems, local and state authorities in Sonora feared that many 
Arrericans would come to Mexico in search of opportunity. By May, 1851, 
such fears had encouraged rumors of a force of four thousand men on the 
trail to invade Sonora. In truth, Morehead did send a land expedition, 
for some American adventurers, part of his expedition, were reported 
near Arizpe in July and August. 29 If this group of forty-eight Ameri-
cans were Morehead's overland group, they were dispersed by the 
National Guard in November. Upon news of the guard's approach, the 
group quickly abandoned its plans.JO 
The French newspaper ~ £' ~ in Mexico City reported such 
rumors as prevalent in the Mexican capital. This newspaper constantly 
urged Mexicans to act in a concerted effort to throw out the "wandering 
Arabs" who came from the United States. While rumors of larger fili-
bustering efforts penneated Mexican society, the editors of the Daily 
Alta California criticized Amari.can adventurers, and stated that such -
abuses of Mexican territory were a disgrace to the United States. One 
editorial declared, "There is not a man who loves his country and 
glories in her reputation, but must condemn all such attempts to vio-
late our treaty stipulations and tarnish the fame which the world has 
28naily Al ta California, May 24, 1851. 
29ures, ~ Sonorense, August 8, 1851, in Pinart Transcripts, IV, 
P• 329. 
'JOTbid. , November 7, 1851, P• 342. 
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accorded us.n31 
Thus when Morehead' s sea expedition reached Mazatlln, Mexican 
authorities there were prepared to arrest any Americans who came to the 
port armed or in a large group. When the Josephine arrived at Mazatlaii, 
the authorities swarmed aboard to search for arms and ammunition, but 
found nothing to justify seizing the boat or arresting the Morehead 
party. Morehead's men escaped a Mexican dungeon by claiming to be 
miners seeking work. Still a mystery is what happened to Morehead and 
his party at Mazatldh, as no further information is to be had apout the 
group. 
Some historians suggest that part of the men joined the later 
William Walker filibustering expedition bound for Baja California, 
while others reason these men might have joined filibustering activities 
then being planned for Central and South America. The Daily~ 
California of April, 1852, conjectured that Morehead may have returned 
to California to organize another expedition to invade Mexico. 32 Al-
though he had a questionable reputation, Morehead did indeed return to 
California early in 1852. Probably he found that most Californians 
admired his bravery and agreed with his politics of obtaining Mexican 
territory by conquest. In May, 1852, he was reported in Sacramento--
outfitting another expedition. Nothing more is known of his S1;lbsequent 
activities in California. 33 
31Daily Alta California, June 21, 1851. For additional facts see, 
"Monthly Record of Current Events," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XIX 
(December, 1851), P• 124. 
32rbid., May 7, 1852. 
JJibid. , May, 1852. 
Eventually Morehead returned to Kentucky late in 1852 and spoke 
little of his filibustering dreams. He practiced law in Ownesboro 
until the late 1850' s. In 1861, when the Civil War began, he was 
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living in Jackson, Mississippi, practicing law. Once again he saw his 
chance to command men in battle, and asked influential friends to 
recommend him for a commission in the Confederate service. General 
John Bell of Mississippi wrote President Jefferson Davis on April 16 
recommending that Morehead be given a commission in the Confederacy. 
He described Morehead as a "whole souled, Kentuckian and a high toned 
gentlemen, a man of the best practical sense, [who] is fond of military 
life, and has had some experience in that branch of public servis 
[sic].u34 On April 17, Morehead also addressed a letter to Davis. He 
apologized for writing when the President was extremely busy, but in-
sisted it was a matter of great urgency that Davis appoint him to the 
rank of captain. Morehead reminded the president of his eight years 
experience in the military service of the United States, including 
service in California during the Mexican War. He added that "tastes, 
inclinations and association, all incline me to seek for service in 
that Department for which I was intended to be educated and for which 
I have the strongest possible attachments. u35 As Davis apparently did 
not extend the commission, Morehead went to Kentucky to raise his own 
fighting force of volunteers and thereby obtain the coveted commission. 
Evidently Morehead recruited several hundred men to form the 
34aeneral John Bell to Jefferson Davis, April 16, 1861, Jackson, 
Mississippi, Service File of Joseph c. Morehead, Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, RG 94, National Archives. 
35Joseph c. Morehead to Jefferson Davis, April 17, 1861, Jackson, 
Mississippi, Service File of Joseph c. Morehead. 
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Kentucky Partisan Rangers, but they were not organized in time to 
fight the Union forces when they invaded that state. By September, 
1862, he was ready to lead his men in battle, but his bad luck plagued 
him again when a Union force in Kentucky captured him without a fight. 
Seeing his chance at battle frustrated, Morehead cl$Illored to 'be ex-
changed-even writing to United States Secretary of War Edward N • 
Stanton. While a political prisoner at Johnson's Island near Sandusky 
City, Ohio, his health deteriorated-only inGreasing his ,frustration.36 
The conunanding ~ion officer there, Colonel William Hoffman, Conunissary-
General of Prisoners, advised Stanton that Morehead was being held as 
a spy because he had been captured at Owensboro, Kentucky, behind Union 
lines in civilian clothes.37 Quite likely Morehead was recruiting for 
his regiment, and in the Union onslaught he moved too slowly and was 
captured. By June, 1863, Morehead' s appeal had yet to be investigated. 
Hoffman wrote to Lieutenant Colonel William H. Ludlow, agent for the 
exchange of prisoners, at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on March 14 that most 
of the prisoners had been exchanged, but Morehead was going to be re-
tained until something could be determined about his status.38 
Perhaps Morehead was aware of the usual punishment for spies-
d.eath--and feared for his life. For example, in May, 1863, the Union 
executed two Confederate spies guilty of recruiting behind enemy 
36~ !!!!: 2! ~ RebeUion: A, Compilation 2£. the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols in the United States 
serISl set (Washington, 1880-1901), series II, IV, PP·• 354-355• 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid., series II, V, PP• 354-355° 
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lines.39 Finally, on June 30, 1B63, R. o. Ould, Exchange Agent for the 
Confederacy, learned that Colonel Morehead had been released. Ould 
l~unched an official complaint about the delay of the exchange, and 
denounced Union officials for their ill treatment of prisoners. Those 
Confederates just released had reported as many as eighteen men had 
been confined together in cells fifteen-feet square, with almost no 
ventilation--reason that Morehead's imprisonment would have lasting 
effects on his health.40 Nevertheless, Morehead was released, his 
spirit undampened by his captivity. 
On July 16, 1B63, back in Jackson, Mississippi, Morehead was 
anxious to reorganize his Kentucky Partisan Range,rs and wrote immedi-
ately to General Joseph E. Johnson, Confederate Commander of the 
Department of the West. He reported to Johnson that his command was 
scattered; however, he declared his certainty that he could reorganize 
as many as eight hundred men. Morehead added that his capture was un-
fortunate, but not due to any negligence of duty. He assured the 
general that he could reorganize his rangers "so.speedily that it would 
occasion no detriment to the service.1141 Perhaps he actually reorgan-
ized his men, but his death prevented his fighting further for the 
South. He died in 1B64 at Jackson, Mississippi. Morehead had served 
the Confederacy well, and his bravery and devotion to the cause showed 
39Ibid. , P• 702~ 
40ibid., series II, VI, P• 63. 
41Joseph c. M;orehead to General Joseph E. Johnson, July 16, 1B63, 
Jackson, Mississippi, Service File of Joseph c. Morehead. 
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the mettle of his Kentucky ancestors.42 
With recurring filibusters such as the Morehead expedition, the 
United States government finally began to take steps, at least verbally, 
to hinder such activities being organized in this country. On May 3, 
1851, Secretary of War D •. M. Conrad wrote General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, 
commander in the Pacific area, that one of his duties was to defend 
Mexican territory against raids by Indians or by others originating 
from the United States.43 In his second Annual Message to Congress 
President Millard Fillmore on December 2, 1851, denounced filibustering 
expeditions and encouraged the legal authorities to stop such schemes 
whenever possible.44 Fillmore referred to the filibustering attempts 
to free Spanish Cuba that same year, but his statements applied to all 
such expeditions. In practice the United States government and Cali-
fornia authorities made a few attempts to stop raids into Mexico, but 
very little was accomplished. 
Many Arericans believed that the United States should have annexed 
Baja California and Sonora after the Mexican War. The Daily ~ 
California recorded that "the common dictat·e.s of a very simple states-
manship ought to have shown the necessity, at a single glance, of 
42H. Levin, ed., The Lawyers and Lawmakers .£!.Kentucky (Chicago, 
[n.d.]), P• 324. His four-year-old daughter, Margaret L. Mol'Bhead, 
was left orphaned, to be cared for by the soldiers of his regiment. 
She later was adopted and raised by Major General Simon B. Buckner and 
his family. On November 30, 1880, Margaret married Reuben Anderson 
Miller, of Owensboro, the son of another prominent Kentucky family. 
43c. M. Conrad to General Hitchcock, Washington D. c., May 3, 1851, 
Senate.~· !!££.• !_, 32 Cong., 1 sess., Serial 611, pp •. 142-143~ 
44A. M. Schlesinger and F. L. Israel, eds., The State of the Union 
Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966, (New York-;-l966), I-;-PP• 808-813. 
retaining at least one shore of the large Gulf in possession of the 
American Government. 1145 Many still believed that the United States 
had only to be patient and keep foreign influence out of Baja Cali-
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fornia and Sonora in order to see these areas eventually fall into the 
United States' sphere of influence. The editors of the Daily ill!, 
California believed that "we can philosophically 'bide our time,' and 
patiently wait the unfolding of the 'Manifest Destiny' whose strides 
are so gigantic, so certain, so rapid and so wonderful. 1146 Unfortu-
nately, some Americans were unwilling to wait the desired change of 
territory by mere "destiny'' alone; they wanted to hasten the process, 
by force of arms if necessary. 
Joseph C. Morehead--politician, scoundrel, and adventurer~infused 
his band of followers with a desire for conquest, but the delay in 
San Diego and.confusion in Mexico demonstrated his inability to direct 
their actions. However, Morehead' s expedition did serve notice on 
Mexico and Latin America that many Americans believed it was their 
destiny to dominate the western hemisphere. As a result of the Mexican 
·reaction to this attitude, Americans continued to be in jeopardy when 
south of the border whether they were peaceful businessmen or government 
representatives. As late as February, 1859, the United States Consul 
in Guaymas considered the situation almost untenable. c. P. Stone, 
acting consul, wrote Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, that "nothing but 
45Daily ill_! California, September 20, 1851 .. 
46Ibid. 
material force will suffice to protect Americans in their lives and 
property. n47 The United States was unwilling to use this "material 
force," and adventurous Americans continued to gamble their lives in 
order to fulfill their dreams of power and riches. 
47c. P. Stone to Lewis Cass, February 21, 1859, Guaymas, Sonora, 
Consular Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, National Archives 
(Microfilm copy in the Oklahoma State University Library). 
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CHAPTER IV 
FRENCH SETTLEMENT IN SONORA 
On the evening of June 5, 1852, a tiny group of weary Frenchmen 
straggled into Rayon, Mexico. They had fought Indians, starvation, and 
Mexican authorities in order to remain in Sonora. The Mexican govern-
ment had promised financial support for these French settlers to settle 
on the frontier in the vain hope that the French would be a buffer 
against the rampaging Apaches. However, these Frenchmen came not so 
much to"'.settle as to find fortune and power by exploiting abandoned 
Spanish gold and silver mines. They had no intention of farming or 
fighting Indians unless forced to do so. Thus neither Frenchmen nor 
Mexicans were sincere in their agreeroonts. This small French party 
stopped at Rayon on its way back to the colony at Cocospera. The 
Frenchmen had been to Ures to demand, to no avail, the supplies 
promised by the Mexican government. During that night at Rayon, a shot 
was heard in the cottage where the leader of the expedition was sleep-
ing. The men discovered him in a pool of blood, shot through the fore-
head. The death weapon lay next to his body. Thus died Count Charles 
de Pindray. Whether he was murdered or committed suicide was not and 
is not lmown. The truth would have made little difference had it been 
revealed, however, for his dreams of power and wealth had been 
J.t: 
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shattered and his expedition scattered.1 
From 1848 to 1852 many thousands of French immigrants had journeyed 
to California and Mexico to seek their fortunes. France was tom by 
poverty, revolution, and economic depression during these years. 
Suffering under extreme hardship in their own country, the emigrating 
sons of Gaul sought any rreans of escape. News of the gold strike in 
California sent these downtrodden French to the United States and 
Mexico. Most went only for gold; others sought adventure; still others 
left France for political reasonso 2 Especially after 1849 did the 
French come in greater numbers. Private and governmantal companies 
organized the emigrants in France to finance their passage to Cali-
fomia. By 1851 nearly twenty thousand Frenchmen lived in that area, 
mostly in the central and northern parts. 
Almost from the beginning of French settlement in that area, 
strife had been constant between these "foreigners" and the Anglo-
Americans. Many Arrericans considered the French the same as Mexicans 
and lumped them together under the inaccurate name "greasers." How-
ever, in cities such as San Francisco, Frenchmen enjoyed great success 
in business. Merchants and importers of luxuries made quick fortunes 
selling French goods to a culture-starved frontier clientel. or 
course, not all Frenchmen were wealthy or successful--some had found 
neither gold in the wilderness nor security in the cities. This group 
1naily Alta California, August 15, 1852. See also, Horacio 
Sobarzo, C~ De La Aventura De Raousset-Boulbon En Sonora (Mexico, 
1954), P• 54. - - - -
2Many works are available describing the situation in France. 
See, John Plamenatz, Revolutionary Movement in France, 1815-1871 
(London, 1952). See also, Gordon Wright, France in Modern ~: 
1760 to Present (Chicago, 1960). 
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of unemployed, dissident, and adventurous argonauts provided a vast 
pool of ready volunteers for filibustering in Mexico or for a new start 
in that foreign and slightly exotic land. 
Newspapers in California reported that Sonora was possibly even 
richer in resources than California. Allegedly $5,000,000 in gold was 
exported from Gua;Ymas in 1848, and, although this was reported to have 
decreased by one-half in 1851, many people in California believed that 
the potential for quick mining wealth still existed in Mexico. 3 When 
Charles de Pindray reached California in 1850, he soon was captivated 
by the dreams of Mexican gold. 
According to French writers of the age, Pindray was eminently 
suited for the role of adventurer--a man who would have accomplished 
his mission had he not died so mysteriously.4 He was described as 
sullen, morose, restless, and extravagant, but unfortunately his repu-
tation proceeded him wherever he went. In fact, the French minister 
in Mexico, Andre Levasseur, wrote to the French Consul at Guaymas 
early in 1852, advising that Pindray had left France because of in-
volvement in illegal activities. 
Pindray was born in Poitu, France, scion of a principal family. 
From his childhood he reportedly was disobedient and devious. Perhaps 
for this reason he was sent to a Jesuit school where he studied until 
he was sixteen; then he was expelled as uncontrollable. Next his 
father sent him to a correctional institute, from which he shortly 
3naily Alta California, October 5, 1852. 
4charles de Lambertie, Le Drame de La Sonora, L'Etat De Sonora, 
M.• Le Comte De Raousset-BoulbOn Et M_. Charles De Piildray:-(Fa'ris, 1855), 
PP• 208-209. 
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escaped. He joined the French cavalry and at eighteen participated 
in several campaigns in Africa. After the death of his father, how-
ever, he inherited some wealth, returned to his homeland, and lived 
elegantly in Poitiers for a time. Fond of women, drink, and duels, he 
soon exhausted his inheritance and moved to Paris hoping to recoup his 
fortune. He only acquired considerable debts there, however, and after 
involvement in illegal financial activities, fled to North Arrerica. He 
arrived in Massachusetts in 1846 where he remained two years before 
journeying on to Missouri, Oregon, Nevada, and finally California. 
Once in California he rarely spoke of himself, for as Maurice Soule' 
wrote, Pindray was the type of man who would not reveal anything of his 
past. Pindray was said to have dug gold at Carson Bar in 1849. He 
was constantly involved in quarrels with Arrerican miners, however, 
supposedly killing one miner and wounding another in a knife fight. 
Indeed, when he met Count Gaston Raousset-Boulbon, Pindray had just 
been involved in a knife fight in San Francisco. 5 During his entire 
life Pindray seemed bothered by a restless spirit, and he often remarked 
that his only real goal was peace of the soul. 6 
While drifting through San Francisco in 1850, Pindray learned that 
the Mexican Vice-Consul at San Francisco, William Schleiden, wanted 
colonists to establish a settlement in northern Mexico. He believed 
this his golden opportunity and quickly volunteered to lead the expe-
dition. Plans were formulated, and men were recruited easily. So much 
5Farrell Symons, tr., The Wolf ~: The Great Adventures of Count 
de Raousset-Soulbon in California and Sonora, 1850-1854, by Maurice 
Soulie, (Indianpolis, 1927), PP• 80-8<). 
6sobarzo, crcrnica de la Aventura, PP• 43-52. 
enthusiasm developed for the enterprise that Pindray charged each 
volunteer forty to fifty dollars to become a member of the company. 
This provided some financing for the venture; and, moreover, Mexican 
authorities promised financial assistance and material support when 
the group reached Guayrnas. In addition, Mexican colonization laws 
were being considered which would legalize French colonization on the 
frontiers and provide more financial support.7 
The Mexican government doubtless hoped that French settlements 
would function as a buffer against Indian attacks, for villages along 
the frontier were exposed to the fury of fierce Indians, principally 
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Apaches. That tribe had destroyed millions of dollars worth of proper-
ty during the years 1848 to 1852 and had carried off horses, cattle, 
women, and children, while laying waste to the entire countryside. 
Even friendly Indians, unprotected by the Mexican government, were 
forced to join the warring tribes. Consequently fields remained un-
plowed, agricultural production virtually stopped, and many thousands 
starved. 8 Most of northern Mexico was poverty stricken, and the Daily 
~ California recorded that the "people do not hesitate to make a 
living by anything, honorable or dishonorable, and that her [Mexico's] 
calendar of crime is daily on the increase." 9 
The plight of Sonora was well known in the United States; there-
fore, many Americans believed that state, if not all of Mexico, was 
ripe for revolution~ Thus even before the launching of the Pindray 
7Lambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, PP• 207-209. See also 
Chapter two. ~ ~ ~ 
8oailr ~California, October 5, 1852. 
9Ibid., August 16, 1852. 
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expedition, questions arose as to its true intent. Some residents 
of California believed the French had revolutionary intent, but, 
according to the Daily ~ California, accusations of this nature 
were "entirely devoid of truth. 1110 Pindray and eighty-eight Frenchmen 
sailed for Mexico aboard the bark Cumberland in November of 1B51. 
Additional reinforcements were soon to follow, increasing the size of 
the expedition to 150 men.11 The first group arrived at Guaymas a 
month later, receiving a favorable welcome from the local citi.zens. 
The Frenchmen had arrived sooner than expected, however, and the 
• 
Mexican government was taken by surprise. The national Congress had not 
yet acted on the French colonization bills; consequently, President 
Mariano Arista sent General Miguel Blanco with a detachment of soldiers 
to protect Sonora. The troops were not needed, for shortly the Mexican 
Congress passed all pending colonization bills.12 In addition, the 
Sonoran government granted the Frenchmen three leagues of land near 
Cocospera, a village in the valley of Rio San Miguel, and that state 
looked upon the French as deliverers from the Apache ravages. A 
stipulation in the colonization agreement required the French to cul.ti-
vate the land for ten years before disposing of ito The state of 
Sonora also gave the French thirty ho1's.es, thirty mules, thirty burros, 
lOib.d l. • , November 17, 1851. 
11r.ambertie, Le Drame de Sonora, pp. 209-211. See also, Daily A1.!:! 
California, November 22, 1851. 
12naily; Alta California, October 5, 1852. Those bills passed were 
not several colonization plans, such those described in Chapter II; 
rather they were specific bills to aid particular colonists such as the 
French in Sonora. 
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and $1,800 in silver.1.3 
The colonists began limited agricultural projects to sustain them-
selves, but urged the Mexican government to bring five hundred more 
colonists to the area. The national Congress did not act immediately 
on this request, but granted additional land on condition that no 
Arooricans be allowed to join the settlement. Perhaps Arooricans tried 
to join the enterprise, but, if so, they were rejected. It was re-
ported that a Mr. Moore along with a few other Arrericans had accompanied 
the French into Sonora. Possibly these Americans were part of the 
original expedition, but when the French learned of the anti-American 
sentiment in Mexico, they probably expelled the "gringos" in order to 
enhance the prospect of success. 
The New ~ Dail;[ I...imes reported on June .30, 1852, that other 
Arooricans entered Sonora during this period. One such newspaper 
report stated that a party of ten, led by two men known as Thompson 
and Hays, was fleeing from Indians. While escaping, they encountered 
Pindray's party in Sonora. The French threatened to kill the intruders, 
but were stopped by the alcalde at Irmis who provided sanctuary for the 
Arooricans.14 On another occasion an official boundary surveying 
party, led by John Russell Bartlett, met the French near Hennosillo. 
Bartlett recorded that he met a party of 150 Frenchmen going to 
Cocospera: "They were a rather hard-looking and determined set of men, 
with long beards and sunburnt faceso Each one carried a musket or 
l.3~ York Daily Times, June .30, 1852. 
14Ibid. 
rifle, besides which many had pistols. 1115 
Pindray and his men reached Cocospera in March and began limited 
agricultural projects after fighting nearby Apaches.16 In one early 
contact with the Indians, the French killed four members of a raiding 
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party and captured at least twenty-one horses. Pindray sent word back 
to California that because the Indians had no access to lead they were 
using silver bullets. By the time this information was :reported in 
California, the story had been magnified to such an extent that tales 
of silver mines in northern Mexico were prevalent. The French thus 
remained near Cocospera only until a few reinforcements arrived, and 
then they began searching for lost mines.17 It was at this point that 
Mexican authorities turned against the French. 
The reasons for the Mexican change of heart were many, but pri-
marily it came as a result of information about Pindray' s past. Don 
Manuel Robles Pezuela, Minister of War for Mexico, wrote to General 
Miguel Blanco on April 28, 1852, explaining the background of the 
French leader and warning the local government of potential danger. 
Robles told Blanco that Pindray should be watched carefully, for the 
Frenchman had committed several acts against the French R.epublic and 
had been forced to leave France quickly to save his life. The minister 
added that Pindray probably would abuse the hospitality of the state 
of Sonora, and therefore should be considered dangerous. As a result 
l5John Russell Bartlett, Personal Narrative of Explorations and 
Incidents, I (New York, 1854), P• 472. 
16 El Sonorense, February 4, 185.3. See also, Bancroft, North 
Mexican States, II, P• 676. 
17oai!z A11! California, August 15 and July 14, 1852. See also, 
El Sonorense, May 14, 1852. 
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of this information, Blanco refused additional supplies to the French. 
Pindray was warned that if he disobeyed any Mexican laws his men would 
be driven out of the country, while he would be imprisoned at Mazat1a1i. 
With the Mexicans withholding support and equipment, the colony 
began to disintegrate. Pindray tenaciously argued for his right to 
remain in Sonora~ and attempted to force the government to fulfill its 
agreement.18 During this period of difficulty with the Mexican govern-
ment, fifteen or twenty colonists withdrew from the company to look for 
silver mines. Eventually these deserters did find what they sought at 
Saint Theresa; however, they had to abandon it when the Apaches attacked 
in force. Nor did the Frenchmen get title to their mine. Quite con-
veniently a local judge prolonged the French claims' proceedings for 
ten days--enough tire for a group of Mexicans to pre-empt the French 
site. With this final failure, the smaller group of Frenchmen left 
for California--in disgust.19 
Pindray tried one final tire to persuade the Mexican government 
to support his expedition. With a part of his men, he made a special 
trip to Ures hoping to force supplies from the authorities. Of course, 
such a belligerent attitude only seemed to confirm previous Mexican 
suspicions about him. The Mexicans refused him aid, so he and his ren 
began the trip bac~ to Cocospera. They stopped for the night at Rayon, 
and there he died--possibly from a Mexican bullet. 20 The Daily~ 
California of August 15, 1852, suggested that Pindray "committed suicide 
18Sobarzo, cro"nica de 1!, Aventura, PP• 52-53. 
l9Daily Alta California, October 18, 1852. 
20Lambertie, '!& Drame ~la Sonora, PP• 256-257. 
by blowing out his brains ••• whilst laboring under a high fever, and 
in a fit of despair. 1121 When news of his death reached those sur-
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vivers at Cocospera, many of them quickly returned to California, some 
to join other French expeditions already there-part:Les led by Sainte 
Amant or by Count Gaston Raousset-Boulbon. 
Sainte ,f.\.mant was the French consular agent at Sacramento, but he 
was vitally interested in the gold mines of Sonora. Through their 
wealth he planned to increase his power. His expedition was fanned at 
Pl.acer, California, a center for French settlement in the state. From 
there he and his men sailed to Guaymas in the barks Sonora and 
Hennosillo. From Guaymas he planned to explore the interior for gold 
and silver mines abandoned years before. Allegedly the group had 
$14,000 in cash when it started and received an additional $500, along 
with provisions, when it reached Sonora. The Amant party did explore 
the interior and find some ore which appeared to be gold, but it was 
too scattered to be of any value. The men soon learned through ex-
perience that there was insufficient water for large mining operations, 
even if gold could be located. 
Sainte Amant' s expedition suffered greatly in Mexico. One member 
wrote the Daily Alta California that every day he saw his "unfortunate 
countrymen, either from Santa Cruz or Cosespera [sic], in a state of 
misery and prostration difficult to describe, without shoes, without 
clothes, harrassed by fatigue, without money, dying of hunger and 
afflicted with the disentery."22 Records reveal that many of the French 
21naily Alta California, August 15, 1852. 
22-:_ 
--Ibid., October 18, 1852. 
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adventurers had to beg alms from house to house in the Sonoran villages 
to sustain themselves. Before long this group also scattered. Thus 
the early French expeditions in Sonora ended in disaster, as Morehead'~ 
had earlier. Despite such reports reaching California, however other 
men were anxious to follow, gambling their fortunes or lives in this 
barren land. Thus both Frenchmen and Americans would follow Morehead, 
Pindray, and Sainte Amant into Mexico. 
CHAPTER V 
RAOUSSET~ULBON'S ENTRANCE 
Although surviving members of Charles Pindray' s colony joined a 
larger and better organized group of French colonists in Mexico, they 
still were denied success. Mexican attitudes toward foreigners changed 
only for the worse. No group could hope to satisfy both local and 
central authorities, who themselves were toppled from power with such 
stunning rapidity. Intrigue, danger, and uncertainty continued to 
charac,terize Mexican politics during this era. Nevertheless, an enter-
prising Frenchman, Count Gaston Raousset Boulbon, attempted to make an 
agreement with Mexican authorities which would allow him to establish 
French colonies in Mexico. In truth, this French nobleman had more 
than colonies in mi.r).d, for he had a grandiose dream of becoming the 
"Sultan of Sonora." 
Raousset was born in 1817 at Avignon into a wealthy old family 
which had fallen from political prominence. Unmanageable as a boy he 
listened to no one and, when disciplined, flew into an unmanageable 
rage. He was reputed to be irascible and autocratic-so much so that 
by age seven the browbeaten house servants referred to him as the 
"wolf cub. 111 Soon after his eighth birthday, his father placed the boy 
~aurice Soulie, La Grande Aventura: ~'epopie du~~ 
Raqusset-Boulbon ~ Mexigue, 1850-1854 (Paris, 1926). See also, Daily 
Alta California, April 5, 1853. 
r:t. 
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in a Gennan Jesuit school reknown for its discipline, His years there 
were turbulent, but he did become an excellent student. At seventeen, 
when he was forced to leave the academy, he was the recognized leader 
among the students. Unfortunately, he had quarreled with the princi-
pal of the college and was expelled. 
Once in the world, young Raousset set about proving his abilities. 
He inherited considerable wealth from his mother's estate, and until 
he was 28 the young Frenchman lived fashionably in Paris. He allegedly 
wrote two plays, which were never performed and a novel. He helped 
publish a journal called Liberti.' A man of various experiences, he 
also engaged briefly, and significantly, in colonial speculation in 
North Africa in 1845. After the revolution of 1848, he entered French 
politics. He announced for the legislature, but failed to win. Then 
in 1850, after he had dissipated his mother's inheritance, he acquired 
additional wealth from his father. This he likewise squandered in 
Paris. Thereupon Raousset moved to London, and it was there that he 
heard of that golden opportunity and followed the stream of hopefuls 
bound for the gold fields of California. 2 
Raousset arrived in the new Eldorado on August 22, 1850, fully 
expecting--as did most fortune hunters--to get rich quickly. But his 
previous position as a French nobleman made mining distasteful and 
dirty; therefore, he made his living by hunting and working for shipping 
companies as a boatman. Before long in San Francisco, he called on the 
French Consul, Patrice Dillon, to inquire about opportunities of any 
type. Doubtless, the Consul advised him to return to France-it was a 
2sobarzo, c£nica de la Aventura, PP• 61-64. 
difficult time for a French nobleman to live in California.3 Neverthe-
less, the count remained in San Francisco, and, according to the French 
writer Maurice Soulie, Raousset met Charles Pindray in a bar. Seeing 
the same unfulfilled desire for power and position in each other, they 
could not have worked together--they were too much alike. 
Nevertheless, Pindray may have offered Raousset a position in his 
expedition planned for Mexico, But probably each insisted on being 
the sole leader. Whatever the cause, Pindray's expedition left for 
Mexico early in 1852 without Raousset, who began to organize a similar 
exploit. The French consul, also intrigued by the possibilities in 
North Mexico, encouraged the French nobleman's preparations for such a 
party. As evidence of his i...riterest, Consul Dillon wrote a letter of 
introduction to Andre Levasseur, t~e French minister in Mexico. It was 
in this letter that Raousset's goals were outlined as peaceful and law 
abiding. On February 17, 1852, Raousset left San Francisco for Mexico, 
hoping to obtain permission from the Mexican government to bring French 
colonists to Sonora, allegedly to work in the mines. Levasseur proved 
very amiable, and through his efforts Raousset secured political 
support from President Mariano Arista and financial backing from the 
great Franco-Mexican banking house of Jecker, Torre, and Company. 
This was only the first in a series of services Levasseur performed in 
behalf of the French count in Mexico. 4 Thus, Raousset found his entry 
singularly simple. 
On April 7, 1857, a contract was signed with the banking firm, 
3Lambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, PP• 130-13,3. - --
4ures El Sonorense, September 24, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora7lf.' P:- 64. See also, Daily Alta California, November 25, 1852 .. 
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and a corporation called the Compaliia R.estaurada de la Mina de la 
Arizona was established as a subsidiary company to Jacker and Company. 
According to the contract, Raousset was to recruit 150 Frenchmen in 
San Francisco and then return to Guaymas, Sonora, to meet with govern-
mental agents who would accompany them to the area of settlement. 
Jacker and Company agreed to pay all bills incurred in outfitting the 
party. If mines or other valuables were found, the company would re-
ceive one-half as its share.5 The Daily~ California was quick to 
suggest that "according to Raousset's contract with the house of Jecker, 
Torre and Company, he is bound to take the mines from any parties in 
whose possession he may find them." The same newspaper reported that 
"the sum spent already in this enterprise is from $30,000 to $40,000."6 
This was to be a very expensive venture; therefore, to protect its 
investment and doubtless to keep the Mexican gove~nt informed, the 
company appointed a retired Mexican army colonel as its agent to 
accompany the French. 7 The contract of the R.estaurada called for lo-
cating and working mines abandoned since the eighteenth century. Gold 
and silver had been located in the eighteenth century near the present 
northern border of Sonora at a place called the R.eal de Arizona, once 
a Spanish mining community. Mexican authorities and citizens hoped that 
if the French settled in that area, the settlers would be a buffer 
against Indian raids as well as Anglo-American intrusion. To assure 
5wyllys, The French in Sonora, pp. 73-74• See also, Daily~ 
California, November 25, 1852. 
6Daily Alta California, November 25, 1852. 
7ures El Sonorense, Septerriber 17, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
V. P• fil:- -
the venture a measure of success, the Jecker Company involved many 
local and national Mexican officials in the scheme by promising them 
8 either political support or a share of the wealth found. 
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Many Mexican citizens were optimistic about the French colonizers, 
hoping settlements would help to stabilize the frontier. According to 
an American living in Guaymas at the time, all the people who had met 
Raousset were "convinced that this expedition must have the best re-
sults." 9 And, while a group of Sonorans had been in New York, they had 
reported to the New I2!!£ Daily ~ that affairs in their state were 
"sorrowful indeed. The Apaches are conunitting depredations in the 
neighborhood of Hermosillo, and there seems now to be as great a 
necessity to defend the interior as there has been heretofore to pro-
tect the frontier." Taking into consideration all of the problems in 
Sonora, these people speculated that "the French will eventually succeed 
in Sonora, which must ultimately come into the possession of the United 
10 States," 
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1852, Raousset returned to San Francisco 
to prepare his expedition. While he was away, the central governrrent 
quarreled with the state over land grants, and a competitor to Jecker 
and Company emerged. The Barron, Forbes, and Company--another powerful 
banking house, tied to financial interests in San Francisco--organized 
a colonization company similar to that of the French, except this 
company proposed to use only Mexican colonists from the interior in its 
8New York Dail;y; Tines, August 6, 1852. See also, Da.:Ll;y; ~ 
California, May 24, 1852. 
9Dail;y; ~California, August 28, 1852. 
lONew York Dail;y; Times, December 23, 1852. 
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operations in Sonora. The new company also sought to delay the French 
venture, influencing Sonoran officials against foreigners living almost 
autonomously in northern Sonora. The Barron Company propaganda was so 
effective that even while Raousset was yet in California, Levasseur 
was forced to ask for a settlement with officials of the competing 
11 company. 
As others before him, Raousset found recruiting a simple task 
among disillusioned Frenchmen in and near San Francisco. All members 
of the expedition were promised a share of the land and wealth found, 
and this appealed to the weary and desperate. Anglo-Americans we~e 
excluded from the venture, as Mexican law forbade them from colonizing 
in that land. Once the nearly two hundred men were recruited, arms, 
ammunitions, and other supplies were purchased. With Raousset as su-
preme commander, the group was divided into sections of twenty ren. 
Raousset chose as leaders of the first four companies N. Lenoir, 
Achille Garnier, Amed~ Fayolle, and Jean Marie Lafranc. Lenoir was 
described as brave and from a good family, but a man who had suffered 
considerable reverses because of his excessive drinking. Lefranc was 
thought to be a fanatical supporter of Raousset. Fayolle was said to 
be a man of considerable organization genius, while Garnier was a 
dashing, gallant man of the world.12 This odd assortment of lieuten-
ants, along with Raousset, was to form the governing body of the 
company. 
Preparations and planning completed, the Raousset expedition 
11ures El Sonorense, September 2.4, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora-;-f;" P. 65. See also, Sobarzo, Cronica de la Aventura, 
12sobarzo, crcrnica de g Aventura, PP• 88-89. 
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prepared to leave for Guaymas. However, before sailing they were de-
tained briefly by United States customs officials who questioned the 
legality of the expedition.13 After Dillon and the Mexican consul 
assured officials that the expedition was operating under Mexican 
sanction, Raousset and his group were allowed to depart from San 
Francisco aboard the Archibald Gracie, a leased ship operating under 
Mexican license. The Daily &b!:! California reported the departure, 
adding that the venture was surely legal, as the French were "acting 
in concert with the authorities of the state of Sonora and an influ-
ential company in Mexico, composed of bankers and members of the 
. Mexican Congress. 1114 
When R.aousset arrived in Mexico, he carried letters of recom-
mendation from Levasseur to all concerned Sonoran officialso Thus he 
expected to be greeted warmly. However, while he received a cordial 
welcome from the citizens of Guaymas, he soon learned that state 
authorities had become almost hostile, These officials insisted that 
Raousset follow the colonization rules closely and avoid any ostenta-
tious display of military power.15 Raousset waited in Guaymas until 
the Jecker, Torre and Company agent, Colonel Gi~ez, arrived on June 
10, After the agent's arrival, the French leader notified state 
authorities that he was prepared to leave for the colonization site. 
General Miguel Blanco, commander of state troops, replied, indicating 
the entire French party was to travel to Pozo, west of Guaymas, before 
l3Symons, tr., The Wolf Cub, PP• 133-135· 
14naily Alta California, May 24, 1S52. 
1 15Lambertie, !&_ Drame ~ la Sonora, pp. 22-23. See also, Sobarzo 
Cronica de la Aventura, pp. 91-92. · 
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doing anything else. With these unusual directions the party knew 
something obviously was wrong, but neither Raousset nor the port cap-
tain at Guaymas realized what was transpiring. 
By this time the state governor, as well as other high Mexican 
officials, had been in contact with rival firm of Barron, Forbes, and 
Company. And these Mexican leaders were having second thoughts about 
a well-armed alien force living on the northern border. During this 
indecisive interim, the captain of the port gave the French permission 
to leave Pozo and travel to Ures where state officials could be. reached. 
The governor, Fernando Cubillas, heatedly chastized both the port cap-
tain and the prefect of Salvacion for allowing the Frenchmen freedom 
of movementa The governor advised the prefect that the port captain 
"h d d h al d ..;,.. perm-itt;na i't. 1116 as one very wrong, an you ave so one wrong .. Lu ..... --o
In reporting to the congress of the state Cubillas also said the French 
had behaved badly by landing at Guaymas in full military style, "with 
two pieces of artillery at the head, and with other military para-
phenalia which was against the laws of the country. 1117 At this point 
in the conflict, the French minister Levasseur deemed it wise official-
ly to withdraw from the Restaurada. After his withdrawal any French 
governmental interest became unofficial. Several weeks passed with 
little action on either side. There continued to be speculation in the 
United States concerning the involvement of the French government in 
this colonization scheme, but the New~ Daily Times reported it 
16cubillas to the Prefect of Salvaci&n, Ures, June 41, 1852, 
Ures El Sonorense, June 25, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 
P• .32:-
l7 Cubillas to the State Congress of Sonora, Ures, September 2.3, 
1852, ibid., October 1, 1852, P• 72. 
doubtful that the French officially were interested in Mexico. The 
same newspaper also hinted "that the French government was not a 
stranger to the enterprises of certain French adventurers on the 
Pacific Coast. 1118 
Raousset quickly made enemies in Mexico, for he referred to him-
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self as "sultan of Sonora," inviting the opinion from Governor Cubillas 
that Raousset's intentions w~re not those of a legitimate colonizer, 
but possibly of an illegal filibuster. 19 At Ures, the state capital, 
Raousset experienced defeat. Earlier he had met with Jos/ Aguilar, 
then governor of Sonora, and with Interim Governor Cubillas, but no 
satisfactory settlement could be reached in the colonist's case. 
After Raousset returned to Guaymas to impose some order on his restless 
troops, he received word from General Blanco that the main body of the 
French could move inland to Hermosillo, a city then numbering about 
15,000. Blanco added that Raousset and Gi~ez should not go with the 
main group but come at once to military headquarters in Arizpe. How-
ever, Raousset went with his men to Hermosillo where on July 12, 1S52, 
he wrote to Patrice Dillon of the unfolding of events in Mexico. He 
reported that after a month's wait at Guaymas, he finally had per-
mission to continue to Arizona. The French leader stated that "the 
condition of the company is excellent, and I have the greatest con-
fidence in the future, I have come to seek in Sonora." 20 
18New York Daily Times, December 17, 1852. 
l9Cubillas to the State Congress of Sonora, Ures, September 23, 
1$52, Ures El Sonorense, October 1, 1S52, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora-;--v,- P. 76. 
20Daily Alta California, October 25, 1S52. 
How the French leader could display such confidence in the face of 
Blanca's restrictions is difficult to understand. Raousset probably 
did not believe that Blanco would continue to demand the leader's 
presence in Arizpe. Nevertheless, Blanco again wrote the count to 
present himself quickly at Arizpe. The Interim Governor Cubillas had 
decided that all means should be used to detain the French until "they 
had complied with requisites1121 set by the government. Although the 
Mexicans had given permission for the majority of the French force to 
continue to the frontier, most remained with Raousset expecting more 
serious trouble to developa They whiled away their wait working on 
supplies, practicing shooting, or carousing in local taverns. 
While disagreements developed between Raousset and Sonoran ,,, 
officials, a vicious argu.nent erupted between Colonel Gimenez, the 
company agent, and the leader. Girn(r;.ez charged Raousset with spending 
funds recklessly and not making an accounting of the money. By the 
tirne the expedition prepared to leave Hermosillo, both men distinctly 
distrusted and disliked the other considerably. On July 27, as the 
party prepared to leave for Saric, Raousset tentatively agreed to go 
to Arizpe to talk with Blanco. However, two days later, the entire 
French force, Raousset in the lead, left Hermosillo in full military 
uniform. The group left in parade fashion, with their leader in front 
with his sword drawn. The departure was calculated to impress the 
local citizens, although the Mexican government had warned the French 
against any ostentatious display of military power. Not only did 
21cubillas to the State Congress of Sonora, Ures, Septernbe r 23, 
1852, Ures El Sonorense, October 1, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora71T, i):' 73. 
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Raousset leave flaunting the group's strength, but he left without 
keeping his appointment with the Mexican general. 22 Colonel Gimenez 
immediately withdrew from the group. Later, Gi~ez rejoined the 
French when Raousset agreed to stop brandishing weapons and intimidat-
ing Mexican citizens. Gime'nez and Juan Jaroszewski, a mining expert 
hired by Jecker and Company, rode in advance of Raousset's group, and 
at the Hacienda de Santa Ana encountered one of General Blanco's 
messengers. The dispatch from Blanco again ordered Raousset and 
Gi~ez to come to military headquarterso Gim~ez felt they should 
comply, but Ra.ousset did not acqµiese until after he had talked with 
his officers. After a brief consultation the two men left with the 
Mexican escort. 
En route to Arizpe, Raousset's party was joined by six survivors 
of Pindray's colony. They camped near Cocospera, where nearly forty 
French families lived. After talking to these survivors, Raousset 
decided he would not go to Arizpe but instead would send Achille Gar-
nier as his representativeo Raousset made it known that his group 
would fall apart without his presence; therefore, after a few days rest 
he rejoined his party. 23 It is likely that while visiting with the 
remaining colonists of the Pindray settlement, Ra.ousset heard of the 
mysterious death of Pindray. With this knowledge he may have re-
considered the consequences of the influence being brought to bear by 
Barron, Forbes and Company. He felt he could no longer continue his 
22sobarzo, Cronica de la Aventura, PP• 97-98. -----
23Lambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, pp. 36-37. See also, Sobarzo, 
CrOnica de la Aventura, pp:-103-104; and Wyllys, ~ French in Sonora, 
PP• 95-9be 
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plans without Mexican help, so he reportedly went to see Manuel Marta 
Gandara, seeking aid in overthrowing the state government. Gandara 
doubtless realized the futility of such careless action for he refused 
to participate.24 
Raousett's decision to avoid General Blanco was intuitive, because 
when G~ez arrived at Arizpe he was placed in a military jail for dis-
regarding earlier orders to appear. The Mexicans were disappointed 
that Raousset had not arrived, but they still talked of giving terms to 
the French in the hope of avoiding outright warfare. The French were 
told they nnlst renounce their French citizenship and obey all Mexican 
laws; then they would be allowed to petition in Ures for letters of 
security, which would allow them to proceed to their destination with 
a Mexican escort and which would provide them with permits for civilian 
colonization. Finally Blanco urged the French to reduce their force 
to fifty unarmed men to work the mines; they would be protected by the 
Mexican military. Raousset knew that the Mexicans previously had been 
unable to supply adequate military protection on the frontier--com-
pliance with the latter term would be. ceftafu. suicide. 25 
The count gave the expected reply--the terms were untenable. 
Blanco reacted by preparing an imroodiate expedition against the foreign 
intruders. Throughout Mexico rumors spread that the French had sent 
"agents to California to bring a larger number of armed Frenchmen and 
21.iuaily Alta California, November 10, 1852• See also, Sobarzo, 
Cronica de laTventura, P• 109. 
25sobarzo, croriica de la Aventura, PP• 109-110. See also, Wyllys, 
The. French in Sonora, :p:-9s. 
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other resources for resistance. 11 26 Raousset felt that his word and his 
contract with the Mexicans indicated his legal right, and chose not to 
be intimidated by the superior military authorities. Z'1 Yet his legal 
underpinings were soon swept away. The Sonoran Congress abrogated all 
mining claims that the French had filed, and on October 1, 1852, it 
appropriated funds for a large military campaign against the French. 28 
The following day General Blanco advised Governor Cubillas that the 
army was marching to meet the enemy. 29 In that space the governor 
made one last attempt to avert bloodshed. He appealed to the good 
sense of the French, indicating that if Raousset did not comply at 
once he and his followers would be treated "as pirates and dealt with 
as sucho" The governor insisted that foreigners must "strictly submit 
to the requirements of the laws of the Republic for their permanancy 
30 in the Country." 
In his appeal to Raousset, the governor urged the count and his 
men to accept letters of security and to become unarmed civilian 
settlers. He indicated that he favored the French settling in military 
colonies as outlined by the colonization plan of 1848. The Mexican 
leader strongly stated to Raousset that the Mexican government had used 
26cubillas to the State Congress of Sonora, Ures, September 23, 
1852, Ures El Sonorense, October 1, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora71'T, P. 76. See also, Daily Alta California, December 16, 1852. 
27ures El Sonorense, September 24, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora-;-v, P. 67. 
28Ibid., October 8, 1852, P• 81. 
29Blanco to Cubillas, Arizpe, October 2, 1852, in ibid. 
30ures El Sonorense, October 15, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora, V, P• 85. 
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"a greater moderation, pru.~ence and tolerance than you had a right to 
expect. 1131 Again he promised protection from Indians and others if 
the French would obey all state laws. Raousset knew that protection 
had proved inadequate in the past, which weakened the governor's argu-
ment. The Mexicans were detennined, however, and surprisingly 
Raousset did not perceive that if he and his men continued on their 
journey only fatal consequences could result. On October 5 Raousset 
replied with an explanation of the French claims, refusing a peaceful 
settlement. After four months of deliberation Raousset concluded that 
h t h . . h . t . 32 . / w a e was doing was ::ui t e best ::ui erests of Mexicoo Even Gimenez 
tried to dissuade Raousset, to no avail. 
The Mexicans had been surprisingly tolerant, for on September 24, 
1852, shortly before the state congress provided funds to finance an 
anny against the filibusters, General Blanco made a last appeal for 
peaceful settlement. The Mexican general reminded Raousset that both 
high Mexican and French officials had placed great confidence in the 
honesty and integrity of the French expedition. Blanco told the count 
that he had signed a contract with Mexican authorities--a contract 
Blanco aimed to see fulfilled • .3.3 If the French accepted the tenns he 
offered, Blanco advised them to go at once to Arizpe. As an illus-
tration the general reminded Raousset that eighty-three of the French-
men who came to Mexico with Charles de Pindray, along with fifty-seven 
31Tu. d Qr7 1 • , P• o,. 
32Tu"d 1 ., PP• 90-91. 
.3.3Blanco to Raousset, Arizpe, September 24, 1852, in ibid., 
October 22, 1852, pp. 9.3-102. See also, Lambertie, Le Drame de la 
Sonora, PP• 61-63. 
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who settled near Tucson, had become Mexican citizens. He concluded 
by giving Raousset ten days to decide whether to comply with orders~ 
or be driven out of the country by force. 
The French already had made the decision by the first days of 
October and departed before receiving Blanca's ultimatum. The group 
left Saric well armed. After much discussion of the terms offered, 
the men unanimously favored a fight to the finish. The French foraged 
nearby towns for supplies, in the process gaining the enmity of 
villagers who feared the French might take control of the entire state. 
,_ 
Luis Redondo, Prefect of Guadalupe, advised Raousset to obey the 
general's orders, but the count would not go to Arizpe becau~e "he 
would be imprisoned as Gi~ez was by military authority~in which 
case his force would try to liberate him as they could and this would 
have evil consequences which he wanted to avert. 1134 The prefect also 
reported to Governor Cubillas that remnants of Charles Pindray' s party 
and survivors of Sainte Amant' s group had joined with Raousset. He 
warned that all of "these foreigners are now engaged, where they dwell, 
in making lances, bayonets, hand grenades, and other articles of war. 1135 
Thus, when the French left Saric, they were well prepared for a con-
frontation with Blanco. 
As the group neared San Ignacio on September 30, the prefect asked 
why the foreigners were coming and what was their intent. The count 
assured the villagers that they were in no danger. Raousset repeated 
that only if General Blanco threatened violence would he "be forced 
34tJres El Sonorense, October 1, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora-;T, P:- 71. 
35Tuid. 
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to resort to arms for the defense of' his rights. 1136 Raousset stead-
fastly believed that he and his men were "soldiers of liberty" and the 
"apostles or civilization." 
On September 23 the party moved toward Magdalena, seizing 
supplies along the road. In at least two instances they captured sup-
plies intended :for the Mexicans. One of these was a supply train 
headed :for the Forbes and Company base already in the northern border 
area. The other was a supply group that Blanco had sent to his 
northern troops. Since the French were aware of the need for local 
support, they were reaeonablf) careful to pay for items :from local 
\, 
citizens, giving the count's personal script. From October 1 until 
October 6 the French remained in Magdalena, hoping to secure support 
for a general uprising or revolution. If Ra.ousset had come to Mexico 
with honorable intentions, which was doubtful, he had abandoned any 
pretext of legitimacy by this time. It was in this camp at Magdalena 
that he received the last ultimatum :from Blanco--an exhortation :for 
the French to save themselves.37 
The Mexican :force was poorly prepared, but it expected an attack 
on Ures. Blanco led his army into the city and began preparing :forti-
:fications. However, he received information that the French were going 
to attack Hermosillo :first, and raced there with only 240 men and some 
volunteers-not enough to defend the city. Nevertheless, Blanco 
decided to make his stand at this place and therefore :fortified the 
36Gonzales to Raousset, San Ignacio, in ibid. , September 30, 1852. 
37sobarzo, crtnica de la Aventura, PP• 125-128. See also, Cubillas 
to ~aousset, Ures, October 2, 1S52, in ~ fil:. Sonorense, October 15, 
1852, in Pinart Transcrl,.pts, Sonora, V, PP• 84-103. 
72 
outskirts of the city as best he could.JS En route to Hermosillo, 
R.aousset learned of the Mexican occupation. When he stopped to organ-
ize his troops for battle, Blanco took the opportunity to send comis-
sioners to advise the French against attacking the city. Probably the 
French knew their advantage, for R.aousset responded with a challenge-
he would be in the city in a few hours with the Mexicans fleeing before 
him for their lives. 
Within the hour the French moved into the outskirts of the city, 
and sporadic fighting began. The attackers found little opposition 
and moved deeper into the city, pushing the Mexicans before them. In 
at least one skirmish the Me:xicans broke and ran for their lives. 
Blanco himself tried to lead a charge to stop the onslaught, but it 
proved hopeless. The invaders had superior organization and were more 
skillful with their weapons--a probable reason for Blanca's repeated 
entreaties for Raousset to come willingly to Arizpe. Within two hours 
the French occupied all of the city, suffering only eighteen killed 
and thirty-two wounded. Unfortunately, Garnier, Fayolle, and Lefranc-
three of Raousset's most dedicated officers--died in the struggle. 
Mexican losses were twenty-four killed and over fifty wounded. 39 
Allegedly, R.aousset detained the most important men in Hermosillo as 
hostages, and "hoisted a free flag, inscribed 'Liberty to the State of 
Sonora.' n40 As for all military reverses, someone received the blame, 
and Mexican Officials, both at the state and national level, criticized 
3E\.ambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, PP• 75-76. See also, Wyllys, 
~ French In Sonora, PP•· IT1:r12. 
39Tuid. , P• 77. 
40Dailz £i!, California, December 23, 1S52. 
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Blanco severely for his loss. 
With this first military success, Raousset sought more support 
from Mexican citizens. It is likely that he approached known rebels. 
The French may even have contacted Manuel Mar~ Gandara or his brother 
Jesus, hoping for more aid in generating a general revolution. If so, 
these politicians sensed a losing cause and rejected the invitation. 
In fact, as secretary of the state congress, Jesus helped draft a re-
quest to the inhabitants of Sonora to throw out the intruders. This 
appeal suggested that "the miserable adventurers must be taught that 
Sonorans are not cowards, but loyal citizens of the R.epublic. 1141 
At this critical moment a stroke of fate, not Mexican firepower, 
put a temporary end to the French threat. Raousset suffered a violent 
attack of dysentary. He and several of his officers were incapacitated. 
Poor medical attention in Hermosillo added to the seriousness of the 
disorder. In addition, Raousset was said to have had an arm wound from 
the heated fighting at Hermosillo.42 With their officers dead or 
diseased, the French all agreed that Nicholas Martincourt and N. Lenoir 
would lead them out of the country to safety.43 These new leaders 
communicated with Gandara, who was in charge of the Mexicans at Ures, 
and the group secured permission to go unmolested to Guaymas, leaving 
all the wounded behind in Hermosillo. According to this agreement, the 
French were to leave the area peacefully. Blanco did not know of the 
4lures El Sonorense, October 22, 1852, P• 107. -- . 
42iJaily ~ California, December 18, 23, 1852. 
4.3Bancroft, California, VI, 588; See also Lambertie, ~ Drame, 
P• 82. 
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agreement, and he was prepared to fortify Guaymas.44 On October 24 the 
French left Hermosillo, according to Gandara's terms. Blanco by this 
time had decided to attack and beseige the French once they arrived 
at the port city. He intended to "treat with these bandits," and 
"shew [sic] them that the honor of the Mexican flag was not to be in-
sulted with impunity."45 
By the time the French party neared Guaymas, Raousset was unable 
to walk and was being carried on a litter. Vice Consul Josl Calvo 
sent a warning to Raousset that a very large Mexican force commanded 
by Blanco was waiting at Guaymas. At this point, without local 
support and his health at low-point, Raousset knew he could not con-
tinue his struggle. During that evening he sent the message to 
General Blanco: "It is necessary that I have an interview with you. 1146 
The general guaranteed the count safe passage to military headquarters 
for a conference, but Raousset was so ill that he was unable to confer 
effectively. The truce was extended for two more days so that Blanco 
could meet with other French leaders--Martincourt and Lenoir--con-
cerning surrender terms. 47 The wily Mexican general also talked with 
Raousset's men, convincing them of the uselessness of continuing the 
struggle. 
The French signed surrender terms on November 4, denouncing all 
44wyliys, The French in Sonora, pp. 121-122; See also Lambertie, 
Le Drame, p. 82. · 
45Daily; -ill!, California, December 23, 1852. 
46ures El Sonorense, November 12, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora71T, P:- 110. 
47Ibid., P• 112. 
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their original intentions, as well as their leader.48 How Blanco so 
easily obtained such an extensive surrender was not immediately certain. 
Blanco acknowledged that o.n November 4 "the French laid down their arms, 
delivering them to me, as well as their amrrrunition, horses, mules, 
saddles, wagons, artillery--in short all th.e property of the members of 
this distinguished company. ,,49 It was conjectured in. the Daily Alta 
California that Blanco may have bribed the French with nearly eleven 
thousand dollars to obtain their surrender.50 The New York Daily Times 
also speculated that perhaps Blanco had "bought off" the French intru-
ders for a considerable sum of money.5l It is understandable that 
probably the group had decided the land was not promising enough to 
cost them their own blood. It is more probable that Blanco had breached 
the unity of the expedition, successfully dividing Raousset from his 
men and officers. Possibly he also persuaded the local merchants of 
Guaymas to contr,ibute ten thousand pesos for French transportation 
back to California. 52 No matter the stimuli, the French left the ~ 
land. 
With the end in sight, the party scattered. Most of these French-
men returned to San Francisco after securing ship passage from Mazat18£.. 
However, some of the more anxious survivors traveled the difficult over-
land route back to California. Raousset remained for a time in Mazat-
. 8 ' 
4 Lambertie, ~ Drame ~ 1!, Sonora, PP• 90-92. 
49Daily; A1.i! California, December 22, 1852. 
50ibid., December 18, 1852. 
51New York Dail.l, Tines, January 1, 1853. 
5~id., December 22, 23, 1852; see also, Lambertie, ~Drame de la 
Sonora, P• 92. ~ ....,.. 
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,,,,,. 
lan, recovering from his illnesses, but early in 1853 Patrice Dillon 
wrote advising Raousset to make his way back to San Francisco-to 
return later in the year with a greater force. 53 Significantly, almost 
everyone lost in this episode. Jecker, Torre, and Company paid damages 
to the government. The eventual winner, General Blanco, nevertheless 
was relieved of his command and recalled to Mexico City. 54 On May 18, 
1854,, while leading another expedition to Sonora Raousset wrote a 
letter to Consul Dillon, claiming that he had been duped in the earlier 
expedition. He felt the contract signed in Mexico City in April of 
1852, had been binding, but the Sonorans had not fulfilled the agree-
ment. The Frenchmen, he said, "were summoned to renounce their 
allegiance to France, or to reembark ••• they were reduced for their own 
defense, and after having received the first fire to combat the General 
who commanded in Sonora. 11 55 
One question remained unanswered-that of official F:rench govern-
mental influence in the expedition. Until Levasseur stepped out of 
the Jecker and Company organization, the French government was at least 
g,uasi involved, for Levasseur was the minister to Mexico. Not until 
the frontier situation deteriorated-and this occurred when the plan 
was already in motion--did the French officially disassociate them-
selves. However, the ~York Daily Times reported that arguments on 
the Mexican question in French and English newspaper "were calculated 
53wyllys, The French i!!, Sonora, 132. See also, Daily Alta Cali-
fornia, September 24, 1854, and December 18, 1852; and Lambertie, Le 
Drame de la Sonora, PP• 85 and ·97. 
54ures El Sonorense, February 4, 25, March 18, 1852, PP• 140, 143, 
and 151-154-.- Pinart Transcript, Sonora, V. 
55~ ~ Daily Times, November 2, 1854. 
to attract their [French and English citi2;ens] attention, and pre-
dispose them to undertake the protectorate of Mexico whenever events 
shall seem propitious. 1156 Thus it seems feasible that, in order to 
stop the expansion of the United States, a conscious propaganda cam-
paign may have 'been waged, at le.ast by the French government. 
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During his first expedition, Ra.ousset failed as a leader largely 
as a result of bad health. He almost succeeded in his venture to 
revolutionize Sonora. He said he came as a colonizer, but his actions 
suggested otherwise. Considering his personality and his background, 
there is little doubt but that his intentions were to make himself sole 
ruler of northern Mexico--the "Sultan of Sonora.". And his first venture 
encouraged him sufficiently that he would again filibuster in Sonora at 
a later date. And it was his near success that inspired others to take 
personal advantage of the political disorganization in Mexico. Others 
followed his path. Before Raousset returned to California to organize 
his second expedition, William Walker-the "grey eyed man of destiny"-
was preparing to liberate Baja California and proclaim a Republic. 
56Ibid., December 17, 1852. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRESIDENT OF BAJA CALIFORNIA A.ND SONORA 
In 1853 Mexico still was seething with civil strife and shackled 
' • j • 
by Indian uprisings, but there remained sufficient national pride for 
th.e people to repel invaders. Outward instability stiffened ::l.nto uni-
fied resistance when faced with foreign intruders; therefore, when 
WUliam Walker and Henry Watkins began a bizzare attempt to conquer 
both Lower California and Sonora, they were met with hostility by 
officials, peasants, and even bandits. Although they brought a large 
number of armed men to Mexico, their expedition was doomed almost from 
the beginning. Walker's character and his poor leadership not onl,.y 
' -
combined to thwart this filibuster, but eventually would cost him his 
lif.e in Nicaragua. 
Walke.r was born in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1824. His father was 
a native of S_cotland who had. settled in Tennessee four years previouslY:• 
William was the eldest of four children, and did receive a good, even 
an extl'.aord;t.nary, education. He graduated from the University o·f 
Nashvill.e at fourteen and then studied medicine at the University of 
Pennsylvania. After receiving his M.D. degree in lSA.3., he traveled 
through Europe, returni~ to_ Nashville in 1845· Once at home, however, 
Walker found medicine not to his l~king and began the study of lS;w• 
Next he, moved to New Orleans where he practiced law briefly but un.,.. 
' 
successfull_y. By 1848 he, had turned to yet another profession-
. ' . 
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assistant editor of the ~ Orleans Crescent. 
This occupation suited him, and while editing this paper he met 
John Randolph, a clerk of the United States court and grandson of 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The young men formed a la.sting friend-
ship; in fact, Randolph would have great influence on Walker's career 
in California. 
Walker had another acquaintance in New Orleans who indirectly may 
have had even more influence on his subsequent career. She was Helen 
Martin, a bli.nd girl, whose death in June, 1850, possibly gave Walker 
the reckless and careless characteristics which dominated him in later 
life. He allegedly loved only this woman, and after her death he be-
came restless to le~ve Louisiana.1 Thereafter his only close friends 
were men--many of whom swayed him. 
News of the gold strike in California came just after his loss, 
and the heart broken Walker headed west to find his fortune. He 
arrived at San Francisco in 1850. John Randolph, who already had a 
good reputation there, helped Walker obtain a job as assistant editor 
of the San Francisco Daily Herald. In this position he expressed his 
contempt for the corruption in the California courts-especially Judge 
Levi Parson. The judge fought back, jailing the itinerant editor, but 
the people of San Francisco vehemently vocali~ed their disapproval of 
the jud.ge' s action and demanded Walker's release. 
Walker was freed and could have made political capital out of 
the episode had he known how. Instead he fought a duel with one of 
Parson's cronies and was wounded slightly, but still he emerged a 
1 . . . . . . 
Johnson and Malone, eds., Dictionary of Arrerican Biography, 
PP• 363-365. 
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regional. hero. Although he had gained recognition in California, 
' ''"....._,~' ' ' :· 
~. ' 
Walker seemed incapable of capitalizing on his_ opportunities.. PQpul.a:r 
with the people, he was aloof, indifferent, and vacillating-qualities 
which hindered his leadership. 2 
Thomas Robinson Warren described Walker in 185~ as very slim, 
weighing no more than a hundred pounds, with light hair, "while his 
. . ' . ' 
almost white. eyebrows and lashes concealed a seemingly pupilless, grey, 
cold eye, and his face was a mass of yellow freckles, the whole. expres-
si~n very heavy. 113 Regardless of his deficiencies and his appearance, 
"th~ grey-eyed man of destiny" was determined to succeed. The doctor-
ltiwyer-turned editor left California and moved to Marysville, where in 
.• . ' ···-
1851 and 1852 he practiced law with Henry P. Watkins, his future fili-
. I , 
bustering associate. Their law business was onlr meager; consequently, 
both men looked for something more rewarding. At this time the news of 
the French filibustering expeditions in Mexico reached the United 
States. At a later date Walker acknowledged that his idea for estab-
lishing Americans in_ northern Mexico originated among the residents 
living at Auburn, California, in 1852. The aim of several enterprising 
citizens of this town was to establish military colonies along the 
Mexican rrontier--probably under the guise or settlement according to 
M~xican colonization laws. Several or these people. had contributed 
funds for sending two agents to Guaymas to secure land grants near 
. .2For biographical .details, see William D. Scroggs, Filibusters 
~ Financiers (New York, 1916), and Arthur Woodward, ed.; ·The Republic 
or Lower California (Los Angeles, 1966), PP• 9-20., . · - ----- ., 
3Thomas .Robinson Warren, Dust and Foam, or, Three Oceans'" and Two 
Continents (New York, 1858), PP• 21~-21~ - · · · --.- -
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Arizp~. Frederick Emory, later an official in Walker's. RepubLic of 
I 
Lqwer California, was one of the men. Unfortunately for the residE;mts 
of Auburn, the "Sultan of Sonora," Count Gaston Raousset de Boulbon was 
then in Mexico, and the Mexican attitude towards foreign settlers was 
extremely negative. The citizens of Auburn therefore temporarily 
abandoned their plan. 
Yet after Raousset' s failure, Emory proposed the filibustering 
idea to Walker. 
,,. 
Together they approached General Jose Castro, a Mexi-
can living in Monlterey, and asked his help--they wanted to use his name 
to incite revolution in northern Mexico. The general declined and later 
became an official in the government of Antonio Lc(pez de Santa Anna. 4 
Henry Watkins was enthusiastic about the scheme, and both men left 
almost immediately for Guaymas to test the Mexican reaction towards 
"colonizers" from the United States. 5 
Walker and Watkins landed at Guaymas seeking colonization permits 
in June of 1853. They intended to see the governor of Sonora, and for 
that purpose carried letters of reco1I1100ndation from the Mexican Vice-
Consul in San Francisco. Walker also carried a passport which proved 
useless in Mexico. After he and Watkins arrived at the Mexican port, 
the prefect refused to allow them to travel to Ures where they might 
. ~ 
visit the governor of the state. Manuel Maria Gandara, then chief 
executive of Sonora, countermanded the prefect's order and issued the 
necessary travel permits, but Walker and Watkins hastily left for 
4A. P. Nasatir, "The Second Incumbency of Jacques A. Morenhout," 
California-Historical Quarterly, XXVII (June, 1948), PP• 141-148. 
5William Walker, ~ War ~ Nicaragua (Mobile, 1860) , pp. 19-20. 
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California.6 The future filibusters had heard of Indian raids in So-
nora and had left Guaymas firmly convinced that the local citizens would 
welcome Arrericans who were willing to help fight the Apaches. 
Back in California, Walke.r "at once hoisted his filibustering 
banner, and the work of enlistment went on very rapidly; many a ruined 
gambler, outlaw, and drifter in California flocking to his standard."? . . ' 
However, l~cal Sonoran officials were irate when they heard of 
Walker's suggestion for American intrusion. Moreover, they were not 
the only Mexicans concerned, for Manuel Diaz de Bonilla, Mexican Minis-
ter of Foreign Relations, advised the United States minister to Mexico, 
James Gadsden, of Walker's intentions. The Mexican minister told 
Gadsden that the two Arrericans were not to be allowed passage to the 
interior, as he and local authorities suspected "them of complicity 
. . . 
with a group of adventurers then intended to invade Sonora. 118 The 
Mexicans had made only half an accurate appraisal; Walker had designs 
on both Sonora and Lower California. In fact, Walker--the future 
president of the "Republic of Sonora''--had already begun selling bonds 
for his. "republic" as early as May, 185). Thus the Mexicans were 
fully aware of Walker's plans by the time he arrived at Guaymas. 9 The 
warning from Bonilla to Gadsden was but the first of many diplomatic 
messages concerning Walker; in the next year he would have a strong 
6. . . . .. 
Ibid., PP• 20-21. 
7warren, ~ ~ Foam, P• 213.· 
~anuel Diaz de Bonilla to James Gadsden, August 20, 1853, 
Mexico :City~ Ministeral Despatches, Department of State, BG 59, 
National Archives. 
9Daily Alta California, December 1, 1853. - .. 
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influence on relations between the two republics. 
Recruiting men for filibustering expeditions to Mexico, as 
always, proved easy. Newspapers in California gave considerable space 
to Walker's activities. Soon he had more men than he could equip or 
transport. By the end of September all preparations were completed, 
including chartering of the Brig Arrow to transport the group. A 
delay occurred, however, when near midnight on September 30 United 
States Army troops seized the ship. The commander of the Department 
of the Pacific, General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, had orders from President 
M.illard Fillmore to prevent such illegal expeditions . to Mexico. 
Hitchcock had heard of the proposed filibustering expedition the year 
before, but not until September 30 did he know the ship was loaded with 
arms, ammunitions, and other supplies and was preparing to leave the 
bay area. 
When Hitchcock verified the rumors, he seized the ship.10 The 
army found on board only the ship's captain, a lady and her child, 
and a flailo.r. The Daily Alta California recorded that in addition to 
these persons, "in the hold of the brig were found a quantity of 
cartridge boxes, paper for making cartridges, a lot of camp kettles, 
and other cooking utensils for military forces. 1111 Army Captain E. D. 
Keyes and his men turned the ship over to a United States marshal the 
next day. The affair was so heatedly debate.d in the press and in 
public places, however, that the marshal decided he could not legally 
.. a . . ..... 
1 W. A. Croffut, ed. , Fiftf: ~ in Q!!!2 and Field: Diary of 
Ethan Allen Hitchcock, l!.•2.•!• New York, 1909), pp .• 465-403 .. 
11naily ~California, October 2, 1853. 
hold the ship, an expedient and popular conclusion. Accordingly, he 
returned it promptly to the army. Filibusters were local heroes in 
California in the 1850' s, and local newspapers attempted to damage 
Hitchcock's military reputation. However, one editor speculated that 
"all will alike smile at the puny attempt of this desappointed ~i~ 
expeditionist to injure the fame of one of the most distinguished 
soldiers in the Uo S. Army.n12 
Walker responded to Hitchcock's seizure by taking out a writ, 
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claiming he owned both vessel and cargo, whereupon the local sheriff 
urged the army to surrender the ship to its owner. General Hitchcock 
had presidential orders to stop illegal filibustering expeditions, but 
the local sheriff was unimpressed--ile had the firepower. Fearing the 
boldness of the local law, Hitchcock ordered the ship anchored in the 
bay with a small guard detachment. Intent on fulfilling his orders, 
he then sought help from the United States district attorney in San 
Francisco, but conunented in his diary that this official too "had been 
corrupted, probably by Senator Gwin. 1113 The district attorney re-
sponded that he felt pressure and public opinion demanded that the 
vessel be returned to its rightful ownero Hitchcock angrily replied: 
"Damn public opinion. 1114 . 
While the Army held the Arrow and while the court case was de-
veloping, Walker and several of his men slipped out of San Francisco 
12Ibid., October 9, 1853. 
l3Croffut, ed., Fifty Years in Camp and Field, P• 401. William 
Gwin, a United States Senator, obviously favored Walker's plans and 
may have used his influence with the district attorney. 
l4Ibid. See also, Daily Alta California, October 11, 1853. 
on board a smaller ship, the Caroline, a ship licensed in Mexico and 
owned by the son of the United States consul at Guaymas. With some 
forty-five men on board, the ship sailed from San Francisco on October 
16, headed for Cape San Lucas at the Southern tip of Baja California. 
There the party stopped briefly before proceeding on to La Paz.15 Be-
cause this expedition had departed as hastily, they had left behind 
many guns, considerable quantity of ammunition, and other supplies 
still on board the Arrow and on the wharves nearby. At Cape San Lucas 
the men foraged for what supplies were available and waited for rein-. . . ., ,' . 
forcements that Henry Watkins was to. bring from California. Watkins 
did not arrive, so Walker continued alone. 
On November .3, 185.3, the Caroline and its. party of filibusters 
sailed into La Paz harbor. There they took possession of the town 
and arrested Colonel Rafael Espinosa, the Mexican governor. Less 
than thirty minutes were required for them to capture the poorly-
defended city. When the Mexican flag was lo:wered, Walker declared 
the independence of Lower California. A new flag with two red stripes, 
a white stripe, and two stars was raised, and the "Republic of Lower 
California" was therefore established.16 Walker and his small group 
contemplated their situation in La Paz for three days. Finally all 
agreed that they could neither hold La Paz with so few men nor could 
they invade Sonora, their real goal. Thus they contente.d themselves 
with plundering the area, disrupting the economy, and oth~rwise in-
curring the hatred of the local Mexicans. Still no actual resistance 
l5Daily Alta California, December 8, 185.3~ See also, Croffut, ed., 
Fifty Years in Camp and Field.' P• 403 • 
. . 6 . . . 
1 San Diego Herald, December .3, 185.3. 
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was encountered until November 6 when the group was leaving. 
On this same day the Walker expedition complicated United States-
Mexican diplomacy. James Gadsden, United States Ministe.r to Mexico, 
was attempting to complete the purchase of the southern portion of 
present-day Arizona--and he had more than enough problems without the 
complication of filibusters. Juan Robinson, United States consul at 
Guaymas, contacted Gadsden, asking if Americans (obviously referring 
to Walker and Watkins) could be kept from journeying to the Mexican 
interior. Robinson specifically mentioned ri.unors of American fili:-
bustering expeditions. He suggested to Gadsden that an American ship 
should be sent to Guaymas "to dispel in a great measure the existing 
apprehensions, remove the jealous feelings, and create confidence 
l? towards our government." Within three days the filibustering expe .... 
dition had created a crisis of international proportions. Robinson 
sent a request to a British warship off the Mexican coast near Guaymas 
to intercept the Caroline loaded with those "piratical" filibusters. 
Commander J. c. Prevost replied on November 9 that the Virago could 
take no such action.18 The Mexican minister of foreign affairs in 
Mexico City, Manuel Diaz de Bonilla, informed Gadsden on November 9 
that a filibustering expedition comprised of "more than 200 men, with 
anns and several pieces of artillery" had left San Francisco for 
l7 Juan Robinson to James Gadsden, November 6, 1853, Guaymas, 
Consular Despatches, Department of State,. BG 59, National Archives. 
18Juan Robinson to J. c. Prevost, November 9, 1853, Guaymas, ibid. 
See also, J. C. Prevost to Juan Robmson, November 11, 1853, Guaymas, 
ibid. 
Mexico.19 Gadsden wanted no interference with the treaty he was ne-
gotiating. To placate the Mexican authorities Gadsden assured Bonilla 
that he had issued orders to all United States warships in the waters 
off Mexico to intercept any suspicious ships containing a large group 
of men or carrying obvious war supplies. 20 There followed a steady 
stream of reports pouring into Mexico City from Guaymas. On November 
17 Robinson advised Gadsden that the Sonoran seaport was an armed 
camp, for the commandante militar had recruited all able-bodied men 
to repel the filibusters. 21 It was the American minister at Mexico 
Qity who notified Bonilla of the capture of La Paz. He further alerted 
the minister that "the party will await reinforcements, and mature 
their plans for consummating their original designs against the state 
22 
of Sonora." · 
While the tempo of diplomatic correspondence increased each day, 
Walker issued additional d~crees for his "republic." He established 
a free trade policy, and he promulgated the Civil a.ode of Louisiana as 
law. 23 Several influential people in the United States viewed Walker's 
' . . 
activities as proof of a slaveocracy conspiracy. The Daily Alta 
19Manuel Diaz de Bonilla to James Gadsden, November 15, 1953, 
Mexico City, Ministeral Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, 
National Archives. · 
20James Gadsden to Manuel Diaz de Bonillas, November 17, 1953, 
Mexico City, ibid. 
21Juan Robinson to James Gadsden, November 17, 1953, Guaymas, 
Consular Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, National. A.rchives. 
22James Gadsden to Manuel Diaz de Bonillas, November 19, 1953, 
Mexico City, Ministeral. Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, 
National A:rchives. 
23Daily Alta California, December 26, 1953· 
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California reported on December 16 that "the filibustering. scheme was 
concocted last winter or spring, and it is confidently asserted by some 
nqt unacquainted with the leaders, that the introduction of slavery 
[into Mexico~ is one important object in their aggression."24 . To be 
certain, Walker appeared the harbinger of slavery, for one of his 
first moves was to establish the Civ:i.l Code of Louisiana as the legal 
guide for Baja California. Although such evidence seems to indicate 
Walker indeed was part of a Southern slaveocracy conspiracy, no such 
premeditated plan can be proven to have existed. Of course, Walker and 
others involved were Southerners who doubtless favored slavery and 
would have established it if the quixotic Republic of Baja California 
had succeededo Yet no concerted involvement on the part of Jefferson 
Davis, then Secretary of War, or of any other known Southerner in the 
United States government, then or now, was evident. The available 
facts indicate only that Walker was an ideali~tic individual-albeit 
occasionally verging on insanity-who sought personal power and fame. 
Adventure and disappointment, as well as infamous propaganda, were his 
only rewards. 
Before leaving La Paz on November 6, Walker unexpectedly captured 
the replacement governor of Baja California. Actually, the governor 
had the misfortune of arriving at the port when Walker's well armed . ' ' 
party was in contr,ol. Walker realized that the new governor would 
' make a good host~e; therefore, he immediately seized the Mexican 
before he could muster support. When a party of six men went ashore 
to collect wood before departing, the group returned to the ship only 
24Ibid., December 16, 1S53. 
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after fighting a battle with local patriotic citizens. Walker was 
angered by the attack, and he intended to prove that he was not to be 
taken lightly. Therefore while his cannon fired on La Paz, he landed 
a larger party of men. Seven Mexicans were killed, and once again 
Walker was master of La Paz. This "Battle of La Paz" was regarded by 
members of the expedition as symbolizing their establishment of a 
"Republic." 
The Walker part:r then sailed to Cape San Lucas, arriving there 
on November 8, 1853. The Americans were sorely disappointed, for the 
to:wn was small, poor, indefensible, and still too far south. Moreover, 
a Mexican warship appeared on the horizon, causing Walker to fear that 
an attack was forthcoming. He decided to move much nearer the United 
States border to await reinforcements, also knowing that a more 
northern base would facilitate his conquest of Sonora; thus the next 
day he sailed for Ensenada (]ahi~ de Todos Santos. Then headquartered 
at Ensenada, one hundred miles below San Diego, Walker awaited news 
and reinforcements before continuing his venture. And from there he 
sent his secretary of state, Frederick Emory, to California for 
supplies. 25 
Emory was well received in California. Filibustering activities 
almost always proved popular with Californians and received widespread 
notice in the press. On this occasion the newspapers hailed Walker's 
efforts "as another advance toward that 'manifest destiny' of the 
25Rufus K. Wyllys, "The ReP,ublic of Lower California, 185.3-1854," 
Pacific Historical Review, II (June , 19.3.3) , pp. 194-21.3. See also, 
Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers, pp • .38-.39, and Wyllys, "William 
Wal~r' s Invasj,on of Sonora, 1854," Arizona Historical Review, PP• 
61-67. . 
Anglo-Saxon race.n26 Californians realized also that should Walker 
fail, "the Mexican character is too well known to hope or expect that 
a company, from this country would be shown any rercy if taken 
prisoners ••• they can expect no quarter, or hope for no rf!i3rcy. n'Z1 
Therefore, the Daily~ California recorded that Emory's. arrival 
28 "excited our American population to the wildest bounds of Joy." In 
San Francisco Emory opened a recruiting office and unfurled the flag 
of the Republic of Baja California over the door-a propaganda ploy, 
for immediately there were too many volunteers. 29 
Shortly after the debarkment of the filibusters at Ensei:lada and 
. ' 
while the captain of the Caroline was still ashore, the first mate 
of the ship sailed off with the captured Mexican official on board. 
Perhaps the Mexican on board convinced the first mate that Walker and 
the ship captain would meet certain failure. 30 It is possible that 
90 
such Mexican argurents were influential; in addition, the mate may have 
known that Thomas Robinson, the ship's owner, was unaware of Walker's 
use of the vessel for filibustering. Significantly, much of the 
trouble between Juan Robinson, the United States Consul at Gµaymas, 
~d Mexican authorities had arisen because of the son's ownership of 
the Caroline. Juan Robinson tried to vindicate himself and his son, 
but did not successfully convince the Mexicans of his family's inno-
cence. Robinson wrote to William Marcy, Secretary of State, explaining 
' ' ' i . 
26Daily ill,! California, December 9, 1853. 
'Zlibid. 
28Ib"d 1 ., 
29Ib"d 
. 1 • ' 
December 8, 1853. 
December 11, 1853. 
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that the younger Robinson lmew nothing of the filibustering expedition, 
but it mattered little by this time, Juan Robinson was forced to nee 
from Guaymas, and the United States government appointed another 
consui. 31 
Walker's problems were greatly intensified by the loss of the 
ship. He had insufficient supplies, and he was being harrassed by a 
Mexican bandit...,turned-patriot, Guadalupe Melendrez. No sooner had 
Walker and his men disembarked than the Mexican attacked them. 
Lieutenant John McKibbin, accord:ing to report~ from Ense'fiada, die_d 
. 32 
"while taking deliberate aim at the person of the outlaw, Melendrez." 
\"\ 
Although faced with these problems, Walker was not content at Ensenada. 
He sent men to capture Santo Tomas, a Mexican military colony about 
thirty miles south of his headquarters. The Mexican commander there, 
Colonel Francisco del Castillo Neg~te, drove the filibusters away. 
The Mexican then sought the help of Melendrez, and in a combined force 
they laid seige to Ense~ada during the middle of December. Wearied 
by the harrassment, the filibusters launched a surprise attack one 
dark night and drove the Mexicans back some distance. 33 Not until 
this attack was a woman reported with the Americans. The Daily~ 
California noted that she was "the wife of Capt. Chapman, of the first 
party of 'old guard; ' whose attention to the sick and wounded ••• and 
personal heroism, contributed greatly to the success of the 
·31Juan Robinson .to William Marcy, February 24, 1854, Mazatlan, 
Consular Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, National Archives • 
.' • ' ' 1 
32naily ~California, January 10, 1854. See al~o, Woodward, 
ed., ~Republic 2f_ Lower California, P• 29. 
33Daily fil! California, December Z1, 1853, and January 10, 1854. 
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expedition'. 11 34 ~he must have been the only woman filibuster, for no 
other mention of,' her or any other female was ever made in any corre-
spondence, 
While at Ense~ada in close proximity to, th,e American border, 
Walker took the opportunity to justify his venture to the people of 
the United States. He declared that Mexican officials had not faced 
their responsibilities in Lower California or in Sonora. He said that 
if the two states remained under Mexican rule, they would be forever 
"wild, half savage and uncultivated, covered with an indolent and half 
civilized people.035 Walker made the same mistake, as oth,ers before 
and after him, of underestimating the nationalistic urges of the local 
citizens and of ignoring their tolerance for bad government by Mexi-
cans in preference to "enlightened" government by such Arrericans as 
himself. In an attempt to placate the local Mexicans, Walker added 
that he would "guarantee every man possession of what he earns by the 
sweat of his brow. 1136 
Reinforcements arrived at Ense~ada on December 28, almost two 
hundred of them aboard the small brig Anita. According to an anony-
mous member, whose letter was quoted in the newspaper, the trip was a 
terrifying experience. He reported that "almost all on board were more 
less drunk. 1137 Nothing was secured below or above deck; the sea was 
rough; and the ship was ill equipped for so many men. "In the 
34Ibid •. 
35san Diego Herald, December 3, 1853. See also, Daily Alta 
Califo:t'n.ia, December 8, 1853. 
36Ibid., January 14, 1854. 
37woodward, ed,, The Republic of Lower California, p. 40. 
93 
steerage," he wrote, "the quarters for the men, were several thousand 
pounds of gunpowder, and yet the men were going about in the most 
careless manner with lighted segars [sic], pipes, and candles."38 
Despite such carelessness the ship did arrive at Ense'D.ada, and the. 
um disembarked enthusiastically, led by Walker's trusted associate 
Henry Watkins. Enthusiasm dwindled, however, when the men learned of 
Walker's problems. The Anita brought men and guns; but, believing 
the advance guard had been highly successful, Watkins had brought no 
food-this a most serious. h~dicap.39 Many of the, new men had their 
own ideas about conquering Sonqra. These problems, when complicate.d 
by poor diet,. led to dissensio? and desertions. To keep his followers 
occupied and to find food, Walker sent a party of men to seek and - . .' . . 
destroy Melendrez and. his bandits who allegedly were headquarte.red at 
Santx> Tomas. Fortunately these few filibusters found .no unfriendly 
forces, and they returned to Enseri'ada with cattle and sheep stolen 
from the nearby ranch belonging to the bandit ~elendrez. 
By December 30 all appeared quiet, and a correspondent from 
Enset\ada wrote the Dail;y ill! California that WaJ.k:er' s. govemni.ent was 
• ' - - • L • • ' • 
doing well and that the bandit, Melendrez "has retired to the lower 
' : ·' 
portion of the Republic without um, arms or ammunition. n40 Some 
Mexicans may have welcomed the Americans at first'· but Walke,r' s party 
did little to encourage such l~cal trust. In Guaymas th.e citizens 
threw stones at any American and cried "mueran a los Yankees" (death 
38Tuid. 
3<}nauy ~California, January 10, 1854. See also, Scroggs, 
Filibusters !ill! Financiers, p. 41· 
40 . ' ·. . . . 
Ibid., January 3 and 10, 1854. 
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to Americans). Two thousand regulars of the Mexican Army fanned near 
the city, expecting to move to Baja California to engage the fili-
busters shortly.141 On January 18, 1854, with his "Republic" tottering 
on the edge of political, financial, and moral bankruptcy, Walker 
granQ.iosely annexed Sonora to Baja California and changed the name of 
the expanded country to the "Republic of Sonora," with Baja California 
and Sonora as the two states. 42 Foreshadowing his ult.imate defeat was 
a Mexican warship cruising off the coast near Ense'nada, which shortly 
was joined by the 1!,o§.•§.o Portsmouth. 
On February 13, 1854, Walker had to move. His wounded were left 
to the care of sailors from the American ship, and he, along with 130 
of his men, left Ense!lada bound for Sonora. His numbers had dwindled 
to this size through desertion, many leaving when he had asked them to 
take an oath of allegiance to him. At one time forty-six men had le.ft 
togethe;r. Although Walker had asked for their guns, "two of the men 
only gave up their rifles; some hid theirs and smashed tnem against the 
rocks, rather than give them up. 1143 These deserters reported that 
Walker personally had shot two deserters and had whipped others 
severely. Thus the remaining filibusters went to Santo Tomas and on 
to San Vicente, their enthusiasm very questionable. At this town on 
February 28, Walker hel~ a forced convention of local citizens and 
exacted their support. 44 Few in Mexico or in California believed the 
41Ibid. 
42san Diego Herald, January 28, 1854 •. 
43Daily !ll! California, February 4, 1854. 
44rbid. , February 22, 1854. 
residents of San Vicente willingly signed Walker's oath. They had 
affixed their signatures to. a document which read, "Yesterday, in 
I 
your camp, we solemnly renounced all allegiance to every other fiag 
' . \ -
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or government which was not that of the Republic of Sonora •••• We passed 
beneath the two banners in token of submission, and here offer to serve 
you faithfully unto death. ,,45, - It was this deed that led one American 
writer to declare this a "bombast declaration, prepared by Walker 
himself •1146 In, January, ~owever, ~alker fe·l~ ready to leave Baja 
California and invade Sonora. Emotionall,y he told his_ army that "the 
men of Sonora have been forced to see their wives and daughters 
ravished--and babes at the breast have been tom from their mothers, 
and murdered before the eyes of captive parents."47 
Although Walker sounded convincing and confident, the future was 
bleak for his "republic." Frederick Emory had been arreste.d in San 
Diego for complicity in the filibustering scheme. General Ethan Allen 
Hitchcock previously had been removed as commander of the Department 
of the Pacific, and there had been a brief period when America had 
' ' 
Q.one little to hinder illegal filibustering expeditions~partly be-
cause the local civilian authorities in California worked against th.e 
army. But ld-th the arrival of General Jolin E. Wool as commander of 
the department, the entire military establishment had become more 
determined t~ halt filibustering; hence ~mory' s arrest. 
John Ellis Wool had been in the mili.tary since 1812. He was 
45 - ' - ' ' ' 
Ibid., March 15,, 
46s~ Diego Herald, 
47Ibi<l. 
January 28, 1854· 
b_reveted a lieutenant colonel in 11314 for gallantry at the Battle of 
Plattsburg, promoted to brigadier general in 11341, and made major 
general in 11347 for gallantry at the Battle of Buena Vista. In 11354 
Congress would resolve that thanks were due to the general "for his 
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distinguished service in the late war with Mexico, and especially for 
the skill, enterprise, and courage which distinguished his conduct •• •. 
that the president be requested to cause a sword ••• " to be given the 
general. 413 Thus, John E. Wool was no ordinary soldier; in fact, even 
before arriving in California he had begun his campaign against fili-
bustering expeditions. While. yet in Washington on January 10, 11354, 
Wool wrote to Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, concerning the rumored 
reinforcement of the Walker party. Wool asked Davis to assign more 
troops in California in order to stop effectively such filibustering 
expeditions. Davis replied that part of Wool's job indeed was the 
maintenance of "our international obligations, by preventing unlawful 
expeditions against the territories of foreign powers. 1149 However, the 
secretary of war seemed relatively unconcerned about filibustering. 
Nevertheless he agreed with Wool that t.here were insufficient troops 
in California. Considering the major problems then threatening to 
fragment the Union. Davis understandably had littl,e concern about 
filibusters. Some suggestions have been made that this lack of con-
cern implied involvement in a "conspiracy" to create a slaveocracy in 
Mexico, but no evidence has ever surfaced to suggest a genuine con-
4$Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the 
United ·States Army (Washington, 1903), I, PP• 1059-1060. · · - · 
49~o'fm E. Wqol to Jefferson Davis, Washington, January 10, 11354, 
Senate Exec. Doc. 16, 33 Cong., 2 sess., Serial 751, P• 7. 
-~ ...... 
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nection between governmental officials and filibusters. Granted, Davis' 
ardent Southernism would not have revolted at the extension of "the 
institution" to Mexico, but he apparently did nothing which actively 
promoted it. 
By mid-February, Wool was in San Francisco. There he received 
information from Captain T. A. Dornin of the u.s.s. Portsmouth that 
. . ---
Walker and his men had left Ense'ti'ada--destination unknown. Wool re-
layed this information to army headquarters in New York City, adding 
that he believed Count Raousset Boulbon (then organizing another 
expedition fo.r Sonora) was involved with Henry P. Watk.ins of the Walker 
group. Wool also moved irnrediately to intercept and arrest the fili-
busters. 50 On March 15 he reported to the adjutant general of the 
army that he had arreste.d Watkins and Emory as well as others involved 
with Walker.51 That same month he again wrote army headquarters that 
"the notorious Count Raousset de Boulbon was actively co-operating 
with Watkins, and that he had Frenchmen and Germans engaged, with whom 
it was supposed he intended to join Walker either in Lower California 
or Sonora.,,52 Wool also believed it likely that the French consul, 
Patrice Dillon, was de13ply involved and that the Mexican consul, Don 
Lu~ del Valle, also sought to support the expeditions, an act of 
treason against the Mexican government according to Wool. 
The crusty old commander was unaware at this time that General 
50 . , 
John E. Wool to Lieutenant Colonel L. Thomas, San Francisco, 
February 28, 1854, in ibid., pp. 10-ll. 
5lJohn E. Wool to s. Cooper, San Francisco, February 28, 1854, 
in ibid., PP• 10-ll. 
52John E. Wool to L. Thomas, San Francisco, March 31, 1854, in 
ibid., P• 28. 
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Antonio to'Pez de Santa Anna, then dictator of Mexico, had encouraged 
Del Valle in his activities. Consequently at half-past one o'clock on 
March 31, a United States marshal arrested Del Valle for violation of 
the American neutrality laws; subsequently Dillon was arrested on the 
same charge. However, both Dillon and Del Valle were tried and de-
clared innocent, for Del Valle did indeed have orders from Santa Anna 
to send men to Sonora. 53 General Wool was reprimanded by Jefferson 
Davis for his part in this farce. The secretary of war wrote that 
while Wool chose "to hold the high commission of general in the Army, 
you assume an obligation to render cheerful obedience to the authority 
and orders of this department. n 54 And the general became so unpopular 
in San Francisco for harrassing the filibusters that he was forced 
to move his headquarters to Benicia Barracks, north of the Bay city. 
Within two years Wool was transferred back to the eastern department, 
but he did successfully interfere with the expeditions invading Mexico. 
PartiallY: because of his efforts, no filibustering expedition succeeded 
while the Department of the Pacific was under his command. 55 
Meanwhile, on March 20, the "grey-eyed man of destiny" had 
determined to lead his men out of San Vicente. With them they drove 
nearl~ one hundred head of cattle toward the Colorado River and Sonora, 
for food was scarce--only beef and corn sustained the rren through the 
desert. En route to the Colorado River, Cocopas Indians joined the 
53John E. Wool to John s. Cripps, San Francisco, July 29, 1854, 
in'Ibid., PP• 95-96. 
54Jefferson Davis to John E. Wool, Washington, August 18, 1854, 
in Ibid., P• 98. 
55John E. Wool to L. Thomas, Benica, December 4, 1$56, House Exec. 
!22£.• fil!, 35 Cong., 1 sess., Serial 956, P• 207. 
group long enough to steal thirty head of cattle, losing three of 
their tribesmen in the process. Rations to the men were so reduced 
and water was so scarce that more followers desert~d each mile. Ye.t 
Walker and the remainder did reach the Colorado River about six miles 
' ' . . ' 
above its mouth (seventy mile_s south of Fort Yuma and the American 
border). Major Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander at Fort Yuma, re-
corded in his diary on April 7 that seven more of Walke-r's. deserters 
had arrived at the fort. 56 Seventy-eight deserters had arrived two 
days previousl;y:, and the following day more came. Some of the men 
. . . 
ult~t~ly decided to return to Mexico with Walla:'.r, while perhaps 
forty-five had remained loyal to their leader throughout this tying 
march.57 
At the Colorado River, Walker and his men tried to cross by raft 
or by swimming.· In the process several head of cattle were drowned, 
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but many men successfully crossed. The party then marched a short 
distance in,to Sonora and encamped for three days. At this point s.till 
more men deserted; those reported by Major Heintzelman began to 
straggle into Fort Yuma nearly naked, starving, and suffering from 
' . -
extreme exposure. Walker was forced to decide to return to San 
Vicente, whereupon still more discouraged and dis.illusioned deserters 
turned toward S~ Diego and safety. Only t~nty-five men foll.owed 
Walker back to their old headquarters at San Vicente in Baja Cali-
. 58 
fornia. 
56Los Angeles Star, April 22, 1854· 
.................... i _, ' . . ' 
57ijnpubli~hed jou:rnal of Samuel P. Heintzelman, Reel 4, Letter 
Book ~847, variant copy in Arizona Pioneer's Historical ~ociety, -Tucson. 
58san Diego Herald, May 5, 1854. 
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The bandit Melendrez had watched every move of the :retreat, and 
he saw the return. Walker was concerned at the bandit's continued 
presence and sent two men to his headquarters, Rancho de la Calentura, 
but both were taken prisoner by Melendrez's men. Walker, in anger, 
ordered an attack. When the main group of filibusters finally took 
the ranch, they learned that Melendrez also had captured the thirte.en 
men left behind at San Vicente with the cattle. A Mexican, Don Juan 
Bandini of San Diego, described what followed when the Mexican force 
saw Walker's band: "After making a sudden attack and while under 
fire, his [Melendrez's] men succeeded in seizing the cattle in plain 
view of the filibusters, who shouted at them and berated them as 
thieves. 1159 On April 17 Walker was confronted by Melendrez and about 
eighty well-armed Mexicans. According to a letter from one of 
Walker's men, the enemy remained some distance away "and commenced 
trailing our flag in the dust, and yelling insulting and defiant wordi:; 
at us. 1160 Walker and his men retreated to Guadalupe Ranch, six miles 
distant, and camped there for a few days. On April 20 Melendrez again 
confronted the Americans and asked them to surrender. Walker refused 
by "trampling the lette.r under his foot. 1161 The Mexicans charged, 
only to retreat leaving three dead and several others wounded. Walker 
then moved his men to the La Grulla road, but found his way to the 
United States blocked by armed Mexicans. His men were outnumbered 
four to one, so they had to take cover in the tall grass during the 
59woodward, ed., The Republic of Lower California, p. 70. 
60san Diego Herald, May 13, 1B54. See also, Daily Alta 
California, April 26, 1B54· 
61Ibid. 
ensuing battle. The Mexicans set fire to the grass, whereupon, as 
one of the party related, "we found it was necessary to leave, par-
ticularly as part of our luggage was powder. 1162 
The bedraggled and bitter band journeyed back to Ensenada on 
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May 1, and from there they began a tortu.rous march toward San Diego. 
Snipers followed the band along the way, firing on the open roads from 
positions in the brush. On May S, 1B54, the Americans at last neared 
I 
the border and safety, only to find Melendrez and his men blocking 
the way to the north. Seeing their escape route once again blocked, 
the filibusters made a wild and desperate charge. The blockade, 
dissolved, and the party arrived safely on United States soil, The 
irony of the battle was that a detachment of soldiers from San Diego, 
under the command of Major J. McKinstry, along with numerous citizens 
of San Diego, had come out to watch the fight. 63 And they had watched 
impassively, not joining in to help. Then, when the filibusters were 
safely on American soil,, the troops moved to arrest them. Walker and 
his men passively agreed to go to San Francisco to face trial. The 
i'onner "president" of the Republic of Sonora said he had been abused 
and otherwise treated badly by the Mexicans--and for no good reason, 
he added. The Daily ill_! California reported that the Mexican "govern-
ment had offered a reward for his head, and that he left the country in 
order to save the important member advertised. 1164 Walker pleaded not 
guilt:y at his trial, and popular sentiment so favored Walker that a 
62Ibid. 
63wyllys, ":El.epublic of Lower California," P• 211. See also, 
San Diego Herald, May 13, ia54. 
64nail;y Alta California, September 12, ia53. 
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jury decla.red him innocent of filibustering after just eight minutes 
of deliberation. Ironically the first witness that Wal,ker' s attorney, 
John Randolph, called was Henry A. Crabb, then a prominent Whig member 
of the state senate and later himself to invade Sonora. Walker's sad 
experience in Baja California and Sonora did not discourage other 
would-be conquerers, who would lead men southward seeking the illu-
. . 
sive, magic pot of gold. Count Gaston Raousset de Boulbon already 
was preparing his second and final expedition to make himself "Sultan 
of Sonora. n 65 Nor did the experience teach Walker the folly of fili-
bustering. He later died trying to conquer Nicaragua. A Central 
Aroorican firing squad finally ended his career in 1860. 
6 . . 
5Wyllys, French in Sonora, P • ?f7 • 
CHAPTER VlI 
SULTAN OF SONORA 
Count Gaston Raousset-Boulbon had returned to San Francisco after 
his first failure to plan for a second attempt to conquer northern 
Mexico. Soon after his return in January o:f' 1853, he wrote friends and 
newspapers of his intentions to go to Mexico again. ije said that "to 
return to Sonora, was the one thought of rnY li:f'e. 111 To all who would 
listen he constantly recalled the treachery of the Mexicans and ex-
pressed his optimism at the success of a new venture. This time his 
expedition would be composed only of Frenchmen with military experience 
who could be organized into an effective fighting force. 
Just as his preparations appeared near completion, rumors spread 
of the pos~ibility that the United States military might intervene. As 
the army had been instructed to halt filibustering activities, many 
San Francisco speculators withdrew their financial support from the 
' 
venture. Perplexed but not disillusioned, Raousset waited in San 
Francisco for a better opportunity. And luck seemed to favor him, for 
Andrf Levasseur, the French minister in Mexico, wrote the French Consul 
in San Francisco, Patrice Dillon, inviting Raousset to come to Mexico 
to confer with dictator Antonio LoPez de Santa Anna. Although Levas-
seur claimed no connection with Raousset, many Mexicans believed he was 
l ... · . · .. 
A.~ De Lachapelle, Le Comte de Raousset-Boulbon ~ L'E;xpedition 
de laSonora {Paris, 1859), p. 138. · · ·. · • · --
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a co-conspirator of the count.2 When Raouseet heard of the invitation 
to Mexico, he felt certain that rumors of his impending "expedition" 
had intimidated the Mexican dictator. In th.is positi,on of power 
Raousset detennined to go to Mexico City and demand that Santa Anna 
make him military governor of Sonora. 3 
The overly optimistic count left San Francisco on June 15, 1853, 
and arrived at Mexico City on July 7. He previously had made arrange-
, 
ments to delay his expedition until· his return from Mexico, for he 
reasoned that Santa Anna might well give up Sonora without a fight. 
At the first meeting of these two opportunists the Mexican dictato.r 
greeted the Frenchman as a long lost friend, and offered him the rank 
of general in the Mexican Anny-but nothing beyond the title. Raousset 
later said that he remained in Mexico City "four months entertaining 
the purest and most straight forward intentions •••• " He added that . . . 
the Mexican leader "trifled with me, deceived me, did everything in a 
word, to make me his bitterest foe. 114 
During the course of their talks, Raousset offered to bring 
several thousand "colonists" to the Sonoran frontier to help Santa Anna 
control the Indians while simultaneously settling the area. This the 
Mexican dictator quickly rejected. Then the count offered to bring 
soldiers to Sonora solely for the purpose of fighting the Apaches. 
2 . . . . . 
Spbarzo, cr&'nica de la Aventura, P• 154• 
California, September 24, 1854, and Lachapelle, 
3Symons, tr. , The Wolf Cub, p. 185. 
See also, Daily Al ta 
Le Comte , p. 13.9. 
4aaousset-Boulbon to Patrice Dillon, San Francisco, September 23, 
1854, in Daily Alta California, September 24, 1854. See also, Lacha-
pelle, Le Comte~. 143-145, and New X2.!!s. Daily Times, November 2, 
1854. · · · 
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Through all this Santa Anna waited and watched for signs of the count' s 
true intent. 5 At the s~ time these discussions were taking place, 
Manuel Mar~ Gandara, the centralist governor of the Department of 
Sonora, was studying the French activities in California during 1852, 
and he concluded that these foreigners could not be trusted in Mexico. 
Gandara therefore was prepared to make a strong, negative recommenda-
tion should the central government come to some agreement with Raousset. 
Early in September, the Mexican minister of war did approach Gandara to 
test his attitude toward French participation in colonization, where-
upon the governor explicitly rejected any scheme using Raousset' s men. 6 
Gandara wrote the minister of war that "this French citizen will not 
·' 
be well rec.d in the Department. It cannot be easily forgotten that he 
tried with his foreign follo.wers to break asunder the ties of union 
which bind the Sonorans with their brethren of' the rest of the Rep. 117 
The Mexicans in Sonora had taken up arms once before when they expelled 
the count, and Gandara felt they would do so again. Furthermore, the 
governor reali.zed that Mexicans, indeed any force, could control the 
Apaches if only the central goverruoont would finance a well-armed expe-
dition of five hundred meno Despite these warnings Santa Anna's 
government did offer Raousset a contract to bring half a thousand 
Frenchmen to work in th.e mines of Sonora and to fight the Indians. 
Several provisions of the proffered contract were unsatisfactory to the 
5Sobarzo, La Crdnica de la Aventura, pp. 162-165. See also 
Lachapelle, Le COmte, PP• 145-146. - ', 6 ' ', ' .,,,,. 
Sobarzo, ~ Cronica de J:! Aventura, p. 165. 
. . ) . 
?Gandara to Minister of War, Ures, October 26, 1853, Ures El 
NacionaJ., March 17, 1854, in Pinart Transcript, Sonora, V,p.2Qb'. 
Hereafter cited as ~El Naciorial. ·· 
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count, h~wever, and he rejected it.. An impasse had developed. 
Probably Raousset did not get what he wanted from the centralist 
government because he was involved in a conspiracy with liberal Mexi-
cans to overthrow Santa Anna. Possibly this charge is true , but no 
e~idence survives to substantiate it-or to disprove it. a Raousset, . . ' . ' . . . 
disappointed and disillll;sioned again with the Mexicans, broke off 
negotiations, and announced he had "resolved to appeal a second time 
' 
to the use of armed force." 9 When Raousset arrived back in San Fran-
cisco on December 6, 1853, he spent several months recruiting among 
. ' ' . 
dissatisfied, expatriate Mexicans and Frenchmen. Unfortunatel:y f'or 
.. . ' ~ _. . 
the count, h~wever, the exiled Mexicans were not willing to join a 
revolution against Santa Anna-at least not to satisfy the whims of 
foreigners. In Mexico itself, the local citizens had, tired of foreign 
intervention, whether by nations or individuals. Moreover, the fili-
.1 .. . : ' ' I l 
bustering expedition of Will~am Walker and his asso~iates had stirred 
up strong nationalistic sentiments.10 
Early in 1854 newspapers in Mexico City were carrying reports of 
the second, coming of the "Sµltan of Sonora." T!tese papers referred to 
this effort, which was organizing on American soil, as "villiany,", 
"rreason," and an atte.mpt to establish an "iniquitous" government on 
M~xican soil. Raousset was described as a "ranting revolutionist-
8r.amberti.e, Le Dr~ de la Sonora, pp. 1~1-102. See als,o., New 
!2!! Daill Herald,~ February ·28, 1854, and Symons, tr.,, !!!st.~~' 
PP• .187-188. · 
9Lambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, pp. 100-101. See also, 
Lachapelle, ~ Comte, P• i49.~ 
10 ·f .· 
~achapelle, ~Comte, PP• 153-154· 
lower than a common trickster. nll Josef Mar:!a Yaliez was appointed mili-
tary commander and governor of Sonora to prepare local defenses. He in 
turn named Ignacio Pesqueira to le.ad the frontier troops should the 
French come overland. While Y~ez made preparations to repel the fili-
busters, Santa Anna seconded such effort~ by ordering that no armed 
foreigners should be allowed to. disembark anywhere in Mexico, and that 
12 North Americans living along the coast were to be watched carefully. · 
These preparations were occasioned by a rumor that three hundred French-
men, led by Ra.ousset, were en route to Sonora. Finally, the Mexicans 
I 
firmly believed that Ra.ousset and William Walker had combined their 
efforts.13 
On January 17, 1854, the Mexican Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Manuel Diaz de Bonilla, wrote Alphonse Dano, French Charge d' Affaire s 
;,5)'. 
in Mexico, that the Mexican government had documents proving Ra.ousset 
was a filibuster, not a colonizer. Bonilla felt Dano should urge 
Patrice Dillon to stop the count. And Bonilla suggested that a French 
warship should "prevent the disembarkation of those who, trampling 
under foot justice and the rights of nations, wish like vandals, to 
take possessions with the armed hand of part of the Mexican terri~ 
tory. n14 Dano answered that he hoped Bonilla was mistaken about 
Ra.ousset. He also reminded Bonilla that French "relations with the 
llures El Nacional, March 17, 1854, P• 225. See also, Mexican 
Manuscript Selection, 140, Ures, March, 1854, in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora, V, P• 226. · 
12Thid., P• 219. 
l3Ibid., March 10, 1854, P• 220. 
14:sonilla to Dano, Mexico City, January 17, 1854, Senate Exec. Doc. 
~' 33 Cong., 2 sess., Serial 751, PP• 43-44· 
108 
Government of Gen. Santa Anna are of the most friendly nature, and · 
every violatio_n of the Mexican territory can only be considered by us 
as an act of infamous piracy. 1115. 
In order to halt Raousset' s recruitment of Frenchmen in Cali-
fornia with which to invade Sonora, Santa Anna decided to allow 
foreigners to settle in Mexico independently of the count' s group. On 
. I 
January .31, 1854, the Mexican dictator advised Luis del Valle., the 
Mexican Consul in San Francisco, to select men for settlement in 
northern Mexico. Santa Anna also stipulated th.at'as many as th.ree 
thousand of them could be used, but they could not be sent in groups 
larger than fifty men each.16 Del Valle was advised to include 
Raousset's men in order to undermine the count's expedition. French 
consul Dillon assisted this scheIIE, for he was required to sign all 
passports of the new French recruits. The Mexican government promised 
those volunteers that their engagement would be for at least one year. 
Each would be subject to the military regulations in Mexico, as well 
as to all civilian laws and authorities. Enlisted men would receive 
the sane pay as those in the Mexican Army, while officers would be 
paid according to French Army standards. In addition, all transpor-
tation would be provided by Mexico. As an added attraction, the 
colonists would receive a quantity of free land when the government 
discharged them.17 
l5Dail;r Alta California, AprlJ.,. 20, .1854, Dano' s reply to Bonilla, 
Mexico City, January. 21, 1854. · 
16sobarzo, La Crcfuica de la Aventura, P• 17.3· See a1s,o, 
Lachapelle, ~ Co'mte, pp. lb.3-164. · · 
l7Daily Alt~ California, April 20, 1854· See also, Lachapelle, 
Le Comte, P• 144. - . ' 
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With the Me~cans openly luring his men, Raousset i'elt his cause 
was vindicated and his actions justified. He claimed his expedition 
was to aid Mexico, and he asserted that Del Valle and Santa Anna 
wanted only to paralyze the French plan to further their own selfish 
motives. Furthermore he said that all the French volunteers knew the 
true motivations of both parties, and they knew the Mexican government 
rarely kept its. promises.18 Raousset's efforts were hurt early in 
1854, when the United States placed a new commander in charge of the 
troops of the Department of the Pacific, one who proved a formidable 
foe of filibusters, both French and American. 
General John E. Wool became commander of the Department on 
January 9, 1854. Just as with Walker's expedition, Wool determined to 
stop Raousset's group. The general advised Secretary of War Jefferson 
Davis that the notorious French count again was preparing an expedition 
of conquest for Mexico, but that the military was determined to "arrest 
his progress. 1119 In fact, Wool learned that Del Valle was recruiting 
men, and the commander expressed his distrust of the Mexican consul. 
Del V:alle.pursued his instructions, and with the help of two Frenchmen, 
he contracted for a British ship, the Challens;e. During the period 
from March 5 to 20, 1854, a heavy volume of correspondence nowed be-
tween Wool, Del Valle, and Dillon, but the latter constantly proclaimed 
his innocence in the filibustering scheme. He told General Wool that 
if he G/ooi) could prove Raousset's. guilt, then the French leader 
I 
18sobarzo, La Cro'riica de la Aventura, PP• 173-174. See also Daily 
Alta California-;-September~0~1854o 
~ ~ J 
l9wool to. Davis, San Francisco, March 1, 1854, Senate ~· 122£• 
16, 33 Cong., 2 sess., Serial 751, pp. 11-12. 
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should be arrested at once. Dillon referred to the count's expedition 
as a "wild and wicked scherre. 112~ 
Wool was quite angry and frustrated with Dillon, for the French 
passports to Mexico were signed. Wool diligently searched San Fran-
cisco for clues to prove the expedition's real intent and thus to have 
an excuse to put an end to the expedition. In one instance , he advis.ed 
the collector of customs for the port t.hat Raousset had six hundred 
arms and a quantity of powder hidden "somewhere in the neighborhood of 
Telegraph Hill. 1121 The general was unsure of the filibustering plans 
and the leading conspirators, but he thought Raousset and Dillon were 
duping the Mexican consul. At one point Wool asked Del Valle if he 
were aware of the type of men being recruited by the Mexic_an govern-
ment. Wool told Del Valle that the consul was deceived, for the 
French would become filibusters the minute they landed in Mexico. The 
general further hinted that there was a strong possibilit;r that Del 
Valle was receiving a percentage of the money the Mexicans paid for 
' 22 
each French volunteer. 
Del Valle in reality was aware of Raousset's intentions and 
planned to foil the French filibuster. He agreed with Wool that the 
Challenge should not be allowed to sail for Mexico at that time. 23 In 
'20 ' ' ' ' ' ' 
Dillon to Wool, San Francisco, March 18, 1854, in ibid., P• 34. 
See also,· IJachapelle, :r.e Comte , pp. 165-167, and Daily £&! California, 
April 20, 1854~ 
2lwool t~ R._ s. Hammond, San Francisco, March 15, 1854, in ibid., 
P• 36. . 
22wool to L. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, San 
Francisco, March 31, 1854, in ibid., PP• 27"".'30. 
23Del Valle to Wool, San Francisco, March 15, 1854, in ibid. , 
P• U. 
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B:ddition, Del Valle sent nearly one thousand French colonists to 
Guaymas at once-a direct violation of Santa Anna's orders. Actually 
the Mexican consul had invited Mexicans, Frenchmen, Spanish, Belgians, 
and other foreigners in California t.o volunteer to settle in Mexico. 
Recruitment was very easy, for, as the Daily ~ California reported, 
this plan was promoted by "the Mexican government, and the passengers 
will likely be treated with good faith, 11 24 
Del Valle soon had sufficient volunteers for his group. General 
Wool was unconcerned about the fate of the passengers on board the 
Challenge, but he was determined to detain the ship at all costs. 
Therefore on March 23, 1854, he ordered the port customs collector to 
detain, but not seize, the ship for violating an old and seldom used 
law regulating the number of passengers a ship could carry in relation 
to its size. 25 By March 24, the general said he believed his efforts 
successfully had 
paralyzed the expedition fitting out in this port by the 
sanction of Santa Anna, for Guaymas, ostensibly for the 
settlement of Sonora, and the fence of the frontiers 
against Indians, but in fact, to aid in the revolution 
now going on in Guerrero, and, as I believe, to relieve 
Walker, who, as we are informed, without this aid will be 
compelled to abandon the country, or surrender himself a 
prisoner.26 · 
Wool constantly sought proof of the probabl~ le.aders of these 
filibustering attempts. Throughout Wool's investigation, Dillon in-
sisted that he was innocent of any conspiracy with Raousset. By March 
2liuaily Alta California, March 13, 1854. 
25Ibid., March 30, June Z7, 1S54. 
26 .. 
Wool to T. A. Dornin, San Francisco, March 2, 1854, Senate Exec. 
!22£• 16, 33 Cong., 2 sess., Serial 751, P• 35. 
20, 1854, Wool was partially convinced that th.is could be true, but 
he remained determined to get to the bot.tom of the scheme.~ He was 
convinced that Del Valle was indeed a co-conspirator with Raousset • 
. ' ' ' . 
Th~refore on March 31, 1854, h~ requested that local authorities 
arrest Del Valle and try him for violation of the United States 
. .. ' ' .' ' . 
ll2 
neutralit_y laws. Specifically Wool believed the Mexican guiltl' of 
violating an Act of 1818 which forbade raising an armed force on United 
States' soil which was destined to attack. a friendly foreign power. 28 
De..l ~alle actually was arrested, and the newspapers carried a 
detailed account of the story, one hardly nattering the general. 
The pally~ California accused Wool of giving "no notice that the 
law of the United States forbids enlisting men for foreign service, a 
• ' I . 
. . .. · ~ 
law unknown to most Americans and even to most o.f the press." . Wool 
said that the arrest and conviction of the Mexican Consul would help 
the army "in a great measure put 8: stop to filibustering in Cali-
fornia.1130 At Del Valle's. trial, Fren~h Consul Dillon was called to 
testify, but he refused, claiming diplomatic immunity. 31 Dillon also 
insisted he had nothing to do with the French filibusters. Neverthe-
less the Federal District Court subpoenaed him to testify. Again he 
refused, whereupon he was arrested and taken to court. Dillon 
. 27Wool to Dmon, San Francisco, March 20, 1854, in ibid. 
28wool to s. w. I~e, San F'I'.ancisco, March 20, 18,54, in ibid., 
P• 49. 
29Daily ill,! California, April Z7, 1854. 
30Wool.to,J. Davi~, S~ Francisco, April 14, 1854, Senate Exec. 
Doc. 12_, 33 Cong. 2 sess., Serial 751, P• 53. 
31Dailz ill,! California, April 19 and 23, 1954. 
officially protested by lowering the French flag over the consulate, 
symbolizing the suspension of diplomatic relations with the United 
States.32 The entire matter thus had reached international propor-
tions. 
ll3 
Meanwhile, the four hundred members of the French group on the 
Challenge gave bond of $10,000 to cover any legal action against them, 
and then sailed for Guaymas on April 1, 1854. Raousset was pleased 
to see the expedition sail-he had beaten the Mexicans at their own 
game of duplicityo Rather than try to stop the legal expedition, his 
men infiltrated the enterprise in order to subvert it to the count's 
purpose. Raousset naturally had been unable to. secure pennission to 
accompany the group, but three of his trusted lieutenants-Leon 
Desmarais, Edouard Laval, and Nicholas Martincourt-were among those 
who sailed. Raousset remained behind in San Francisco under the close 
scrutiny of General Wool's agents. Thus while Del Valle's trial was 
taking place, the men aboard the Challenge were sailing leisurely toward 
Guaymas where they would await the arrival of their leader, the in-
famous count. 33 
In San Francisco the French consul was protesting the trial as 
improper. He reminded the United States that the local authorities had 
over-extended their powers and exceeded what was within their purview: 
It will remain with the inhabitants of this city and with 
the Federal Government to say how far the said authorities 
have fulfilled that duty prescribed to them, namely: to 
extend to the representatives and agents of foreign 
countries, particularly to those of France, the oldest 
32Ibid., April 20, 25, 26, and 28, 1854. 
33John Cripps to William Marcy, May 4, 1854, Mexico City, Minis-
te.ral Despatches; Department of State, RG 59, National Archives. 
and most faithful. ally of their country, that courtesy 
which is shown them even by semi~barbarous communities.34 
ll4 
Del Valle's trial revealed that he actually was acting under orders of 
his government. Therefore he was not a Mexican traitor, nor was he 
guilty of violating American neutrality laws. John s. Cripps, United 
States Charge d' Affairs in Mexico City, advised Wool on April 22, 
1854, that Del Valle was innocent and that both Mexican and American 
authorities in Mexico wanted Del Valle "to be put at liberty, and left 
in the free exercise of his functions •••• n35. Finally in July, Wool 
admitted his error in accusing Del Valle of complicity with the fili-
busters. 36 He re-examined the evidence, concluding that, after all, 
Dillon was the one most guilty in the case. He thereupon ordered 
Dillon's arrest, and the Frenchman was brought to trial. Wool now 
feared French intervention, and had visions of warships attacking San 
Francisco; he was sufficiently concerned to prepare harbor defenses 
to repel such an attack. Ten heavy guns were mounted on Alcatraz 
Island, and ten howitzers were emplaced at Fort Point. He believed 
these preparations, along with his intervention in Raousset's plans, 
would "put a stop to his nefarious schemes.1137 
Dillon's trial was held on May 24, 1854. The comic opera aspects 
of the case became public knowledge when insufficient evidence effected 
his release. Ironically, if anyone was guilty of aiding Raousset, it 
16, 
. 3'1Jail;)7 !ll!, ca_iifornia, April ~, 1854• 
35cripps to Wool, Mexico City, April 22, J..854, Senate ~· !22.£• 
33 Cong., 2 sess., Serial 751, P• 94. 
36wool to Cripps, San Francisco, July 29, 1854, in ibid., PP• 95-96. 
37 Wool to Davis, San Francisco, May 15, 1854, in ibid. , p. 57. 
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probably was Dillon, for he was a party directly or indirectly to most 
of the French scheming.· Whether he acted as his own agent or that of 
the French government cannot be ascertained. However, General Wool 
was definitely embarrassed professionally by the two trials;, for 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis expressed his dissatisfaction with 
the problem Wool had caused between the United States and France. This 
diplomatic impasse eventually was resolved in 1855 when the two 
governments agreed that French and,Arerican warships would meet in San 
Francisco harbor and fire salutes to each country's flag. JS James 
Gadsden, the American Minister to Mexico who had just received Mexican 
approval for the purchase of sbuthern Arizona, criticized both Mexican 
and French governments for allowing accredited officers "to connive 
at, if not encourage, illegal enterprises from an American port •••• n39 
While these diplomatic argurents raged, Raousset was continuing 
his plans. He searched San Francisco for financial backing for his 
trip, for funds with which to buy rifles and ammunition for his men 
. ' 
already in Mexico. Although it seemed the United States was enforcing 
the integrity of its southern border, the Mexican government did not 
leave anything to. chance. The central government appointed a military 
man, . ,. ·""' y ..... d d f th Jose Maria anez, as governor an supreme comman er o e 
Department of Sonora. 
Y~ez had enjoyed a long, prestigious career as a soldier. Born 
in Mexico City in 1804, he joined the army in 1821 and was wounded 
JSJ. Y. Mason to Count Walewski, Paris, August J, 1855, House 
~e Doc. 88, 35 Cong'., l.:sess·., Serial 956, pp. l.3J-1J6. 
J9James Gadsden to John E. Wool, August 2, 1854, in ibid., P• HY/. 
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while fighting against the Spanish. In 1833 he was promoted to captain, 
and, for his service against the centralists., he was elevated to 
lieutenant colonel the ,following yearo He fought th.e French at Vera 
Cruz in 1838, displaying his bravery by saving many men and consider-
able artillery from being captured. In May of 1853 he was promoted to 
brigadier general and was made military commander of Guadala,jarao Then 
in June he was transi'erred to Sinal.oa where he had his first encounter 
with filibusters. He organized opposition to William Walker, and for 
his actions on the frontier he was awarded the Order of Guadalupe, 
the prestigious award created by Santa Anna. He then was given command 
of the Department of Sonora later that fall with e:Xpress orders from 
Santa Anna to stop French and Arerican filibustering;--.. ·Thus Yanez was 
a loyal officer who bad the e:Xperience to organize Mexican resistance, 
directing both military and civilian affairs.40 
The new commander arrived at Ures, the. capital o,f Sonora, on 
April 18, 1853. Just a few days later, on April 20, he received re-
ports of Ra.ousset's approach; dispatches arrived from Lu~ del Valle 
warning the new governor that the French count ha,d partisans scheduled 
to arrive at Guaymas. On that same day Yanez issued a proclamation to 
the people of Sonora calling on them to revitalize their patriotism 
and to rally to the defense of their national integrity. 41 That same 
day the Challenge arrived at Guaymas with 480 Frenchmen and other 
foreigners. The arrival of so many foreigners caused Yal'tez great 
consternation, for he had insufficient troops to fight so many people. 
40Almada, Diccionario de Historia, PP• 835-842. See al,so, 
Sobarzo, La Cr6nica de la ~entura, PP• 179-182. ........ -- " . 
41sobarzo, &!. cr6nica de ~ Aventura, P• 181. 
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The citizens failed to understand why Santa Arm.a had allowed so many 
foreigners to come to colonize, for the expedition led by Raousset in 
1851 was still fresh in many minds-especially in tho,se at Guaymas.4~ 
Neverthe~ess, the French had arrived at Guaymas to demand the ful-
fillment of their contracts. 
Ya'iiez was unprepared to oppose the arrivals, even h~d they not 
come at the express invitation of President Santa. Anna; therefore, he 
decided upon temporary measures in dealing with the group. He 
annolinced that six reals. (three-quarters of one peso) would be paid 
to the men each day and one dollar to the officers. The agreement 
between Del Valle and the French also had provided that the volunteers 
would be_ armed, but Yanez chose to give weapons to only 125 of the men. 
To these he supplied only out-dated percussion muskets, yet he ordered 
the caps to remain in the. hands of the Mexican Army. More significant-
ly, each man was given only ten bullets, certainly not enough to wage 
. .' ' 
war, or so the general believed. And, while he attempted to placate 
the French, Ymrez simultaneously was preparing his force to engage the 
foreigners should it prove necessary.43. The Mexican conunander was 
still receiving other warnings of Raousset's intent to join the 
foreigners at Guaymas; consequently, he wanted adequate time to pre-
pare his men. 44, 
Although Yanez maintained his suspicions, the Me.xican minister of 
4~. R.· Gatton to John Cripps, May l, 1854, Mazatlfui, (Mexico 
City) Ministeral Despatches, Department of State, RG 59, National 
Archives. · · 
43J. M. Ymi'ez, "Defensa de su Cohducta," in Pinart Transcripts, 
Sonora, V, PP•· 230-235. · 
44ne1 Valle to Y~ez, San Francisco, April 2.4, 1854, Ures El 
Nacianal.·, .. May 26! ,18;4~ .PP~ .22s.:2309<o · · --- -
us 
war wrote that the French volunteers should be divided into smaller, 
more manageable groups and should be settled on specified land with all 
possible speed. The central government, although authorizing Del Valle's 
activity, was also concerned that the consul in Sari Francisco had sent 
such a large group to Guaymas. 45 
In San Francisco Raousset was completing his plans to. join his 
men at Guaymas. An Italian banker, Felix Argenti, provided the money 
to buy a smaller schooner, the Belle, in which the count and a few 
associates left San Francisco between May 23 and May 25. The ship 
carried eight men, 180 rifles, and ammunition for several types of 
weapons. The small ship was so cramped with these munitions and 
supplies that the men suffered an unpleasant voyage to Guaymas. 46 Be-
fore leaving San Francisco, Raousset had left a letter for Dillon which 
exonerated the French consul of all involvement. Curiouslr the letter 
was dated May 19, although the count did not leave until four days 
later. Possibly the date indicated that the letter was delivered late 
or, more likely, that Dillon knew the complete plans in advance. The 
latter is possible--Dillon was wise enough to make certain there was 
no incriminating evidence. 
In the letter Raousset justified his expedition and said that 
Dillop "had thrown every obstacle in the way of my projects of return-
ing to Sonora, projects of which I never made the slightest mystery."47 
45Minister of War to Yanez, Mexico City, June 7, 1854, in ibid., 
August 4, 1854, P• 234. 
461achapelle, ~Comte, PP• 171-177. 
47Daily ~ ca'.iifornia, September 30, 1854, Raousset to Dillon, 
San Francisco, May 19, i854. 
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Raousset also explained that it was Levasseur, the French Minister in 
Mexico, who transmitted Santa Anna's request for Raousset to come to 
Mexico. Only for this reason, said Raousset, had he agreed to go to 
Mexico. Later, after he again was in that nation, Raousset claimed 
that Santa Anna had treated him badly, and the Frenchman added that 
the Mexican leader's "conduct towards me bore injustice and persecution 
so palpably on its face, that even foreign newspapers denounced it 
48 unanimously, in severer terms than I now employ." He added that the 
men on the Challenge, already in Guaymas, saw the insincerity and 
duplicity of the Mexican government. The French had bided their time 
and accepted the Mexican terms only provisionally. They awaited 
Raousset. Their leader claimed he was in no way a filibuster; he only 
wanted to see his men get the land cessions they had been promised. 
The voyage to Guaymas was extremely difficult, for there was in-
adequate food aboard. Then the ~ capsized near Santa Margarita 
Island, which encloses Magdalena Bay. Fortunately the men were able 
after much hard work to. salvage both the boat and its cargo. Near the 
end of June the sea-weary men landed near Guaymas and sought shelter 
from the rough seas. From there the count sent two men to contact 
Desmarais, one of his lieutenants already in Guaymas. However, these 
two men erred in their calculation of the distance to Guaymas and had 
to camp overnight some distance from the town. That night Governor 
YWi.ez learned of th.eir presence, and late the next day, just outside 
of the city, he arrested both men and imprisoned them in a dark, damp 
adobe hut used for the city jail. The following day he questioned them, 
4Sibid. See also, New York ~aily Times, November 2, 1,854, and 
Lachapelle, ~ Comte, PP• 175-:17 • , 
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leanied of Raousset's presence, and tunied them loose, for the French 
had lost the advantage of surprise. 49 Raousset's messengers then did 
contact Desmarais. Even with the messengers' news of reinforcements, 
so much disenchantment existed in this "French Battalion" that little 
hope remained for complete cooperation against Y~ez. 
The Belle continued its cruise down the coast and entered Guaymas 
harbor on July 1, 1854. The count was not aboard the little boat, 
however. He had disguised himself and entered the port city in 
secret. 50 On July 3, after establishing his headquarters, Raousset 
wrote Yanez requesting an interview, and they agreed to discuss a 
possible settlement. However, both men steadfastly refused to compro-
mise, and Yanez ended by ordering the French out of the country at once. 
The "French Battalion" chose to disregard the general's order. In 
truth Raousset had fatally underestimated the Mexican general--he 
believed Yanez ;::a«•:coward for offering terms. 5l 
Meanwhile, Mexican authorities in that nation's capital had asked 
J.ames Gadsden to use his influence to stop more filibusters from 
leaving San Francisco to reinforce the French. Gadsden reported to 
William Marcy, Secretary of State, th.at Raousset had joined his com-
rades and that now the French, "being much dissatisfied are in now a 
state of mutiny threatening a pronuncimiento in Sonora. ,,52 Actually by 
49Sobarzo, La cr6nica de la Aventura, PP• 186-188, See also, Lacha-
pelle, Le Camte-;-p. 177 andDail;y; !lli Califoniia, Sept~mber 30, 1854. 
50Lambertie, Le Drame de la Sonora, P• 105. - --
51ures, El Nacional, July 15, 1854, p. 236; see also, Dail.;y;-~ 
Qalifoniia, September 30, 1854; and New York Daily Times, September 2, 
1854. 
52James Gadsden to William Marcy, Mexico City, Ministeral Des-
patches, Department of State, RG 59, National Archives. 
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this time General Yanez had the entire affair under control. He had 
sought, with some success, to divide Raousset from a portion of his 
men, but the count' s eloquence stirred many of the French to return to 
his support. In addition, the French leader reminded Ya'ttez that the 
Mexican had yet to honor agreements made through Del Valle. During 
this preliminary stage Raousset had military advantage over Yal'i:ez, but 
did not attack; as in his first expedition, his leadership tactics 
failed. Yal'iez believed the Mexicans needed reinforcements, and 
therefore on July 6 and 12 he asked the central government for more 
men. Then on July 12 a fight broke out between anried Me;x.ican civilians 
and some of the French. Two Mexicans and four Frenchmen were wounded. 
This incident served to stir local sentiment against the French, and 
Yanez received public support at last. 
Yanez thereupon ordered his troops to occupy barracks near the 
bay to avoid unnecessary killing. 53 He also moved his headquarters 
to the barracks, for he had heard rumors that the French intended to 
kidnap him. Finally, Colonel Bandara dispatched several hundred troops 
toward Guaymas, but they did not arrive until after the entire matter 
had been settled-:-by bloodshed, Much of the day of July 13 the Mexi-
can general tried to convince the French group to give up their plans 
and leave quietly, but shortly after noon the discussions ended. 
Raousset, with the support of many of the French, decided to attack 
the Mexican headquarters. 54 Raousset was unable to obtain the support 
of other nationalities in his party, but he determined to defeat the 
53ures, El Nacional, July 15, 1854, PP• 236-240. See also, 




Mexicans anyway with what men were with him. 
Again Ra.ousset's military strategy fell short of the realities of 
his situation, The French leader wrote out his battle plans and cir-
. ' 
culated them to his officers; unfortunately a copy fell into the hands 
of the Mexicans. Yaliez thus was able to gather his troops in barracks 
surrounded by a courtyard, and could position them at the best sites to 
repel a French attack. Raousset ordered two companies to assault the 
barracks from the rear, while the others charged the Mexicans from all 
directio.ns. His plan called for occupation of one barracks and the 
' ., I 
Hotel de Sonora. From these positions he thought th~ French could 
fire on the Mexicans until they surrendered or came out to fight, 
whereupon the French were to use the.ir bayonets freely. 55 Raousset 
ordered his men to use their bayonets when possible to conserve ammu-
nition, for each man had only ten to twelve shots. 
The battle began at two o'clock in the afternoon and lasted three 
hours. The initial attack went badly for the French. In the heat of 
the fight the Belle, whose company was to capture two Mexican ships 
in the bay, sailed off, leaving Ra.ousset at the mercy of the Mexicans. 
At the first heavy barrage of fire the "French Battalioh" disinte-
, ''. . ' 
&r.f!.ted, and more than half of the men fled for safety into the house 
of the American consul. 56 That evening Y~z advised Gandara the 
victory was secured. Elated with success, the governor bombastically 
55Jose N. Y~z, "Detall y Algunes Documentos," Ures, El. 
Nacional, August 25, 1854, pp. 243-246. See also, ·Lachapelle,, ·!e 
Comte, PP• 193-196, 
',, ..... 
56Ibid., Ures, El Nacional, August 15, 1854· See il~.o, Lambertie 
Le Drame .9&., la Sonora, PP• 106-107; and Daily~ Calif6rnia,, 
October 15, 1854; and lliU'! York Dailz Times, November 10, 185'4• 
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proclaimed "Glory to the Nation! Honor to Sonora and to the Arms of 
' ' . . 
the Republic. 1157 When the battle finally ended, forty-eight Frenchmen 
were dead and seventy-eight wounded, while 313 were being held prisoner, 
including Raousset. The Mexicans had nineteen dead and forty-five 
wounded. 58 The French survivors ultimately were given the opportunity-
to settle in the interior, but most fled to Martinique or to other 
French settlements.- Yariez treated his prisoners fairly well, and he 
arranged for Barron, Forbes, and Company to finance the deportation of 
those who wished to leaveo 
At last Raousset faced his fate at the hands of the Mexicans. He 
was court martialed on August 9, 1854, convicted of conspiracy to over-
throw th.e government, and sentenced to. be shot. While awaiting exe-
cution, Raousset wrote several letters exonerating himself of all 
charges leveled against him in the court martial.59 According to 
reports, he behaved with "calmness and courage" as the order to end 
his life was given. He faced a firing squad on August 12, 1854, after 
receiving last rites from a local priest. The count was thirty-six at 
the time of his death. 60 
Yanez did not conceal his joy at the performance of his men during 
the heat of the battle. They had faced a fonnidable number and had 
won, something not overly common in Mexican history. He lauded the 
57ures, El. Nacional, July 15, J.854, P• 239. - ' . : 
· 58Yanez, "Detall,t" !!~ .. ~.i; !b N§cienaL, A~ust '25Y 1854j' '' .. · 
245. . . . ., . . 
59ures, El Nacional, September 1, 1854, p. 2490 See also, New 
York Daily Times, November 10, 1854. 
60 . 'V 
J. M. Yanez to Prefect, Guaymas, August 9, 1854, in ibid., 
August 18, 1854, p. '248. See also, Lambertie, Le I>rame de la Sonora, 
PP• 109, 114, and 119• 
local citizens for their patriotism by saying 
it is a remarkable fact which must be mentioned in honor 
of the country that neither in the cause prosecuted agt. 
Raousset, nor in the great quantity of papers searched and 
intercepted ·correspondence appeared the naroo of any Mexican 
as implicated in the intrigues plotted aft. the rights of 
the nation, and the entirety of her territory.61 
The inhabitants of Ures responded by honoring Ya'!iez as the "Libertador 
' . . .l 
62 de Sonora," praising his skill in the battle against the French. 
. . I • 
Although the Mexican general had totally disposed of the French threat, 
the central government was displeased; the elites of Santa Anna's 
government believed Y~ez had been too liberal with the French sur-
vivors. They believed that only Santiago Blanco, whose brother Miguel 
' ' ~ . . . 
had been humiliated at Hermosillo, had insisted that the punishment 
rendered by the court martial be execute do They felt that but for 
Blanco, the French count might have been spared. 
The death of the enterprising count should have indicated that 
Mexicans would brook no interference or violation of their national 
sovereignty, that the time for wresting away their territory had 
passed. Still there seemed to be men in California who dreamed of 
conquering and controlling part of northwestern Mexico; these men 
would continue to plot expeditions and gamble their lives recklessly. 
Especially were there those who el:>elieved they could obtS;in Mexican help 
by promising governmental stability and safety from the marauding 
Indians. Yet only one other American came forth to organize a fili-
bustering expedition, Henry A. Crabb, once a prominent California 
6 . . . .. 
1ures El Nacional, September 1, 1854, P• 250. 
62Ibid., October 1, 1854, P• 254. 
state senator. He was the last Amarican to lead an expedition into 




Between 1848, even before Joseph C. Morehead's expedition, and 
1854, the Unite.d States and Mexico experienced serious, unsettled 
border problems, stetnming not from filibustering but from the Treaty 
: .' . . 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo it~elf. Two provisions of that treaty, Article 
V and Article XI, caused most of the difficulties. Article V 
established the new boundary between the two republics and provided 
for a survey to be jointly conducte.d; Article XI committed the United 
State_s to prevent Indian raids into Mexico from originating north of 
the international boundary. Complications arising from these two 
provisions, along with incessant infringements on Mexican soil by 
filibusters from California, led increasingly to a terse diplomatic 
atmosphere between the two countries. In December of 1853 the 
bc:>undary dispute and the questions of culpability for Indian 4epreda-
ti~ns would be solved by the tenns of the Gadsden purchase agreement, 
whose origins and terms were almost as collll>licate.d as the filibuster-
ing problem. The trouble began almost immediately after the peace 
' ' ' . 
settlement ending the Mexican War was ratified by both countries. 
The treaty called for each nation to name a boundacy commission 
to run and mark the new b<?undary, and on December 18, 1$48, outgoing 
President. James K., Polk nominated ex-Senator Andrew H. Sevie_r of 
Arkansas and Andrew B._ G~ay of Texas as commissioner and surveyor for 
17.h 
127 
this commission. A month later Sevier died, whereupon the president 
appointed Colonel John B. Weller of Ohio as commissioner. The Mexican 
government likewise appointed representatives: Pedro Garcia Conde and 
Jose' Salazar y Larregui.1 The two teams met in San Diego on July 9, 
1849, to begin the survey. Yet not until October 10 did they decide 
on the initial point on the Pacific Ocean at which to begin working 
eastward; then they signed a joint declaration which "was placed in a 
bottle hermetically sealed and deposited in the ground, upon which a 
2 temporary monument to mark the spot was placed." · 
For the next few months these men surveyed and extended the 
boundary between Upper and Lower California. Weller was very opti-
mistic about the survey, believing the work would "settle the question 
forever. 113 However, Weller's optimism was premature, for politi.cal 
considerations soon began to. interfere with the survey. Weller was 
a Democrat, and Whigs in the new administration of Zachary Taylor 
forced a delay of funds needed for continuance of the survey. Before 
the boundary team could proceed far with its work, Weller heard in 
September that he was to be officially removed as head of the team. 
John c. Fremont of "P~thfinder" fame was named to. take his place; 
however, Frefmont, was elected to the United States Senate from Cali-
fornia and never became the A~rican commissioner. Therefore Weller 
continued to head the survey. According to William H. Emory, a major 
1 . . . 
Senate ~· ~· JJ.2_, 32 Cong., 1 sess., Serial No. 626, p. 56; 
hereafter cited as Senate ~· ~· 119. 
2Journal of the Joint Boundary Commission, October 10, 1849, 
Senate ~· ~· ll.2,; P• 59. 
3Ibid., January 28, 1850, p, 61. 
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in the First Cavalry accompanying the survey as chief' astronomer, 
Weller did all he could to carry out the work properly. Emory added 
that 
Colonel Weller's drafts had been protested, his dis-
bursements repudiated, and himself denounced as a 
defaulter; when at that very time, as the settlement 
of his account afterwards showed, he was in advance 
to the government.4 
Then on February 15, 1850, Weller learned he had been fired by im-
patient Whigs in Washington. As no replacement was on location, the 
survey was postponed until November when the joint commission would 
be reunited at El Paso del Norte (the present Julrez, Chihuahua). 5 
Major Emory and Surveyor Gray subsequently completed the California 
portion of the survey, then went to Wash;i.ngton, where on November 
4 they discussed with government officials the problems they had 
encountered. Emory was angry about the political maneuvering involved 
in the boundary commission and asked to be. relieved of further duty 
with it. They learned that John Russell Bartlett of Rhcxie Island had 
been appointed the new survey commissioner, on August, 1850, and Gray 
was ordered to rejoin the commission at El Pasoa 
Bartlett was born in 1805 in Providence ,Rhode Island, but moved 
to Canada where he lived until age eighteen~ He was well educated in 
accounting procedures, art, banking, and history. In the 1830's he 
became interested in the study of the American Indian and corresponded 
with important ethnologists of his day. Beginning in 1847, he pub-
~ry, Report of~ United States and Mex;ican Bound:1 
Commission, Senate Exec.J22.£. 108, 34 Cong., 1 sess (2 vols~, P• 3; 
hereafter cited as Emory, Report. 
5Journal of the Joint Boundary Commission, February 15, 1850, 
Senat.e ~~ Doc. 112, P• 65. 
lished several works on history and ethnolo.gy, yet such work never 
adequately supported his wife and four children. Fortunately his 
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political connections with the Whigs secured for him the appointment 
as commissioner of the boundary survey :1.n mid-1850, for which he was 
to receive three thousand doll~rs a year plus expenses--sufficient to 
untangle his extremely confused financial affairs. In his instructi.ons, 
he was reminded that Arti.cle VI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had 
made provisions "for the collection of infonnation relative to the 
constructi~n of a 'road, canal, or railway~ which shall, in whole or 
in part, run upon the river Gilau •• 116 Bartlett was therefore to 
keep the construction of a southeni railroute in mind while surveying 
the disputed territory. 
The new commissioner traveled to El Paso as quickly as possible in 
order to meet the Mexican survey team on November 1, 1850--the time 
previously agreed upon. From the beginning Bartlett made grave errors 
of organization owing to amateurishness. Political pressure-the very 
force which got him the job-caused him to take on many unqualified 
personne_l, After length.Y delays he finally arrived at El Paso on 
November 13, 1850. On December 3, he met for the first time with 
General Garcia Conde, who was even later arriving, and the two men 
disagreed immediately over the location of the initial po:i,nt on the 
Rio Grande of the Southeastern boundary line. The Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo declared that the inteniational boundary would initiate three 
6 . . . . . . 
D. C. Goddard (Secretary of the Interior ad interim) to John 
Bartlett, Washington, August 1, 1850, Senate Exec. Doc, 119, ·p. 87. 
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marine leagues out in the Gulf of Mexico, follow the main channel of 
the Rio Grande to the southern boundary of New Mexico, move along 
that line three degrees of longitude to the western border of New Mexi-
co, and thence go north to the Gila River. It then would proceed down 
the deepest channel of the Gila to the junction of that river with the 
Colorado, and thence to the Pacific one marine league south of the 
harbor of San Diego. The disagreement arose ,over a map drawn by· 
J. W. Disturnell in 1847, which incorrectly located the southern 
boundary of New Mexico by longitude and latitude in such a way as to 
place El Paso thirty-four miles too far north and 100 miles too far 
east. 7 
General Conde and Bartlett at first refused to compromise, for 
any settlement would result in one nation or the other losing con-
siderable territory. Late in December and after considerable debate, 
however, the men announced that in agreement with Disturnell's map 
used in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
the line should run up the middle of the Rio Grande 'to 
the point where it strikes the southern boundary of New 
Mexico; and, furthermore, it was agreed that, instead of 
extending west and terminating at the southwestern angle 
of New Mexico, which would give a line of but one degree, 
it should be prolonged three degrees west •••• B 
By agreeing to t:qis line, which began forty-two miles north of El 
P,aso, but which ran westward the entire three degrees of longitude 
(175.28 miles), Bartlett surrendered several thousand square miles of 
7For additional details see, Odie B. Faulk, Too Far North: Too 
li!: South {Los Angeles, 1967). See also, Humber to Escoto Ochoa, 
Integracion ~ Desintegracio'n de Nuestra Frontera Norte {Mexico~ 1949), 
PP• 122-12.3. ' 
~port of J. R. Bartlett, Senate Exec. !22£• £., .32 Cong., 
2 sess., Serial 6,65, P• ,3. 
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United States territory--land of absolutely no value he assured his 
superiors in Washington. Bartlett insisted that by his compromise the 
United States had received land that possibly contained valuable ores. 
Thus, an agreement had been reached, but the terms of Art:i,cle V re-
, ' 
quired that both commissioner and surveyor sign all agreements. The 
.• ._..__ ' I 
official surveyor, Andrew B. Gray, was yet in Washingto,n and thus 
unavailable to sign the agreement. During Gray's. absence, Bartlett 
simply appointed Lieutenant A_miel W. Whipple as a surveyor ~ interim 
and ordered him to sign the Bartlett-Conte compromise. 
When Gray rejoined the survey in June, 1B51, he actively disa-
greed with this compromise, refusing to sign any paper giving away 
six thousand square miles of what he thought to be American territory. 
He emphatically denounced the surveying done according to the compro-
mise and "advised 'an immediate suspension of the work upon the line,' 
which extended west, and which the engineers of the two commission~IS 
were engaged conjointly in running •• o " 9 Gray ·insiste.d to his superi-
ors that in his opinion 
the point where the southern boundary of new Mexico 
intersects the Rio Grande, according to the treaty and 
the treaty map, is about eight miles above the town 
of El Paso, not forty..:.two north, as General Conde and 
Mr. Bartlett agreed.0 •• 10 
Bartlett naturally defended his work to official~ in Washington, and 
the official correspondence mounted. Both Bartlett and Gray sent 
lengthy letters to the secretary of the interior, hoping to be upheld 
9Ibid. , P• 140 
10A. B, Gray to Ro McClelland, Secretary of the Interior, 
Washington, May, 1S53, Senate Exec. Doc. 2.i' 33 Cong., 2 sesso, 
Serial 752, P• 5. 
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in their actions.11 While the men awaited replies from the govern-
ment, they decided to survey the Gila River, over which no disagreement 
existed. Gray and Whipple carried out this survey, while Bartlett 
went to Mexico seeking supplies. It was during this trip that Bart-
lett met some of the survivors of Charles Pindray' s French colony and 
learned of their problems.12 Bartlett was at Ures, Sonora, on his 
wide-ranging forage for supplies. He. did not soon return for from 
there he went to Hermosillo, Mazatltfu, and Acapulco, traveling by ship 
to San Diego. 
On February 9, 1652, Bartlett met G~y and Whipple at San Diego 
and heard of their survey difficulties along the Gila. The work had 
progressed well until the group was only sixty miles from the con ... 
fluence of the Gila and Colorado rivers. There they ran out of 
supplies and, soon afterward, encountered nearly 1,500 Yuma Indians. 
The survey party planned to ask the Indians to ferry the group across 
the Colorado River, but the Indians proved hostile. Probably the 
Indians would have killed the entire party if Whipple had not earlier 
befriended the chief's daughter. The Indian girl recognized Whipple, 
whereupon the tribe helped the survey team to cross the river and to 
continue their journey to San Diego. In California he met Gray, but 
then toured north to San Francisco, then back to San Diego. Not until 
May 31, 1652, did he begin his trip to rejoin the survey, and then 
he traveled to Fort Yuma, El Paso, Saltillo, and Monterrey before 
arriving at Ringhold Barracks, Texas, just before Christmas, 1652. 
~ew York Daily Timas, May 19, 1653. 
12John Russell Bartlett, Personal Narrative of Explorations and 
Incidents ••• , 2 vols. (New York,· 1B54), facsimile reprinted in 1965, 
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Whipple and Gray met with Bartlett in California before beginning the 
arduous return march to El Paso.13 
In the meantime Whig official~ had reached a decision about the 
Bartlett-Gray appealso The administration upheld Bartlett. Alexander 
Stuart, secretary of the interior, advised Gray "to remove the only 
obstacle which now exists to the completion of this branch of the 
work, by affixing your signatUI'e to the requisite papers. ,,l4 Four days 
later Stuart wrote Major William H. Emory that he was to replace Gray 
as surveyor, and if Gray had not signed the agreement, Emory was to 
"sign the official documents which have been prepared for the purpose, 
and which only require the signature of the surveyor to settle this 
important point. n15 Emory arrived at El P,aso del Norte on November 
25, 1851, to learn that Gray and Bartlett were not there, He found 
the majority of the survey team in a state of severe disorganization.16 
Immediately he organized the men, nearly one hundred of them, and 
started them working southeastward surveying the Rio Grande. He 
arrived at Ringhol~ Barracks in December, 1852, just 241 miles from 
the mouth of the river, and there Bartlett and Grey joined him. 
The work was progressing well under Emory at that point, but, 
just as Bartlett arrived, orders came from Washington that the survey 
was to be suspended. Members of Congress had become dissatisfied with 
the progress of the boundary survey; in fact, several senators, in-
l3~ ~ Daily Times, December 20, 1852. 
14stuart to Gray, Washington, October 31, 1851, Senate Exec •. Q2.£. 
119, p.' 118. 
l5Stuart to. Emory, Washington, November 4, 1851, Ibid., P• 121.. 
16New ~Daily; Times, June 3, 18510 
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eluding John Weller~the first boundary commissioner, who had been 
elected to the senate from California-were demanding an investigation 
17 . 
into Bartlett's conduct and the Bartlett-Conde agreement. Bartlett 
was accused of squandering governrrent funds and of general negligence 
in all matters surrounding the survey, Although these were the obvious 
I 
reasons, doubtless it was the loss of territory which resulted in the 
suspension of the survey. In addition, Southerners believed a railroad 
route should run through the southern part of the country-a route 
which demanded the land signed away by Bartlett. A senate resolution 
forced President Filmore to supply Congress with all instructions and 
correspondence dealing with the survey.18 
The result of the Congressional investigation was the attachment 
of a rider on the appropriations bills conQeming the survey. The 
rider required that no survey could commence until the southern boundary 
was establi.shed just eight miles north of El P.aso, thereby giving the 
disputed territory back to the United States.19 The Filmore ad.minis-
tration had no recourse but to stop the survey, for no money thus could 
be spent. Accordingly Bartle.tt was instructed to sell his government 
equiproont and disband his crew. The members of the survey team then 
went to Corpus Christi where on January 8, 1853, they boarded ships 
for New Orleans. Meanwhile citizens in New M:exico, led by Governor 
William c. Lane, tried to extend control over the disputed land, now 
17 . . .. 
~·Globe, 32 Cong., 1st sess. (1851-1852), XXIV, pt. 2, P• 
1628. ' 
18Ibid. , P• 814. 
19 . 
The . Statutes ~ Large of the United States Qf. Aroorica, I-IX, 
(Boston, 1845,-1856), X, PP• 94-95. 
135 
known as the Mesilla strip. Just as detennined to control the disputed 
/ 
area was Governor Angel Trias of Chihuahua, who moved troops into the 
territory and swore to defend it at all costs. Once again on the brink 
of war with Mexico, United States officials took a long look at the 
border problems with its neighboring republic. 20 
Changes in both governments opened the door to reconciliation. 
A new administration had moved into Washington in March of 1853, and 
President Franklin Pierce was detennined to end problems with Mexico. 
He appointed a balanced cabinet, but Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, 
agreed with and influenced the president more than any other member. 
However, Pierce did not require Davis' influence to pursue an ambitious 
foreign pol.icy. In his inaugural address he talked of expansion, es-
pecially to acquire Cuba. This was the era of the Ostend Manifesto, 
annexation treaties with Hawaii, Admiral Perry's historical visit to 
Japan, and the Gadsden Purchase--the President's mood was expansion-
. t' 21 l.S l.Ce 
In Mexico changes likewise had occurred. Mariano Arista had re-
signed the presidency on January 6, 1853, and Antonio Lb°pez de Santa 
Anna shortly was invited to return as president for one year. He took 
the oath of office on April 20, and within five days was virtual die-
tator of Mexico once again, although he did not declare himself so 
up.til September. Once in power, Santa Anna desperately needed money. 
Therefore with strong motivations for settlement on each side, a 
. 20see statement of Governor William c. Lane, ~ ~ Daily Tines, 
June 4r 1853. · 
21J. D. Richardson, Compilation of 2 Mess~es and Papers of the 
Presidents, 1789-1897, 10 vols. (Washington; 189-1897), V; P• 198. 
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solution was forthcoming.22 
In May of 1853 the United States announced the appointment of a 
new minister to Mexico, James Gadsden of South Carolina. He was a 
dedicated expansionist and a diplomat with considerable experience. 
Gadsden had been born in Charleston in 1788, the grandson of Christo-
pher Gadsden of Revolutionary War fame. He graduated from Yale in 
1806, and after a brief commercial career joined the anny. For more 
than ten years he participated in campaigns against the British and 
later the Indians. He was acting adjutant general for eight months in 
182i, but, when th.e Senate refused to ratify his appointment, Gadsden 
left the army and moved to Florida. From there, he performed diplo-
matic services for President James Monroe. He later supported nulli-
fication in South Carolina, which alienated him from his lifelong 
friend Andrew Jackson. Finally Gadsden returned to Charleston in 
1839 where he became involved in railroads. By 1853 he and his close 
friend Jefferson Davis were championing a southe:rn route for the 
proposed transcontinental railroad--which would require land in 
southe:rn New Mexico. His friendship with Davis and that influence 
l 
with Pierce got Gadsden the appointment as minister to Mexico. 23 
Gadsden wen.t to Mexico with instructions to get sufficient land 
for a railroad through the Mesilla strip. Furthennore he was to se-
cure a release from Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
which had required the United States to halt Indian raids into northe:rn 
22New York Daily; Times, May 18, 1853 •. 
23 Johnson and Malone , Dictionary 2f. American Biographies , VII, 
PP• 83-84. See also, Gadsden to Marcy, Charleston, May 23, 1853, 
Ministeral Despatches. 
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become "more numberous (sic) and more destructive than those that have 
occurred since the year 1848." The Mexican minister emphasized that 
where the frontier states were once prosperous, they now were "laid 
28 
waste and deserted.". · In fact, he asked that the United States pay 
damage for destruction wrought in Mexico by the Indians. In those 
first exchanges Bonilla placed the United States minister on the de-
fensive, and the Mexican continued to compound the complaints. The 
next day Bonilla dispatched a protest to Gadsden because two thousand 
United States troops were moving into the disputed territory. 29 
Gadsden replied that the troops were only fulfilling the obligations 
of the United States under Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.JO 
Not until September 9, 1853, was Gadsden able to translate 
Bonilla's lengthy protest of August 30 and answer in a letter almost 
as long. He assured Bonilla. that "all the obligations of the Treaty 
of Hidalgo, have in good faith and to the extent of its ability, been 
respected and fulfilled by the U. States." Furthermore, he adamantly 
disclaimed Aroorican obligation to indemnify Mexicans by saying "that 
every interpretation which leads to an absurdity ought to be rejected; 
and that that is deemed absurd; which is not only physically but 
morally impossible."JL Finally, in this letter Gadsden submitted 
several possible bOUJldaries for consideration. 
28:sonilla to Gadsden, Mexico City, August 30, 1853, Ministeral 
Despatches. 
29Ibid., August 31, 1853. 
30Gadsden to Bonilla, Mexico City, September 1, 1853, Ministeral 
~espatches. · · · 
3libid., September 9, 18530 
1.38 
Gadsden did not receive an answer to this note, but a conference 
was scheduled between himself and Santa Anna on September 25. Santa 
Anna later wrote in his memoirs that he had a rather terse conversa-
tion with the American minister, who informed him that the railroad 
to California "must be built by way of the Mesilla Valley, because 
there is not other feasible route. The Mexican government will be 
splendidly indemnifiedo The Valley must belong to the Uniteci States 
by an indemnity, or we will take it. 1132 The only agreement reached 
at this time, however, was one stating that the disputed territory 
should remain as it was, officially uncontrolled by either goverll.Qlent, 
while negotiations continued. On October 2, Gadsden suggested that 
the Mexicans consider selling a larger part of their territory to the 
United States, perhaps even Baja Californiao 33 
Optimistically Gadsden had advised Marcy several days before of 
his firm belief that the Mexican dictator would offer "propositions 
for a convention to arrange all the disagreements between th~ two 
countries which may involve the cession of additional territory on 
the one part; and the payment of an adequate compensation on the 
other."34 Gadsden correctly assured that Santa Anna badly needed 
money, and with sufficient money the American minister believed he 
could get nearl~ anything from the wily Mexican dictator. Gadsden 
reported to Marcy that "everything connected with the government in 
2 ..... 
3 Clarence Ro Wharton, El Presi.dente: 
General Santa Anna (Austin, '"T926), p. 189 • 
. -
A Sketch of the Life of - ,...__.......,.......,... 
33Gadsden to Marcy, Mexico City, October 3, 1853, Ministeral 
Despatches. 
34Ibid., September 18, 1853. 
139 
Mexico is much unsettled. Discontent, disappointment, and faction are 
st~l at work." He added that the Mexican dictator was "on a volcano 
which may explode in a month, and yet he smothered for a more pro-
tracted period-money and an Army, that can be continued faithful, are 
the elements on which he must rely for a conti?uance of his power. ,,35 
At this stage the United States sent Christopher L. Ward with 
memorized instructions as a special agent to Gadsden. 36 He carried 
six different plans to be suggested to the Mexican government, Plan 
one called for the United States to purchase Baja California and parts 
of Sonora, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. Four other plans called for the 
purchase of diminishing amounts of territory by the United States. . . 
As a last resort, Gadsden was to purchase just enough land for a 
railroad. The United States was willing to pay up to $15,000,000 for 
the area, however much might be had. 
Significantly Ward had sought this appointment to Mexico so he 
could influence the treaty negotiations, for he ,h~eliid.~i:fiEh~J!e·etae:; 
' - : ·-·' ·- ' 
in the Garay grants. 
,, ' 
In 1842 Jose de Garay received from Santa Anna, 
then president, the right to build a canal or railway across the 
Mexican Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Garay sold the grant to two British 
subjects, who in turn sold it to a commercial firm, the P. A. Hargous 
Company of the New York. This company paid about $25,000 for the 
grant, but asked $3,500,000 as an indemnity when the grant was 
annulled by the Mexican Congress on May 22, 1851-largely for 
35Ibid.·; October 3, 1853. 
36zorilla, Historia, PP• 345-347. 
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political. reasons. 37 Thus, Gadsden not only had to deal with an un-
stable Mexican government but also with American speculators. Later 
in 1853 a filibustering expedition from California led by William 
Walker would add to his problems. Gadsden complained of these hard-
ships in a note. to Marcy, but he received little sympathy from the 
American cabinet member. And failure to secure a settlement with the 
Mexicans naturally would be blamed on Gadsden. 38 
Making the American minister's job more difficult was the growing 
Mexican hatred of Americanso The United States had not fulfilled 
Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but even worse in 
Mexican eyes was the American failure to halt filibustering expedi-
tions launched from California. Mexico Cit;y El Universal., a major 
newspaper in the capital, reported that Mexicans were tired of having 
their sovereignty violated and would defend their national. integrit~--
"when Mexicans once take up anns against foreign enemies, they will 
not be led to the combat by a presumptuous whim, but by the natural 
defense of their honor •••• 1139 On November 15, during the heat of the 
negotiations over the Mesilla strip, Bonilla charged the United States 
with extreme negligence for not stopping Walker's filibuster, The 
Mexicans had heard of the brig Caroline, loaded with anns and. ammuni-
tion, and the government knew that the expedition had departed 
.3?Gerber, Gadsden Treaty, PP• 4.3-51. 
38Gadsden to Marcy, Mexico City, November 20, 1853, Ministeral. 
Despatches.· · 
39Mexico City El Universal., October .30, 185.3, in Ministeral. 
Despatches. · 
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California with its master intent on conquering Baja California.40 
Bonilla confirmed the arrival of the American expedition to 
Gadsden and conjectured that more expeditions were "being fitted out in 
that State of the American Union in the notorious manner implied by 
its very publicity." T~e Mexican also suggested that United States 
authorities sho'Q].d be punished when "responsible for the failure to 
suppress those expeditions against a neighboring nation, enjoying peace 
and friendship with the United States. 1141 Walker's expedition, along 
with American negligence in stopping such illegal intrusions, convinced 
Santa Anna that the United States intended to annex yet more Mexican 
territory--either legally or illegally. To satisfy the Mexicans, 
Gadsden sent a circular note to all American naval vessels i,n the 
Pacific instructing them to halt any suspicious crafts and to search 
for filibusters. He did this when the Mexicans became so concerned 
with the intrustion of the Walker expedition as to cease the negotia-
tions for several days. 42 Interestingly, if Gadsden had not been 
faced with Mexican fears about the Walker expedition, he might have 
been able to secure considerably more Mexican territory in his treaty, 
perhaps even Baja California. However, had Walker's expedition not 
convinced Santa Anna that the United States by one method or another 
was going to secure additional territory, he might not have sold the 
land he did in his treaty with Gadsden. Thus Walker may have helped 
4°zorilla, Historia, P• 347. 
4laonilla to Gadsden, Mexico City, November 15, 1853, Miru,steral 
Despatches. 
42Gadsden· to Bonill~, Mexico, November 17, 1853, Ministeral 
Despatches. 
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Gadsden, but most likely he actually prevented the American purchase 
of Baja California. 
In spite or these interruptions and an extremely unfavorable 
diplomatic atmosphere, Gadsden remained optimistic for a settlement. 
By November 29 he knew or the worsening financial condition or the 
Mexican government, and he expected Santa Anna to be willing to act on 
OM of his six prop~sals. 43 On November 30 Bonilla advised Gadsden 
' ! 
that Santa Anna was ~ady to grant some concessions providing they were 
"compatible with the security, independence, interests, and rights of 
Mexico •••• "44 Soon thereafter, the Mexican dictator appointed an 
ad hoc commission to negotiate the boundary controversy, In the first -- ' 
meeting with the commission, Gadsden wanted to consider the proposal 
calling for American purchase of Baja Cali,fornia; however, Santa Anna 
instructed his negotiators to talk only of the sale or the Mesilla 
territory. Doubtless, the Mexican president knew of his people's 
discontent and realized that further loss of so IIRlch territory would 
cause his downfall. Doubtless he also realized that if he indicated 
his willingness to sell more land, the residents or many of the 
northern states would join with the filibusters and declare inde-
pendence. 
On December 4, 1853, Gadsden reported to Marcy that he now ex-
pected "a more protracted negotiation than was at one time anticipated, 
when I ha,d treated with the President direct, still the conferences had 
43Ibid., November 29, 1853. For a Mexican interpretation of parts 
of the negotiations, see Ochoa, Integracion, pp. 132-135•, 
~onilla to Gadsden, Mexico City, November 30, 1853, Ministeral 
Despatches. 
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with him have proved faVQrable ••• •" He was confident th11,t t.he negotia-
tions would be completed with the government of Santa Anna, but "pa-
: ' . . 
tience will be necessary, for at this time t}Je President and the 
cabinet think and dream only of dictatorship with the Empire to 
follow."45 At his first meeting with the Mexican negotiators in 
' . . .' . 
December, Gadsden presente.d his version of a projected treaty, one 
which he said had been "carefully drawn up and reconciling in the most 
liberal of provisions all the disturbing issu~s between the two 
governments •••• "46 The MeJtican commission was willing to consider the 
' I . • 
proposal, and the December 24 all disputes were settled. The treaty 
was signed six days later. 
Gadsden agreed to a line designated by Bonilla ·which gave the 
United States considerable territory--more than enough for a railroad • 
. . ' .· . . .' 
Inhabitants in the territory were guaranteed ecclesiastical and 
property rights, and United States was released from Article XI of th~ 
T~aty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In addition, the purchase agreement 
called for a complete, new survey of the boundary. Gadsden had pressed 
' ' 
for the recognition of the Garay grant, but Bonilla refused, telling 
the American minister the United States would have to assume payment 
for it. The treaty also stipulated that the United States would pay 
s15,000,000, as well as assume $5,000,000 more in claims of A~rican 
citizens against the Mexican government. Bonilla also insisted that 
I ' ' ' 
both governments be bound by the treaty to halt. ille.gal intrusions 
45Gadsden to Marcy, Mexico City, December 4, 1853, Ministeral 
D~spatches. · 
46Ibid., December 16, 1853· 
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into either nation.47 
Gadsden returned to the United States on January 12,, 1854, with 
his trea~y.48 Arguments over ratification of the agreement created 
considerable interest in the United States. Southerners favored the 
acquisition, while Northerners strongly denounced it. The Senate 
began considering the treaty in February, 1854-an undesirable. time, 
for Congress was fighting over the Kansas-Nebraska bill at the time. 
Thus ratification of the Gadsden Treaty, like the boundary survey, 
involved the sectional struggles then engulfing the nation. The 
Senate amended1'"bhe··treaty·byh3caling 'the purchase 'price to $10,000,000 
and striking out the $5,000,000 for claims. However, Article XI was 
completely abrogated.49 Moreover, there was considerable disagreement 
over how far above the mouth of the Colorado River the boundary should 
be drawn, but the Mexicans were aware that if the final boundary 
separated Baja Californ.ia from Mexico, it would be only a matter of 
time until this land also became alienated from the Mexican Republic. 
It was Juan Nepomucano Almonte, Mexican Minister in Washington, 
who finally influenced the boundary agreed upon by the Senate. The 
agreement signed by Gadsden had set the boundary just six miles above 
the mouth of the Colorado, where extreme tides prevented a bridge 
being built. At Almonte's. urging the final boundary was placed 
twenty-eight miles down the Colorado from its junction with the Gila 
47New ·~Daily Times, February 15, 1854. See also, Zoz:illa, 
Historia, pp• 293-302. · 
48 . 
Ibid., January 16, 1854· 
49For the Mexican version of the ratification controversy see, 
Zorilla, Historia, PP• 348-.'.351. 
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River. Gadsden was dissatisfied with the final version, but he could 
do nothing to. stop its approval.. Like.wise Santa Anna was somewhat 
dissatis.f'ied, but he needed money so desperate!~ that he could not 
afford to stall for a better price. Therefore on May 31, 1854, the 
Mexican dictator signed the amended treaty. Although the House of' 
Representatives was divided over sectional interests and had heatedly 
debated the appropriations bill for the purchase, it did vote on June 
l 
29 to provide the first pa~nt of $7 ,000,000. The additional. 
$3,000,000 was to be paid when the boundary had been properly surveyed. 
Thus the United States-Mexican border becare stabilized-at least 
legally. Yet filibustering expeditions continued to influence diplo-
matic relations between the two countries. Expeditions were organized 
'I •• • 
and launched from California for several more years-creating in Mexico 
an even more intense hatred for the: gringos from the north. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE ARIZONA COLONIZATION COMPANY 
On April 8, 1857, at the edge of the village of Caborca, hogs were 
feeding on the bodies of dead Americans, while several hundred Mexicans 
gleefully shou.ted, ''Muerto ! los Gringos" (Death to American~). At the 
town plaza the head of the American leader was floating in a jar of 
mescal, displayed for all to see. The air was heavy with the smell 
of death, yet the Mexicans were preparing for a gala celebration. Only 
a few short months before, the head on display had sat on the shoulders 
of l{enry Alexander Crabb, a California state senator who appeared 
destined for a brilliant future. Many of his followers were prominent 
Californians-men unlikely to sacrifice their lives foolishly on a 
quixotic venture. The entire group of less than one hundred men had 
i'oll,owed a dry, dusty, and dangerous trail to Sonora early in 1857, 
proclaiming their intention of colonizing part of northern Sonora, only 
to meet a degrading death at Caborca on April 7. 
Crabb had firmly believed he was ent~ring Senor~ at the invita~ 
tion of leading citizens-including Ignacio Pesqueira, the potential 
governor. Upon arrival in Sonora, however, Crabb and his men treacher-
ously were ordered captured and shot by Pesqueira-dead men could tell 
no stories of betrayal. The only survivor of the massacre was a 
sixteen-year-old boy, who was spared for reasons of youth. To Mexicans 
it was ~de to appear that Crabb and his men were filibusters, Never 
ll6 
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resolved-then or yet-was the question of Crabb' s real intentions: 
were he and his men in Sonora to wrest territory from a weak and 
neighboring republic, or were they innocent colonizers, dupes of a 
master plan which would give Pesqueira control of Sonora? Whatever the 
truth, Crabb's entanglement did prove how volatile and unpredictable 
Mexican politics and politicians could be. 
The Mexican frontier in 1857 was a wild, lawless, and dangerous 
place. Apaches raided within fifteen miles of Guaymas, the principle 
sea coast village. Indians harassed caravans, killed homesteaders, 
' 
1 
and mercilessly preyed on all villages in the area. In addition, 
outlawry had become so serious a problem that in 1857 martial 1aw was 
declared for many areas of the frontier. Thus, plagued by Indian and 
outlaw raids, Sonora also suffered the ravages of revolution, as did 
Mexico at large. 
Conservative forces led by Manuel Maria Gandara, the governor, 
fought liberal leaders such as Ignacio Pesqueira. 2 In the midst of 
this struggle, rumors spread that one of these groups was seeking 
support from Anericans in California. 3 To some opportunistic Ameri-
cans a divided Sonora seemed to be a singularly attractive chance to 
improve their lot. Into this land, replete with hostile men and 
animals, came Henry A. Crabb and his small band o;f men, the dupes of a 
1naily Alta California, April 3, 1856. For additional information 
on Frontier conditions see, Daily Alta California, October 16, 1856. 
See also, Stevens, "The Apache Menace," pp. 2:11-222. 
2See Chapter I for background details on Pesqueira and Gandara; 
for an excellent biography of Pesqueira see, Rudolph F. Acuna, "Ignacio 
Pesqueira: Sonoran Caudillo," Arizona and the West, XII (summer, 1970), 
PP• 1.39-172. 
3naily Alta California, December 2.4, 1856 • 
. - . 
Mexican politico in Sonora, would-be governor Ignacio Pesqueira. 
Perhaps in appearance and background Crabb was unsuited to the 
hard life o.f a .filibuster/colonizer. He was bearded and dark-eyed, 
resembling in every way the stereotype aristocratic Southerner. A 
Tennessean by birth, he was a lawyer by trade who came to San Fran-
cisco in 1S49 and became involved in politics. He served in the 
California Senate during the years 1S53-1S54, edited the Stockton 
Argus, and in 1S55-1S56 ran unsuccessfully for the United States 
Senate.4 Consequently, when Crabb realized early in 1S56 that he 
would not win the senate seat, he withdrew his name. He was at the 
14S 
time a member o.f the Know Nothing Party, a loosely organized political 
group comprised of dissident Whigs and Democrats. He was seeking the 
seat in the United States Senate previously held by William Gwin. Un-
fortunately California, like the country at large, was torn with 
factionalism. Opponents and proponents of slavery fought for influ-
ence in the state. 5 Crabb was then in his thirties, a pro-slavery 
supporter, but also a man "of influence, of respectable character and 
talents~"6 His marriage into the prominent California-Sonoran !insa 
family allowed him access to the leading political f~c'\;ion in Sonora, 
led by Ignacio Pesqueria. Allegedly, with Pesqueira's encouragement, 
Crabb agreed to lead a group of "col~nizers" to Sonora. 
Actually Crabb had thought of going to Mexico for some time 
before he led his ill-fated group to their deaths. In 1S55 he failed 
4rbid., January Z't, June 11, July 30, ia56. 
5Bancroft, History of California, I, PP• 697-699. 
6 House :Exec. !22£• ~' 35 Cong., 1st sess,, Serial 955, P• 71, 
Hereafter cited as House Exec. !22£• ~· 
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to win re-election to the state legislature, and before he ran for the 
United States Senate he traveled to Mississippi by way of the Isthmus 
of Nicaragua. He may at this time have considered a scheme for control 
of Nicaragua. Another filibuster, William Walker later would carry out 
such a plS?, become president of that country, and eventually lose his 
life. Crabb possibly talked with Walker about such an expedition. 
Regardless of the dealings between the two men, they each may have 
greatly influenced the other's future. 7 
In Sonora in 1S56 Ignacio Pesqueira's exhausted forces were unable 
to control the increasing Indian raids while suppressing the opposi-
tion Gandarist faction. With the promise of mining concessions and 
land grants, Crabb became interested in "settling" the frontier. As 
early as June, 1S55, Crabb and his brother-in-law Agustfu Ainsa went to 
Sonora by ship. While he was there, influential merchants and other 
Pesqueira supporters urged Crabb to lead a larger party overland to 
belp place Pesqueira in power. Actually Crabb and Ainsa had begun to 
plan their entry into Mexico during the last year of Santa Anna's rule. 
Working with Jesus Islas, a Sonoran living in California, Crabb and 
Ainsa approached Jose de Aguil8:r, then a secretary in General Esp.ejo's 
administration. Crabb, Ainsa, and Islas planned to bring several 
thousand Mexicans, then living in California, to colonize northern 
Mexico. Santa Arm.a was overthrown in 1S55, however, but the government 
still saw the usefulness of such a colony. Islas returned to California 
7Rufus K. Wyllys, "Henry A. Crabb-A Tragedy of the Sonora 
Frontier," Pacific Historical Review, IX (June, 1940), P• 1S4. 
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and waited for the ruling junta to decide its official position. On 
May l, 1855, Airlsa and Crabb presented themselves be.fore Governor 
Aguil~r. They talked about the col~nization plan for thirty minutes 
and told the governor they were "precursors of the Islas colony, which 
abt. the l5,th or May was to reach the Colorado mines. 118 
Ainsa and Crabb said they had advanced Islas $13,000 to recruit 
colonists, and the two .financiers believed the Mexican government 
should repay some or this money and contribute to the colonization 
I , 
effort. The two men also told Aguilar that they had talked with Manuel - . Maria Gandara, the military commander or the state, and had obtained 
his support for their efforts. Aguilar claimed later that he saw the 
whole, manipulation as a method to get money from the Mexican government. 
He said he knew that as Crabb was an American, he could inspire little 
confidence in Mexicans living along the border. 
Nevertheless, Aguilar ordered the prefects of Altar and San 
Ignacio to aid the Islas colony or five hundred Mexicans when it 
reached their areas. They were to advance necessary funds to the colo-
nists by using government credit. 9 About J.une 15, 1S55, Ainsa ·jour-
neyed through Ures and advised the governor that the colony would 
arrive soon. Shortly thereafter, the governor issued an order for 
· Ainsa' s arrest for t~king o:f.' Sonoran independence. Ainsa temporarily 
avoided arrest, and for an unexplained reason Aguilar changed his mind ·. 
about arresting Ainsa and decided only to have him watched. Aguilar 
kept close surveillance on Ainsa until he received a report from the 
.8 . 
Jose de. Aguilar, 
scripts, Sonora, v, P• 
9!bid. ' p. -;J,7. 
Vindica·cion de su Conducta, in Pinart Trans-- --265. . . . 
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prefect of San Ignacio. After receiving this report, he finally 
arrested Ainsa. Captain Juan B. Navarro, an officer under Gandara' s 
conunand, demanded Ainsa be turned over to the anny for court martial, 
yet Aguilar refused the order.10 
The Mexico City Integridad Nacional on May 18, 1856, carried a 
report from the prefect at San Ignacio. This Mexican official claimed 
that Ainsa had tried to bribe him to help liberate Sonora, Sinaloa, and 
Baja California from Mexico. Ainsa reportedly had told him the terri-
tory then would be annexed to the United States, which would pay 
$25,000,000 for the expenses incurred. Mexicans easily could recall 
that this was the period when many expansionists dominated the United 
States Congress. Moreover, William Gwin, one senator from California 
w~s a known expansionist (he later tried his own scheme to establish 
a republic on Mexican soil). Others unofficially may have encouraged 
Crabb and Ainsa to secure additional Mexican land in hop~s that it 
could be converted to slave territory.~1 
Aguilar, in his Vindication 2f his Conduct, may have been trying 
to protect himself. He possibly was deeply involved with Ainsa. 
Yet his justification for his actions served to demo~strate his 
extreme anxiety to clear himself of any connection with Crabb. It is 
unlikely, however, that Aguilar was completely innocent.· In his 
proclamation of July 11, 1856, to the citizens of Sonora, he was even 
d t b t h . . d 1 in . 12 Aft more a aman a ou is innocence-an even ess conv . cing. er 
-· 
iaib· "d 269 
. J. •' P• • 
11. . 
Ibid., P• Z/O. 
1~anuscript ~rint ll41, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, P• 313. 
the revolution began in Sonora in 1856, the governor was denounced 
for his cqnduct in the Ainsa affair. Reportedly after Aguilar had 
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Ainsa arrested, he allowed Ainsa liberties and even eventually freed 
th . 13 e pnsoner. 
Regardless of the political maneuverings in Mexico, Crabb con-
tinued his plans. By the sunmer of 1856 Crabb was malQ..ng prepara-
tions to lead this overland party. It was also during this summer 
that revolution began in northern Mexico. Thus when news of the 
American preparations reached Mexico, the Gandarists used the invasion 
to charge Pesqueira with betrayal of his country.14 Regardless of 
the charges and counter-charges, Pesqueira gained control, and in 
July he assumed the executive power of the state of Sonora. It was 
w;i.th the encouragement of this man and hie associates that, early in 
1857, Crabb prepared to move into Mexico. In fact, the Ainsa family 
probably provided connections for Crabb to conspire with Pesqueira. 
Crabb' s "colonists" were to help Pesqueira defeat Manuel Gandara.15 
The Arizona Colonization Company, the formal title of Crabb's 
group, consisted partly of' influential citizens of California, former 
state senators, and men of substantial backgrounds. 16 Eventually the 
force was projected to total one thousand men; however, less than one 
hun~red men actually made the trip. They sailed from San Francisco in 
1\exico City, Integridad Nacional, July 18, 1856, in Pinart Tran-
scripts, Sonora, V, p. 341. 
14aasey Biven to John Forsyth, June 18, 1857, Mazatlan, Mini1;5teral 
Despatches. 
l5Wyllys, "Henry A. Crabb," P• 186. 
16zorrilla, Historia, p. 371. 
January of 1857 and grouped near Los Angeles where they assembled 
supplies. From there they journeyed to Yuma Crossing (the junction 
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of the Colorado and Gila rivers), where they remained for a ehort time 
before marching into Mexico.17 
The Sacramento ~ received word from a member of the party 
that they had reached Fort Yuma on March 1, 1857. This writer indi-
cated that the group suffered greatly on its journey through barren 
southern California-a desert with sand eight to ten inches deep which 
made each step as punishing as ten. Still, according to the writer, 
their spirits were high. The three companies were comprised of "men 
of courage, energy and enterprises, ready to face any danger, and 
18 
equal to any emergency.". Crabb shared the hardships of his men, 
wading rivers and pushing the wagons through the sand. Often the men 
tied themselves to harness and pulled the heavy wagons through the 
desert. One of the party was said to have remarked that "it was 
rather hard to leave Cali.fornia in rope harness, acting in the 
capacity of a horse. 1119 Of course, many of the party became ill, and 
they sorely regretted the medical supplies and wagons left behind in 
the desert. Even yet, the party remained detennined. 20 
Word of Crabb's_ approaching expedition spread rapidly in Sonora. 
l7Robert H. Forbes, Crabb's Expedition into Sonora, (Arizona, 
1952), P• S. 'Fo+ additional infonnation on Crabb's preparation see, 
Daily fil! California, March 20, 1857" · 
18naUy ill! California, March 20, 1857. 
l9Ibid. 
20J. Y. Ainsa, History of the Crabb Expedition~!• Sonora 
(Phoenix, 1951), p. 16. •· See also, Juanita Ruiz, ''The Watch of Henry 
A. Crabb," Journal of Arizona History, VII (summer, 1966), PP• 139-143. 
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He had made no attempt at secrecy, discussing the expedition freely 
with California newspapers. 21 T,he New~ Daily Times reported on 
April 15 that Crabb' s colonizing party was, in truth, a filibustering 
22 
expedition. In Mexico, American ambassador John Forsyth wrote to 
Lewis Cass that the newspapers in the Mexican capital had been carrying 
rumors of the American filibustering expedition for two months. 23 
Forsyth expressed his fear that an invasion would result in Mexicans 
showing little mercy to the Americans. 
The group now was reduced by sickness to about ninety men. After 
leaving Yuma they followed the Gila River for some forty-five miles; 
then they rested at a place later called Filibuster Camp. There they 
gathered strength for the arduous journey that lay ahead. Only after 
great suffering did the men arrive at Sonoita on the international 
border. It was there, on March 26, that Crabb wrote a letter to Don 
Josef'Mar~ Redondo, prefect of Altar. He advised Redondo that the 
Americans were entering Mexico in accordance with the colonization 
laws and "in compliance with positive invitations from some of the 
most influential citizens of Sonora. "24 The party was armed, but 
Crabb wrote that this was necessary for protection against outlaws 
and Indians. He also advised Redondo to make a decision about the 
Americans; "Bear this in mind, if blood is to fiow, with all its 
21 .. 
John Forsyth to Don Juan Antonio de la Fuenta, May 30, 1857, 
Mexico City,· House Exec. Doc. ~' p. 40, · 
2~ew ~Daily Times, April 15, 1857. 
23 . . 
John Fori:>yth to Lewis Cass, April 24, 1857, Mexico City, 
Ministeral Despatches. 
24Henry A. Crabb to Don Jos6 Marfa Redondo, March 26, 1857, 
Sonoita, House ~· Doc. ~' p. 31. 
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horrors, on your head be it, and not on mine. 11 25 Crabb evidently was 
warned of hostile Mexican feelings before the end of his march, but he 
chose to pursue his venture. 
Crabb received an answer, indirectly, in the form of a proclama-
tion by Pesqueira. The governor called on free Sonorans to arm them-
selves and prepare for a bloody battle. He charged the Americans with 
violation of the national sovereignty of Mexico, Patriotism was his 
password for promoting unity-and himself-in the hearts of all Mexi-
cans. He called .for Sonorans to let their "conciliation become sincere 
in order to fight this horde of pirates, without country, religion, or 
honor. 1126 Conflicting reports circulated in both countries, and Crabb 
was expected to attack by land and sea. Americans were told that Mexi-
can authorities might have poisoned the water wells from Sonoita to 
Cabor~a. 27 In fact, Crabb's plan called for a march through the arid 
desert region of Sonora to Caborca, Mexico, an arduous march of over 
ninety miles. Sixty-nine men set out for Caborca, leaving twenty 
men to follow later. However, only sixteen of these men would follow 
Crabb into Mexico. Four were too ill to make the journey. 
While the Americans marched into Mexico, Pesqueira prepared his 
defenses. Don Lorenzo Rodriguez and two hundred men were sent from 
Altar to Caborca. 26 Mexican citizens were indignant over this American 
25Tuid. 
26Datos Historicos Sobre Filibusteros de ~' ~ Caborca, .§2!!. 
(Caborqa, Sonora, 1926), p. 10. See also, Mexico City, Estandarte 
Nacional, April 2.4, 1S57 • 
27~ !2!! Daily Times, May 19, 1S57; see also, Ibid., May 21, 
1S57, 
28Datos Historicos, p. 11, 
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invasion, but they were especially vehement in their condemnation of 
those who ~ay have invited Crabb to enter Mexico. 29 This attitude per-
haps led to the death sentence later inflicted on the group of fili-
busters. ~neral Luis Noriega, commander at the Guaymas garrison, 
called the Americans pirates; he implored his men to "march to meet 
them. Let there be no mercy shown, no generous sentiment felt for 
these rascals.n30 In addition, the Mexicans launched a maritime 
expedition on March 17 from Mazatlaii. / Led by Jase Velasquez Cadena, 
this convoy hoped to attack any Americans invading by sea. 
R.esidents of the Mexican village of Caborca learned of Crabb' s 
approach by land, and on April 1 the first hostile contact was made. 
The Americans were unprepared for an attack, as they had no scouts in 
advance. As the Crabb group marched through a wheat field in dis-
orderly fonnation, the Mexicans opene.d fire. 31 · Althotlgh caught unaware, 
Crabb' s men killed several Mexicans, including one of the leaders. 
After the initial contact, both sides withdrew. The Mexican force 
retu:rned to Caborca, and later the Americans followed. To enter the 
village, they had to cross a barren strip of land about four hundred 
yards from the first houses. This cleafing exposed them to intense 
Mexican rifle fire from fences, houses, and shelters. Still, the 
Americans attacked and forced the Mexicans to withdraw to a church in 
the city. The church walls were thick, and the Mexicans very tena-
29For Mexican attitudes see, Mexico City Estandarte Nacional, 
April 24• 1857, Ministeral Despatches. 
30New ~ Dail:y; Times, May 19, 1857. 
31 . 
Sworn Statement of' Charles Edward Evans in correspondence, 
Charles B. Smith to John Forsyth, September 14, 1857, Mazatl~, 
in House ~· !22£.• ~' P• 65 • 
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ciously held their position. 
Five Arericans had been killed and .fifteen more wounded in the 
house-to-house .fight, but a considerably larger number o.f Mexicans had 
been killed. Although the Mexicans had the advantage o.f position, 
Arerican .fire was deadly accurate. 32 To dislodge the church de.fenders, 
Crabb ordered his ren to blast the church door down. Fifteen ren tried 
to carry a keg of powder to the door, but intense Mexican .fire forced 
them to take cover. Five ren lost their lives, and Crabb and seven 
more were wounded in this effort. 33 Both the Mexicans and the Areri-
cans held their positions for almost six days. The building in which 
the Arericans were stationed was well provisioned with large stores of 
food and water. During this six-day seige, more Mexican troops came 
from nearby towns and surrounded the village, swelling their number 
to 1,500. Moreover, several hundred Papago Indians armed with bows 
and arrows were with the. Mexicans. 
On April 6 one of the Indians shot a fire-tipped arrow into the 
thatched roof o.f Crabb's stronghold. Crabb attempted to blow the roof 
a.ff with dynamite, but in the conflagration several men were burned, 
and others were killed when the magazine exploded. 34 Reluctantly, the 
Arericans asked the Mexicans for terms of surrender. In reply the 
· Mexicans promised to treat the Arericans as prisoners o.f war. Crabb 
knew that his men must surrender or fight their way out against a 
superior force. Many o.f his men distrusted the Mexicans and wanted to 
32Forbes, Crabb's ;ExpE;dition, P• 2.1. 
33Daily Alta California, August 3, 1857. 
34rbid. , May 22, 1857. See also, Ibid. , May 31, 1857. 
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die ftghting, but their distrust was overcome by HUario Gabilondo, 
who promised medical care !'or the wounded and !'air treatment !'or the 
s~rvivors.35 Crabb sent one man out under a white fiag, but Gabilondo 
took him as a prisoner. The Mexican commander then bad him call to his 
companions that they would be taken as prisoners to Altar ii' they would 
march out of' the building in single i'ile. At this entreaty the Ameri-
cans complied and came out unanned. 
Mexican promises quickly proved worthless. The Americans 
irmnediately were bound and taken to a nearby corral where they were 
held until morning. At dawn the men were taken out in groups of' five 
or ten and shot in the back--because, some said, the Mexican troops 
could not look them in the !'ace. 36 Some reports stated that the. 
"bodies were left where they fell, and Mexicans were heard. to boast 
that their hogs were fattening upon the bodies of' 'Los Yankees. rn37 
Crabb alone !'aced solitary death. In the alcalde's office he talked 
with another prisoner. He also wrote a letter to his wife. Then he 
was led out, his hands tied over his head, and his back turned to the 
executioners. An informant told the ~Diego Herald t:Qat "at the 
conunand i !'ire,' at least a hundred [rifie] balls were fixed into his 
body, and all that was mortal of Henry A. Crabb hung dead, swinging 
by his tied hands.~•38 A Mexican severed Crabb's head and placed it in 
a jar of' mescal so that it could be displayed in the village. The 
35statement of' Evans, Smith to Forsyth, House ~· ~· ~. P• 66 • 
.36 Hous~ Exec. !&£.• ~. PP• 73-74. 
37 Charles Smith to John Forsyth, June 22, 1857, Mazat1'1, 
Ministeral Despatches • 
.38 House Exec. lli?.a• ~. P• 74, 
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Mexicans spared only Charles Edward Evans, a boy of sixteen,39 On May 
18 the ~ York Daily Times reported the death of Crabb and his 
party.40 
Other associates of the Crabb group suffered various fates. 
Agustin Ainsa and Rasey Biven were jailed in Sonora, charged with 
aiding Crabb. Both men were related to Crabb by marriage, and their 
subsequent stories of the event, while largely accurate, made the 
Mexicans unquestionable villains. Still other members of the Crabb 
party died at the hands of Mexicans. After the execution of Crabb's 
immediate force, the Mexican carefully searched the countryside for 
additional Americans. Parties traveled as far as Sonoita on the 
international border. There the four sick men left behind at Edward 
E. Dunbar's general. store on the American side of the border were 
taken by the Mexican force. Twenty-five Mexicans entered Dunbar's 
store, dragged the four men out, tied them to stakes, and shot them. 
Dunbar was out of town and probably escaped the same fate. 41 Although 
the bodies of the Americans were left to rot, a group of Papago Indians 
buried them. In addition, the Mexican arrested Jesus Ainsa, Crabb's 
brother-in-law, and took him to Sonora. When news spread of this 
violation of the border, Americans clamored for punishment of the 
guilty Mexicans. 
The Mexican force swiftly dealt vengeance upon unsuspecting 
reinforcements marching to join Crabb's ill-fated group. In Arizona 
. 39wyllys, "Henry A. Crabb," P• 191. 
40New York Daily Times, May 18, 1857. 
~ I . 
41.naily g!:,! California, May 28, 1857. See also, New~ Daily 
Times, June 13, 1857. 
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Major R. N. Wood and Captain Granville H. Oury had organized twenty-
fi ve to thirty men in what was called the Tucson Valley Company. This 
party marched from TucsQn toward Caborca, intending to link forces with 
Crabb. On or about April 5, when they were fifteen miles from Caborca, 
they met a combined Mexican and Indian force numbering almost five 
hundred men and were ambushed. The Mexican leader, Captain Jos/ Moreno 
of Altar, told the Americans that if they would yield their arms they 
would be allowed to leave the state unmolested. However, Captain Dury 
refused to comply as he still hoped to join Crabb in Caborca. The 
Mexican resistance was so strong that Oury' s men were fortunate to 
retreat in good order to the United States border, losing only four 
men on the way.42 One of the four lost was Major R. N. Wood. At 
every waterhole or resting place, the pursuing Mexicans paid greatly, 
losing forty men in all. Oury displayed high qualities of leadership 
in the retreat, and some Americans involved stated that had Oury 
been with Crabb the execution of that larger party would never have 
taken place.43 Deadly aim, coolness under fire, and general bravery, 
along with good leadership, spared the Tt+cson Valley Company from 
Crabb ' s fate • 44. 
Sixteen other Americans, .led by Captain Freeman s. McKinney, also 
42naily ~ California, August 3, 1857. 
43New ~Daily Times, June 13, 1857. See also, Ibid., May 21., 
1857· 
44Granville Oury returned to Arizona Territory, and with his 
brother became involved in territorial politics. Oury served as a 
Democratic delegate to Congress from Arizona in 1880-1882. He prac-
ticed law for several years and died at Washington, D.C., in 1891. 
For information see, Granville Oury file, Arizona Pioneers' Historical 
S~ciety; see also, Cornelius Smith, Jr., William Sanders~; History 
Maker of the Southwest (Arizona, 1967). ----.- - .....- . 
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attempted to join Crabb, but were not so fortunate as those from 
Tucson. .A. few days after Crabb' s execution, a large Mexican force 
patroling near Altar discovered this group from California and attacked 
it. In contrast to Oury's decision, the McKinney party surrendered~ 
and all were quickly shot. Probably the Mexicans did not definitely 
lmow that this group was part of Crabb' s party, but his made no 
difference. On the sea the Mexicans also awaited an attack that never 
materialized. 45 North Americans on any business were unwelcome. 
Crabb's misadventure precipitated vengeance on all his countrymen.46 
The Crabb expedition intensified the violent antipathies that 
had roots in the Mexican War. Americans were appalled and angered at 
the treatment given Crabb's party, but more especially were they 
alarmed that Mexicans had apprehended and shot American citizens on 
United States' soil. John Forsyth wrote an official protest to the 
Mexican government about the Crabb incident, charging the Mexican 
government w,lth refusing information and failure to cooperate. 47 Even 
if Crabb was a filibuster, the United States maintained that he should 
not have been executed without trial. Forsyth added that "the pirate 
who roams the ocean with the black emblem of death at his masthead, 
who robs and murders the people of all nations indiscriminately., • when 
overcome by a cruizer of' a civilized state, is not put to death on the 
spot. 1148 
45Ibid. , May 21, 1857 • 
46Daily A!!:! California, August 3, 1857. 
47 Forsyth to Fuente, May 30, 1857, House ~· !!2..£.• ~' P• 40. 
48Ibid, , P• 42. 
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Later, Rasey Biven, Crabb's brother-in-law informed the Daily 
A!i! Califo:rnia that Crabb's party was not a filibustering expedition, 
but a peaceful colonizing company. He insisted that Crabb came to 
Sonora at the invitation of Don Ignacio Pesqueira, unaware that 
Pesqueira deemed it was "politic to denounce them as filibusters, and 
declare war against them until not one of their invited guests are 
left to tell what they saw in Sonora. 1149 Biven also wrote Forsyth, 
reiterating his willingness to swear that Pesqueira was the guilty 
party.50 When Biven's statement was printed, Californians were 
easily convinced that Crabb was the victim of Mexican politics.51 To 
add credence to Biven's version, the ~~Daily Times on May 21, 
1857, printed a letter from Francis D. Clark, a fonner friend of Crabb 
in Stockton, California. CJ,.ark said he talked many times with Crabb. 
They both knew of the William Walke~ filibuster into Baja California 
in 1853, as well as of other attempts to take territory.52 Clark 
knew their type of operations, and he said that at no. time did Crabb 
mention hostile intentions to Sonora. 53 He recalled that Crabb was 
a prominent citizen, an influential leader in the Know Nothing movement 
in California, and not inclined to foolish activities. 54 
4 9Daily fil! California, May 30, 1857. 
50Rasey Biven to John Forsyth, June 18, 1857, Mazatlab, Ministeral 
Despatches. 
5lDaily ill! California, May 31, 1857 • 
. 5~or information on William Walker's expedition to Mexico 
Woodward, ed. , ~ Republic of Lower California. 
53New !2!:! Daily Times, May 21, 1857. 
5113ancroft, Q..cgifornia, VI, .p. 697,. 
see, 
Later ev;i.dence suggested that Clark was corl'E!ct. According 
to C. P. Stone, Acting United States Consul at Guaymas in 1859, 
163 
Pesqueira was eminently capable of chicanery. Stone reported to 
Lewis Cass in December, 1858, that Pesqueira roused his constit~nts 
against Americans by calling upon Mexicans to repel a large group of 
filibusters who allegedly were invading Sonora. According to Stone, 
this was actually a ruse to obtain men and guns for Pesqueira's forces 
in Sinoloa, not for use against "2 gringos." After assembling 
alarmed citizens, he conscripted some to reinforce his army, while the 
remainder were sent home after registering their firearms. 55 Soon 
afterward, Pesqueira forcibly collected these firearms and ammunition. 
Thus if Stone's report were accurate, Crabb may well have been 
"iµvited" to come to Sonora in 1857 only to serve the purpose of 
furthering Pesqueira's hold on Sonora. Partly as a result of this 
episode Pesquei~a remained the major political figure in Sonora for the 
next twenty years. The heroism displayed by the citizens of Caborca 
resulted in the city being renamed Heroica ("H. de Caborca"), 
In the course of Sonoran politics, it mattered little who was 
the guilty part1 in the Crabb incident. During the next several 
months, Pesqueria and Gandara charged each oth,er with inviting Ameri-
cans to settle in Sonora. 56 The United States government considered 
it a potentially dangerous diplomatic incident, and the House of 
Representatives printed many of the documents surround the event. 57 
55c. P. Stone to Lewis Cass, February 21, 1859, Guaymas, Sonora, 
Consular Despatches. 
56nail;y Alta California, June ~' 1857. 
57House Exec. Doc.~' 35 Cong., 1st sess., Serial 955, PP• 1-84. 
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However, as the facts presented to the United States government offered 
no defense of the Crabb aff~ir, the United States overlooked the issue 
for fear of causing serious diplomatic consequences. Men thereafter 
were cautious about provoking Mexican wrath. Crabb unfortunately was 
naive, he entered Mexico at an inopportune time, and he paid with his 
life. Nevertheless, men continued to dream of that fortune just 
beyond the horizon, that irresistible urge to "see the elephant." 
The dream of taking Sonora--of annexing it to the United States or of 
establishing a separate republic-did not die with Crabb, but like a 
magnet would lure other adventurou~ or naive men to march south.5S 
58For several years after Crabb's death men continued to dream of 
creating a republic including California and part of Mexico. For 
additional infonnation see, Bancroft, History of California, VII, 
PP• 279-280. . 
CHAPTER X 
DUKE OF SONORA 
During the American Civil War, the last major expedition was 
planned by an American adventurer to gain control of northern Mexico. 
Between 1863 and 1865, ex-California Senator William McKendree Gwin 
promoted and planned, with the help of the French who were intervening 
in Mexico, a colonization scheme with himself as the "Duke of Sonora." 
However, he received almost no support from the Mexicans and so little 
from Emperor Maximilian that his efforts failed miserably. Shortly 
thereafter, Napoleon III withdrew French support from Maximilian, and 
in 1867 the Empire collapsed.1 
William Gwin was born in Tennessee in 1805-the son of an 
itinerate Methodist preacher. The future California politician was 
educated at Transylvania University, from which he earned degrees 
both in law and medic:Lne. Afterward he moved to Clinton, Mississippi, 
where he practiced medicine until 1833, when Andrew Jackson named him 
a Qnited States Marshal. Seven years later he served one term in the 
· lower house of Congress, at the end of which he moved to New Orleans. 
In 1848 he decided to move again, this time to California, hoping to 
enter politics. He was quick witted, although often devious, and 
impressive in bearing. These were necessary qualities to win the 
1For a short overview on Maximilian see, Herbert I. Priestly, 
~Mexican Nation, ! History (New York, 1930), PP• 357-364. 
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political ascendancy and influence he wanted more than anything 
else. 2 Gwin"Yirml.Y..Jbelieved that California was the place to gain 
power quickly, as the new territory needed political organization when 
it should become a state in the Union. Gwin was so certain of his 
abilities that before leaving the East, he tqld Senator Stephan A. 
Douglas of Illinois that he intended to be a candidate for the United 
States Senate from California and would see him soon. 3 
The future California politician arrived in San Francisco on June 
4, 1849, just in time to participate in the movement for a constitu-
tion for the golden territory aspiring to statehood.4 Eight days 
later he attended a mass meeting which ended in the calling of a 
constitutional convention. By 1850 Gwin had fulfilled his goal and 
was back in Washington as a California senator.5 Almost continuously 
until 1861 he represented his adopted state, but when the Civil War 
began Gwin grew restive in California. He retired from California 
politics and considered his southern heritage. Being a Southerener, 
he naturally sympathized with the Confederacy.6 Knowing his Mississippi 
plantation was in the path of General u. s. Grant's army marching toward 
2 Johnson and Malone, Dictionary 2f. American Biographies, VIII, 
PP• 64-65. 
3william H. Ellison, "C<;mstitution Making in the Land of Gold," 
Pacific Historical Review, XVIII (August, 1949), p. 322. 
4Bancroft, California, VII, pp. 265-273. See also, James A. B. 
Scherer, Thirty-First ~tar (New York, 1942). 
5For additional information on Gwin' s political career see, 
Bancroft, California, VI. 
6For more details on Gwin's southern sympathies see, A. Russell 
Buchana:'n, David )erry 2f. California, Dueling Judge (San.Marino, 
California, 1956 • · · 
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Vicksburg, Gwin left California to return to there. En route, however, 
he was arrested by United States anny officers at the Isthmus of 
Panama and held a prisoner at Fort Lafayette from November lS to 
December 2, 1S61. Although he was arrested as a Southern sympathizer, 
no evidence could be found to try him as a traitor, As the Daily Alta 
California reported, "no documents or other evidence was found to sub-
stantiate the charge ••• " This paper also added that this "leni ty" 
towards Gwin was uncalled for. 7 After his release by United States 
officials, he journeyed to his plantation in Mississippi where he 
remained through 1S62. 
During the winter of 1S62-1S6J, Gwin departed for France aboard 
the blockade runner Robert E. Lee, which sailed from Wilmington, North 
Carolina. a Gwin knew that while he was in Paris, and even be fore, 
California was experiencing internal problems arising from quarrels 
between secessionists and Unionists. Gwin had lived and served in that 
atmosphere; therefore, he certainly must have counted on considerable 
California support for the Mexican colonization plan that he hoped to 
present to Napoleon III, Emperor of France. 9 Also, Gwin was very aware 
of Southern interest in Mexico, for the Confederate States badly needed 
recognition and support to defeat the Northern forces. In fact, 
Colonel James Reily had been sent to Mexico by General H. H. Sibley, 
7Daily ill.! California, January 20, 1S62. 
~van J, Coleman, ed., "Senator Gwin' s Plan for the Colonization 
of Sonora," Overland Monthly, second series, XVII, P• 6o6 (1S91). 
Actually, all of the correspondence and docum~nts relating to Gwin's 
Mexican plan were published during 1S91 in the Overland Monthly 
(January-December). 
9Daily ill!, California, September S, JO, and November 5, 1S61, 
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Confederate commander of New Mexico, to seek permission for Confederate 
troops to cross the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The Mexican government, 
however, was in such a state of.chaos that the Confederates gained 
nothing by these efforts.10 Yet, others were strongly interested in 
northern Mexico for other reasons, and Napoleon had heard of the gold 
and silver mines alleged to be in the area.11 
The French maintained a steady interest in Mexico from 1848 to 
1852. During these years Napoleon III was president of the republic. 
Then in 1852 he became emperor with dreams of rebuilding the empire. 
Thus French interest in Mexico ultimately became French intervention 
and intrigue in Mexico and other parts of the world. 
Others wanted the land for private uses. In Paris, Gwin joined a 
colony of Confederate sympathizers. He entertained prominent French-
men and frequently associ.ated with John Slidell and other official 
representatives of the Confederacy. Ideologically the ex-California 
senator agreed with the Southerners on slavery, but would take no 
12 official stand in support of the Confederacy. Perhaps he wished no 
prQblems in presenting his plan, but perhaps he saw that neither Great 
Britain nor France would officially support the government of the 
Confederate States of America.13 Thus Gwin removed himself from that 
lOJames Reily to John H. Reagan, January 1, 1$62, in Official 
Records, series 1, part 1, p, 825• 
11Hallie M. McPherson, "The Plan of William McKendree Gwin for a 
Colony in North Mexico, 1863-1865," Pacific Historical Review, II 
(December, 1933), P• 361. 
12For Gwin' s attitudes on slavery see, B. Sacks, "The Creation of 
the Territory of Arizona," Arizona and the West, V (Spring, 1963), 
P• 46. ---
13overland Monthly, second series, XVIII, p. 497. 
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issue while making other critically important connections in the 
Emperor's cabinet. The Marquis de Montholon, Napoleon's minister to 
Mexico, was intrigued with Gwin' s idea of colonization on the Mexican 
frontier, and they talked at length of the future of Mexico. Both n:en 
wished to influence the destiny of northern Mexico, because Gwin had 
spun stories of the abandoned Spanish gold and silver mines just 
awaiting anyone with sufficient ingenuity to reap the harvest. Accord-
ing to the Californian, only a few hostile Indians stood in the way of 
such success.14 
With the encouragement of Montholon and Count Mercier, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gwin met and visited briefly with the 
Archduke Maximilian, newly appointed Emperor of Mexico. Gwin reminded 
the Emperor that 
the weak point of the Mexican Empire is on its northern 
boundary. The country is sparsely populated; the inhabi-
tants are cowed and disheartened by the extortions of 
Mexican officials and the depredations of warlike Indian 
nations.15 
Finally, in January of 1864, Gwin officially communicated his schen:e 
to Napoleon III, and the French Emperor was very interested in the 
plan, especially as financing was necessary if all of Mexico was to be 
subdued.16 The scheme called for a military law, with grants of land 
to inunigrants, governn:ental sharing of mineral wealth, and boundaries 
l4Gwin to Maximilian, Paris, September, 1863, in ibid., p. 499, 
See also, McPherson, ''The. Plan of Will.iam M. Gwin," p. 36,3. 
l5William Gwin to Napoleon III, Paris, January 5, 1864, Overland 
Monthly, MI, P• 501. 
16See an interesting article concerning the French in Mexico and 
William Gwin in Lately Thomas, "The Operator and the Emperors 1 " 
An:erican Heritage, XJl (April, 1864), PP• 4~23, and 83-84• 
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so "as to exclude, as much as possible, lands actually occupied by the 
present Mexican population in Sonora and Chihuahua. 1117 The coloniza-
tion plan appeared to offer great promise of success and wealth, but 
more than potential wealth would be necessary to obtain the unqualified 
support of the French governroont. Count Mercier interested the Due de 
Morny, Napoleon's half-brother and most;, influential advisor, in the 
plan. 
De Morny was also an unscrupulous speculator in various projects, 
the perfect man to back the venture into Mexico. According to Gwin, 
the Frenchman agreed that the Due would provide the money necessary to 
colonize the frontier. Gwin was to be given the title of "Duke of 
Sonora," with a yearly income of $60,000. For his help De Morny would 
receive a share of the vast and untouched mineral we.alth in Sonora and 
Chihuahua.18 With such influence in high echelons of the French 
government, Gwin received an audience with Napoleon III during which 
he convinced the Emperor that the plan should have the support of the 
French governroont, especially of the French military forces in Mexico. 
Napoleon was blinded by the brilliant prospects of great gold and 
silver bonanzas in Mexico, and eagerly he sought to set the Aroorican 
scheme in motion.19 
Soon thereafter, Napoleon officially presented the plan to the 
Archduke Maximilian, who consented to meet with Gwin. The ex-Cali-
1711Plan of Colonization in Sonora and Chihuahua," Overland 
Monthly, XVII, P• 503. 
18New York Daily Times, July 7, 1862. 
l 9William Gwin to Napoleon, Mexico, July 3, 1865, 'Overland 
Monthlf, XVlI, second series, P• 596. 
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.fornia senator later wrote Napoleon that "the Archduke Maximilian, then 
in Paris after making himself acquainted with my scheme , had approved 
' ' 20 I f t ;i.t in the main, and encouraged me to come to Mexico." n ac , 
Napoleon's government not only fully adopted the plan, but also took 
steps to convince both Mexicans and Maximilian that they should support 
the echeme. 21 Thus with approval .from Napoleon and possible help .from 
Maximilian, Gwin prepared to undertake his .first journey to Mexico. 
The French Emperor sent with Gwin a letter to the French military 
commander in Mexico, Marshall Bazaine, asking that he help Gwin in all 
possible ways. In addition, Napoleon had become so interested in the 
mines of Sonora that he forced Maximilian to agree to French ratifica-
tion of all acts of the Regency. The archduke did not take kindly to 
this pressure, but he nonetheless tactfully signed the Treaty of 
l-{iramon, containing the desired clauses, between the Mexican and French 
governments. Maximilian and Empress Carlotta embarked for Mexico on 
April 14, 1864, convinced that they would save Mexico, and Gwin left 
France two weeks later bound for Mexico City. 
22 
Gwin arrived only a month behind the Duke and Empress. He .first 
went to see Marshall Bazaine with credentials from Napoleon. From 
this official the ex-Californian soon learned that the Mexicans were 
generally hostile toward his colonization plans. 
, 
Moreover, Jose 
Hidalgo, the Mexican representative in Paris, had held up delivery of 
20Ibid. 
2~ew York Daily Times, May 2, 1865. See also, McPherson, "The 
Pl,an of William Gwin," p. 369. 
22New !£!:!£Daily Times, May 2, 1865. See also, McPherson, "The 
Plan of William Gwin," P• 369. 
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Gwin' s credentials which already were supposed to be in the hands of 
Maximilian's government. Hidalgo was first a Mexican, and he hoped to 
stop Gwin before the plan could gain momentum. 23 While awaiting an 
audience with Maximilian, Gwin wrote his son that "there has been some 
foul play about my papers. They have never reached the Emperor. For 
fear of accidents, I shall write the Duke de Morny, to see that no 
orders countermanding the expedition are issued. 11 24 
Gwin began to sense serious problems when he could not get an 
audience with the Mexican Emperor regardless of how hard he tried. 
Finally, when he met with the head of the Archduke's cabinet, he was 
abruptly rebuffed. Gwin realized he would never obtain sufficient 
cooperation from Maximilian, and thus soon thereafter the ''Duke of 
Sonora" decided to join forces with Marshall Bazaine. But Bazaine not 
only was fighting with Maximilian for influence in the government, but 
also he was busily courti~ a seventeen-year~l'd'ISill',1~~?,.rQ6fisequently, 
Gwin could accomplish little during the next several months, so he 
remained in Mexico City trying to make inUuentia,1 conI1ec~icmi:;. He 
; should have realized that Maximilian would not chance incurring more 
enmity from his fiery Mexican "constituents" ju;:it to help an American 
adventurer, 
Although he failed to anticipate Maximilian's intentions, Gwin did 
correctly assess the, state of Mexican affairs. In September of 1864 he 
2~cPh~rson, "The Plan of William Gwin," pp. 368-371. 
24-william M. Gwin to his son, Mexico, July Z'/, 1864, Overland 
Monthly XVIII, second series, p. 204. 
25For comment on the Marshall's wedding see, Overland Monthly, 
XVIII, PP• 207-208. 
17.3 
addressed a letter to Napoleon III about the "deplorable" situation in 
Mexico. He described Mexico as a country at civil war for fifty years, 
whose "government is a wreck, and the masses of the people are strangers 
to order and stability in government, and have no hope of a prosperity 
they have never been permitted to enjoy. n 26 The American opportunist 
also advised Napoleon that the French army was handicapped in Mexico 
by poor roads, harsh climate, and constant Indian raids in the north. 
He added that military expeditions were being outfitted for Sinaloa 
and Sonora, but even if the government could become established, Gwin 
queried whether "the Empire [could] be made permanent, and able without 
foreign aid to sustain itself against foreign aggression or domestic 
violence?"27 
The French Emperor also re.alized that northern Mexico might well 
become American territory if something were not accomplished quickly. 
Accordingly, Napoleon urged Maximilian to cooperate with Gwin. The 
Archduke replied that the regency would be happy to cooperate with the 
American in any colonization scheme. Unfortunately for Gwin no evi-
dence existed that the Archduke's support was more than consideration. 28 
Thus Gwin found himself in the uncomfortable position of being caught 
between the French and Mexican Emperors at the same time he also was 
caught between Maximilian and the French army of occupation. No matter 
how he tried, the hopeful "Duke of Sonora," could not get a commitment 
from Maximilian. Tne emperor was too bu.sy traveling through the 
26william M .. Gwin to Napoleon, Mexico, September J.,21 1864, 
Overland Mcmthly, XVII, second series, P• 506. 
2'7Ibid., P• 5cY"/• 
2~cPher~;on, "The Plan of William Gwin," PP• 371-372. 
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countryside trying to convince himself that all Mexicans loved him. 
Gwin's first ray of hope came from Carlotta. Indeed Carlotta 
was di~cting the affairs of state while.her husband was away, and she 
granted Gwin an audience. He had a pleasant and promising conversation 
with the empress, for she raised only a few objections to the plan. 
Gwin confided in a le_tter to his daughter that the empress had sug-
gested an alternate project which "will be at once conceded by 
Montpolon, and then our success is complete. n 29 Gwin agreed to all 
the suggestions Carlotta made and even fully expected her to sign a 
docwnent guaranteeing the empire's support. Unfortunately she refused 
to sign any agreement without her husband's approval. In October 
Maximilian returned. Gwin encountered him at a wedding, and it was 
during this celebration that Gwin became aware of Maximilian's negative 
intentions. Gwin wrote his daughter that "the Emperor was also very 
courteous, but never alluded to our interview in Paris, or business of 
any kind.".30 In fact, ,Maximilian never granted Gwin an audience to 
diseuss his colonization scheme. After traveling in much of Mexico 
the Archduke realized that his support of Gwin could only foster more 
hatred for his regime--Americans were hated and distrusted perhaps 
even more than Frenchmen. Gwin finally began to lose all hope late in 
1S64 when many of the French occupation troops were withdrawn by 
Napoleon III. 
As a last resort Gwin traveled to France, to talk directly with 
the French emperor. On January 19, 1B65, he sailed from Vera Cruz. 
29william Gwin to his daughter, Mexico, September 29, 1B64, 
Overland Monthly, second series, XVII, p. 509. 
30ibid., October, 1B64, P• 514. 
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He arrived in Paris, hoping to obtain immediate help from the Due de 
Morny, who had indicated a few weeks before that he still favored the 
plan. De Morny died four days after Gwin's arrival, however, and with 
the Due's death the last real chance for Gwin's success also died. Yet 
the American adventurer still refused to be totally discouraged. 31 He 
did gain an audience with Napoleon, who still was strongly interested 
in northern Mexico, or rather in its mineral potential. 32 The enter-
prising Gwin presented yet another plan, that of civilizing the Indians 
and converting Sonora into a highly productive region. Napoleon 
enthusiastically approved of the plan, which promised to line the royal 
pocket book; therefore, on March 31, 1865, he gave Gwin a le.tter which 
directed Marshall Bazaine to aid the American in every possible way. 33 
For the second time, Gwin left Paris for Mexico. At approximately 
this time Richmond fell to Union forces, ending the Confederate dream; 
had Napoleon known of this Southern loss, he doubtless would not have 
cooperated so fully with Gwin, for the United States soon would move 
to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and evict the French intruders from 
Mexico. 
Bad luck seemed to be Gwin' s partner now. By the time the 
American reached Mexico, Montholon had been transferred to Washington, 
and Gwin thereby lost his only real support in Mexico. 34 In addition, 
3~ew ~Daily Times, May 21, 1865. See also, McPherson, 
"The Plan of William Gwin," p. 373. 
32ff-illiam Gwin to Napoleon, Paris, March 25, 1865, Overland 
Monthly, second series, XVII, p. 515. · 
33conti to Gwin, Paris, March 31, 1865, ibid., P• 595. 
3\fcPherson, "The Plan of William Gwin," p. 375. 
Marshall Bazaine, who was 55, anticipated his approaching marriage 
to that lovely, young seventeen-year-old girl. Understandably, 
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Bazaine's :i.nterest could not be held by colonization plans and 
politics. 35 Gwin knew that, wedding or no wedding, Marshall Bazaine 
would not carry out Napoleon's orders. 36 Moreover, rising nationalism 
in Mexico, coupled with the icy attitude of Maximilian, doomed Gwin's 
project. And he was constantly assaile.d by the Mexican press as one 
trying to fragment the Republic for the "gringos" of the north. Gwin 
retorted to the Mexico City Diario Qtl. Imperio that he came to Mexico 
"with letters from the same monarch commending ma and my scheme in the 
most emphatic terms to the active protection of the commander-in-chief 
.<.:;, 
of the French forces, and through him to the Emperor Max:Lmilian. "37 
Gwin believed himself "the victim of the most unparalleled turpitude 
that ever disgraced an official minion. 113B 
Gwin knew that without support he would be wise to forget his 
schemes. Therefore he requested a military escort to the United States, 
reporting to Napoleon that 
from the inception of the scheme of colonization, I have 
acted with the most unbounded -frankness, concealing nothing 
of my motives and purposes, either from your majesty, or 
your majesty's representatives here.39 
Thus the American adventurer departed Mexico, disillusioned about his 
35William Gwin to his wife i Mexico, May 11, 1B65, Overland 
Monthly, XVII, second series, P• 593. 
36william Gwin to Napoleon III, Mexico, July 3, 1B65, ibid., P• 596. 
37Ibid., P• 595. 
3Bib.d 1 ., 
39Ibid.' 
P• 596. • 
P• 597. 
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failures and dubious about his future. 
When Gwin arrived in San Antonio, Texas, General Wesl~y Merrit, 
United States Army commander in the area, had orders to send Gwin to 
New Orleans to see General Phil Sheridan. When the disillusioned 
colonizer arrived at this headquarters, Sheridan was vague about 
Gwin's fate. The commander telegraphed Secretary of War Edward Staton 
for instructions. Gwin was not put :i,.n "close confinement , " but he 
was carefully watched. 40 The next day the war department advised 
Sheridan that Gwin should be arrested and confined at Fort Jackson 
until further notice. 41 Still no one knew under what charges the ex-
California. senator was being h~ld .• 42 Nevertheless he was detained, 
and, on January 24, 1866, Sheridan admitted that, although he did 
not know the charges, he had arrested Gwin because of presidential 
orders.43 Gwin recorded in his memoirs that the 
confinement is most rigid. Not a moment night or day, 
since I was first arrested, have I been out of sight or 
S0'1!1d of an anned sentinel, who is relieved every two 
hours, instructing his successor to permit no one to speak 
to me but the officer on duty at the time ••• 44 
Finally President Andrew Johnson ordered Gwin' s release on April 13, 
40p. Sheridan to E. Stanton, New Orleans, September 28, 1865, 
Official Records, VIII, p.· ·7 55 • 
~~ D. Townsend, Asst. Adjutant Gen. to P;. Sheridan, Washington, 
September ,29; 1865, ibid., P• 760. · 
4~. D. Townsend to P. Sheridan, Washington, January 24, 1866, 
ibid., P• $45. 
4'.3p. Sheridan to E. D. Townsend, New Orleans, January 24, 1866, 
ibid., P• 370. 
44overland Monthly, XVIII, second series, p. 211 .. 
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1866. Gwin was told to leave his native land and not return.45 But 
he became ill, and Sheridan asked permis.sion to parole him in New 
Orleans. This permission was given on May 7, 1866. 46 Nine days 
later Sheridan reported that Gwin had been released according to 
orders. 47 For sometime, however, rumors persisted that Gwin again was 
in Sonora awaiting Confederate soldiers fleeing Union occupation of 
the South. 48 General U. s. Grant believed that Gwin was enticing 
renegades from the defeated South to come to Mexico and participate 
in. some filibustering scheme. Yet none of the rumors were true, for, 
although a few Confederates went to Mexico to settle, Gwin had 
traveled to New York where he lived twenty more years~unsucces~ful 
and almost forgotten.49 
Diplomatically the Gwin episode brought the United States and 
France into a serious international squabble. During Gwin' s globe-
trotting, Secretary of State w. H. Seward had advised John Bigelow, 
the American Minister to France, 
that the sympathies of the Arerican people are already 
considerably excited in favor of the Republic of Mexico, 
and that they are disposed to regard with impatience 
45E. D. Townsend to P. Sheridan, Washington, April 13, 1866, 
Official Records, VIII, P• 897. 
4~ay 7' 1866' ibid .. ' p. 905. 
47New Orleans, May 16, 1866, ibid., P• 909. 
4~ajor General F. Steele to P. Sheridan, Brazos, Santiago, June 
10, 1865, ibid., series one, XI.VIII, part II, PP• 841-842. 
49u. s. Grant to Andrew Johnson, Washington, June 19, 1866, ibid., 
PP• 923-924. 
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the continued intervention of France in that country.50 
Thus while GWin was trying to obtain support from the French govern-
ment, the United States was applying diplomatic pressure to obtain 
French neutrality. In fact, the Un:ited States would have preferred 
to force the French out of Mexico earlier, but the Civil War prevented 
such action. Bigelow had relayed Seward's message to the French mini-
ster, Drouyn de Lhuys, that Gwin was considered a traitor. · And Seward 
wamed the French that if the United States government were correct in 
believing the emperor had made a contract with Gwin, 
the President of the United States would be forced to the 
conclusion that his majesty the Emperor of France was 
pursuing towards Mexico a policy materially at variance 
with that of neutrality in regard to the political 
institutions of the country.51 
Drouyn de Lhuys did not like the blunt approach that Bigelow used, 
however, and he retorted that the French were not willing to explain 
anything to the Am3ricans when demands were made "in a comminatory 
[sic] tone about vague allegations, and based upon documents of a 
dubious character. 1152 
The diplomatic impasse resolved itself, h~wever, for on August 
24, 1865, Seward wrote Bigelow that Gwin's project had failed. 
Seward was apolegetic for the United State,s' hostile attitude toward 
the French, and he stated his hope that the episode coul~ be smoothed 
over with a minimum of trouble. Seward told Bigelow that President 
Johnson was 
5°w. H. Seward to J. Bigelow, Washington, July l'.3, 1865, House 
~· Do·c. 1J., '.39 Cong., l sess., P• 5'.39· 
. 5lJ. Bigelow to D. de Lhuys, Paris, August 1, 1865, ibid., P• 541. 
52:o. de Lhuys to Bigelow, Paris, August 7, 1865, ibid., P• 541. 
gratified with the renewed assurance which Mr. Drouyn 
de Lhuys has given us of' the Emperor's resolution to 
observe an impartial and unscrupulous neutrality upon 
all internal @estions which may agitate or divide the 
United States. 53 
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Thus serious trouble between the United States and France was averted, 
and Maximilian eventually was executed by supporters of' Benito Ju{rez, 
after the. French army was withdrawn. William Gwi,n then disappeared 
from the pages of historyo 
This final a~tempt to wrest land f'rom unstable Mexico was the 
last thrust of Mani.fest Destiny--or adventurism~under the guise of 
colonization. Once again an enterprising and opportunistic American 
had failed to find his fortune from Mexican territory. Significantly, 
neither the French government nor their representatives in Mexico 
would admit any connection with Gwin. Yet Gwin had received numerous 
audiences and had detailed correspondence with French officials of 
. ·' ' 
the highest rank. In fact, he advertised much later that the French 
indeed had agreed to make him the "Duke of Sonora,'' pay him $60, 000 
per year, and share the wealth of Sonoran mines with himo Signifi-
cantly, it may be recalled that while Gwin was an ardent Southerne+, 
he was much too shrewd to become involved in the lost cause of the 
Confederacy. Doubtless he supported slavery, but nowhere in his 
memoirs nor in any other documents relating to his life is there evi-
dence that he was trying to expand the institution of slavery. Thus 
he had no dreams of extending the Southern empire into northern 
Mexico-only illusions of himself as a "Duke." With all these 
53w. H. Seward to Jo Bigelow, Washington, August 24, 1855, ibid., 
p. 542. See also, ~ York Daily Times, Jtily 15, 1865, for denial 
of Mexican governmmt of any complicity with Gwin. 
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failures in the past, the United States remained interested in Mexico 
and all of Latin America. Unfortunately conditions ~teadily worsened 
between the "colossus of the North" and its Latin neighbors to the 
South in the decades that followed.54 
54For information on Maximilian and Gwin, see James A. Magner, 
~of Mexico (Milwaukee, 1945), pp. 391-439, or any period monograph 
on Mexico for those years during the American Civil War. -
CHAPTER ll 
CONCLUSIONS 
Filibustering as a phenomenon was spawned by the frontier and 
nourished by the spirit of expansionistic adventurism which permeated 
all facets of American society during the 1S50's. With the failure of 
William Gwin's colonization plans for northern Mexico, the attempts by 
Arrericans and Frenchmen to wrest territory from the Mexican Republic 
ended. From the peace negotiations at the end of the war with Mexico 
until the twentieth century many Americans believed it their mission, 
or destiny, to spread their institutions and government from the cold 
and desolate arctic to the steaming jungles of the tropics. Yet during 
the Mexican War there was a reluctance to absorb all of Mexico into the 
United States. There were reasons for this reluctance; as Frederick 
Merk has suggested, many citizens of the United States did not want 
"eight millions of a mixed race, obliteration of a republic of foreign 
tongue, retention of a subjugated province for the indefinite future-
these were prospects from which a democracy shrank~ 111 
The time came, however, when Americans realized the advantages 
in gaining power and influence at least to Central Arrerica, for there 
were strong interests in the United States pressuring for the estab-
lishment of an interocean canal. Moreover, many maintained that 
1Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: 
! Reinterpretation (New York, 1963), P• l2lo · . · · 
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"America's mission is to hold a light aloft to Europe in the great 
2 
struggle for freedom." Throughout much of the decade of 1850 to 1860, 
this spirit of "saving" an oppressed and disillusioned people permeated 
American thinking and shaped the responses of individuals as well as 
nationso James Gadsden's attempt to purchase Lower California was 
motivated partly by this spirit. In 1858, President James Buchanan 
rep0rted in his annual message that the United States should establish 
a temporary protectorate over Sonora and Chihuahua. A year later he 
repeated his request only to have Congress refuse a second time. 3 
Nevertheless, as Merk stated, these movements were attempted in 
the spirit of manifest destiny, and they "were actuated by petty 
materialism. They were imbued with little of the lofty spirit to annex 
all 0f Mexico, which briefly flourished in the United States in 1847, 
and "nene of its altruism of regenerating a benighted people and 
lifting them to the h~ights of American citizenship. 114 This material-
ism, born of the frustrations of manifest destiny, encouraged fili-
bustering expeditions into Mexico. Many Americans ideologically 
supported filibustering because it seemed in accord with natural laws. 
One of these "natural" laws, that of racial superiority and inferiority, 
enforced the expansionist doctrine because the result would be a tri-
umph for the superior Anglo-Saxon race over the inferior Mexican. And 
it is an unfortunate fact that many Americans were convinced of the 
2Ibid., P• 201. 
3Richardson, Messages ~Papers, IV, pp. 2967-2994. 
~erk, Manifest Destin;\', P• 209. 
inferiority of the Mexican.5 Thus these men who led expeditions into 
Mexico were shaped by their times, reflecting the spirit of the American 
mission. 
Also significant is the fact that each leader seemed to have 
characteristics in common with the others. Joseph c. Morehead, William 
Walker, Henry A. Crabb, and William M. Gwin were all Southerners, loyal 
to the land of their birth. Yet, while each would have supported the 
expansion of slavery into Mexico, their main concem was .for self 
aggrandizement and adventure. Of the expedition leaders, only Walker 
wrote of slavery, and only he_ provided for its protection when he 
made himself President of Sonora. 
Also, all of the filibusters appeared to have acted in desperation. 
They were disillusioned men with political and financial aspirations 
.first, and desire for glory and adventure afterwards. J:oseph Morehead 
could not find his fortune in California. With a family tradition to 
surpass-for he had quit the Military Academy and cast his family . . . 
heritage aside--he gambled his life for power, wealth, and prestige. 
After his participation in the Mexican War, he used his military record 
in the West to try to gain political influence, but he never was 
accepted by the political elite of California. That Morehead failed in 
his attemi>ts to conquer Mexico is a comment on .his ·inability to under-
stand not only the Mexican character, but basic human nature as well. 
Thus he was a victim of the accepted American opinion of the inferior-
ity of th_e Me JO.can race. 
Charles Pindray and Raousset de Boulbon were not Americans and not 
·5Albert K. We.inberg, Manifest Destiny: A. StJ<h{ of Nationalist 
EXJ?ansionism in American History ·(Baltimore, 1935 . , PP•· 2ll-21;2. 
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motivated by a sense of mission. Yet, they, too, were desperate. 
These Frenchmen had rushed to California in search of easy we.alth in 
the gold fields, but they soon learned that the tales of easy wealth 
were la.rgely exaggeratedo Both were former aristocrats-disillusioned, 
disenchanted, and finally desperate-and they turned to converting 
their dreams of reestablishing their Jiamish~d reputations to reality 
in any way possibleo Raousset envisioned himself as the "Sultan of 
Sonora", the monarch of a French-speaking country which once was 
m>rthern Mexicoo Pindray and Raousset, although not Arrsricans also 
were products of the frontier environrrsnt. These opportunistic 
Frenchmen cared not for Mexico nor the United States, perhaps not even 
for France-their interests were personal. 
However, Mexican officials had other ideas concerning infringement 
of their borders by Americans, as well as Frenchmen, who were determined 
to fragment the Republic. However, it was common knowledge that these 
same officials were sorely incapable of maintaining stability all along 
the northern international boundary. The few Mexican attempts to 
colonize the frontier were the result of desperation~a fear magnified 
by the size and seriousness of border problems. Because Mexican 
politicians knew that a feeling of expansionism was rampant in the 
United States, they encouraged an equally hazardous undertaking, an 
attempt to colonize the area with foreigners, who in tum would fight 
the Indians and hopefully provide the much desired stability. 
Occasionally writers have suggested, from the 1850's forward, 
.. ' I 
that the motivation for trying to wrest territory from the Mexicans 
was a conspiracy to create a slave republic on the southern border of 
the United States. Doubtless both William Walker and William Gwin 
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would have supported slavery. In fact, Walker's actions indicated 
that he would protect the institution of slavery. But slavery was not 
the absolute cause for filibustering expeditions. The true motivation 
for all the expeditions can be found in the leaders' past lives more 
than in some abolitionists' paranoid views of most events in American 
history prior to the Civil Waro For example, William Walker always 
had been unable to complete anything he started. His entire life 
seemed confused. Most men would have been happy to have had a career 
and a profession. Walke.r had several, but never appeared to be satis-
fied. Although he had vigorously struggled to rise in the ranks of 
California politics, he believed his future was limited in that state. 
Therefore he sought ad.venture and opportunity in Mexico-not because 
of a premeditated desire to expand the institution of slavery. Conse-
quently adventure, opportunity, and desperation drove Walker~he is 
remembered only as the "President" and "Supreme" commander of Sonora. 
Likewise, Henry A. Crabb plunged into California politics and 
could have reached the zenith of state prestige in the realm of 
politics. Instead Crabb unhappily watched the eclipse of his political 
career. His driving ambition led him to expose his inabilities of 
leadership. Crabb made several mistakes, such as joining the Know-
Nothing political party in California when it was a dying movement. 
He mis judged his influence in Mexico through his wife' s family. He 
should have been well acquainted with all previous filibustering 
attempts. Nevertheless, with the encouragement of influential and 
conniving Mexicans in Sonora, he believed he could win sufficient 
support to control the state. Ultimately he may have hoped to annex 
Sonora to the United States; probably he was not trying to promote a 
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slave republic in Mexico. In truth, however, Crabb's real intentions 
were to enhance his own power and weal.tho He was nothing more than an 
adventurer, an opportunist, who finally lost his life in Mexico. 
William Gwin honestly tried to promote colonization of Northern 
Mexico, but he probably was driven most by financial needso When he 
saw the South in the throes of a losing war for independence, he vowed 
to himself that he would find his fortune elsewhereo With his Cali-
fornia political career apparently at an end and his Southern homeland 
threatened, he turned :in desperation to promoting a colonizing scheme 
for northern Mexicoo No-t, to be overlooked is his zeal for accomplish-
ment and adventure.. More knowledgeable of Mexico than any of the 
previous adventurers, he realized that he could not succeed without 
significant backingo Had the Archduke Maximilian agreed to and 
supported the American's plan, he may well have achieved his goals, 
at least temporarilyo Gwin was no apostle of manifest destiny, al-
though he did believe that suppression of the Indians on the frontier 
would be a great service to Mexico.. He would have supported slavery, 
but his loyalty to the South did not extend so far as Paris when he 
presented his plan to Napoleon III.. Gwin supported only himself; the 
extent of his vision was himself as "Duke of Sonora" with an income 
of sixty thousand dollars a year. 
The decade and a half after the war between the United States and 
Mexico perhaps were the last years of Manifest Destiny, but the par-
ticipants in those filibustering expeditions into northwestern 
Mexico apparently were driven less by lofty ideology than by a spirit 
of adventure o They were opportunists whose desperation drove them into 
a hostile land whose people and whose fierce nationalism they little 
understood. Thus they represent more the roily age in which they 
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